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Autobiographical memories are complex multidimensional memories an individual 
has about their past, which are used for bonding, problem solving, creating self-concepts, and 
emotion regulation. Previous research has found differences in autobiographical memory 
recall among individuals with clinical levels of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) in comparison to psychological healthy individuals. However, the extent of these 
differences among individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD, and the 
mechanisms that may underlie or influence these differences have not been established 
clearly. These gaps in the knowledge limit our understanding into the type of memory-related 
difficulties experienced, and whether subclinical samples will likely benefit from similar 
memory-related interventions as clinical samples. 
The current thesis aimed to investigate whether there are differences in various facets 
of autobiographical memory recall in individuals with subclinical levels of depression and 
PTSD as compared to psychologically healthy individuals. Investigating different facets of 
autobiographical memory enables a holistic overview of memory recall to be established for 
the subclinical populations. In addition, the current thesis also aimed to investigate whether 
potential mechanisms and factors associated with those differences could explain, strengthen, 
or weaken the differences and associations observed.  
Each chapter in this thesis investigated a different area of autobiographical memory 
recall. Chapter 2 focused on the retrieval of semantic and episodic components of memory 
recall. Study 1 in this chapter investigated differences in the characteristics of Cultural Life 
Scripts (CLS) and Individual Life Stories (ILS) recalled among individuals with subclinical 
depression and PTSD symptoms, and the role of societal identification. Participants generated 
events expected to be experienced by a prototypical infant from their culture, as well as 
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events they had (or expect to) experienced themselves, and rated these events on importance, 
emotional valence, pressure, and perceived ability. They then completed questionnaires 
measuring levels of depression, trauma, collectivism, and individualism. Results from Study 
1 showed that when compared to psychologically healthy individuals, individuals with 
subclinical depression generated CLS that were less typical, whereas individuals with 
subclinical PTSD did not have differences in the CLS. Individuals with subclinical 
depression did not retrieve different ILS, whereas individuals with subclinical PTSD 
retrieved ILS that were more negative and have higher pressure to achieve. In addition, 
collectivism moderated the relations of depression with CLS typicality, and depression and 
trauma with ILS pressure.  
Study 2 in this chapter studied whether the differences in CLS typicality observed 
among people with subclinical depression in Study 1 was linked to differences in knowledge 
of CLS events or differences in selection of typical CLS events. To examine differences in 
the knowledge, participants decided whether the events from a list were CLS events or not. 
To examine difference in the selection, participants also generated events expected to be 
experienced by a prototypical infant from their culture. They then answered questionnaires 
measuring depression and trauma symptoms. Results from Study 2 showed that there were 
differences in the knowledge of CLS events for individuals with subclinical levels of 
depression, which may explain the differences in typicality of the CLS observed in the 
previous study. 
Chapter 3 examined the type of autobiographical memories retrieved. Differences in 
recalled memory specificity among individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD 
symptoms, and whether the CaR-FA-X model (i.e., capture and rumination, functional 
avoidance, and executive functioning) would underlie those differences were studied. Study 3 
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in this chapter used minimal instructions to elicit autobiographical memories, whereas Study 
4 used specific instructions. Participants retrieved memories in response to emotional cue 
words and categorized them based on specificity. They then completed executive functioning 
tasks measuring verbal working memory and inhibition and answered questionnaires 
measuring depression, trauma, rumination, and avoidant coping levels. For both studies, there 
were no differences in memory specificity for people with subclinical depression and PTSD 
as compared to psychological healthy people, regardless of the valence and intensity of the 
cues. Trauma severity predicted the development of semantic associations in Study 3, and 
overgeneral memory in Study 4. Components of the CaR-FA-X model did not function as 
mediators for both studies and as moderators for Study 4, but rumination and inhibition 
strengthened the relations of depression and trauma with semantic associations in Study 3.  
Chapter 4 looked at subjective feelings towards autobiographical memories. 
Differences in psychological distance among individuals with subclinical depression and 
PTSD symptoms, and whether memory phenomenology and emotion regulation strategies 
would underlie those differences were examined in Study 5 in this chapter. Participants 
described their most positive and negative memories that occurred within the last three years 
and that occurred more than three years ago and rated these four memories on recollective 
experience, vantage perspective, emotional intensity, and centrality. They then answered 
questionnaires measuring levels of depression, trauma, cognitive reappraisal, and expressive 
suppression. The results showed that there were no differences in psychological distance for 
those with subclinical depression and PTSD as compared to those who are psychological 
healthy, regardless of the age or valence of the memory, but depression severity predicted 
feeling closer to recent negative memories. Recollective experience was shown to explain the 
associations of depression and trauma with psychological distance of recent negative 
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memories, whereas the other memory phenomenology and emotion regulation strategies did 
not function as mediators. Emotional intensity moderated the relations of depression with 
psychological distance of remote positive events, and field perspective moderated the 
relations of depression and trauma with psychological distance of remote negative events, 
whereas other memory phenomenology and emotion regulation strategies did not function as 
moderators.  
The findings from the current thesis showed that individuals with subclinical 
depression symptoms display small differences in the semantic aspects of their memories but 
not the episodic aspects of their memories, the types of memories they recalled, and how they 
felt towards the memories. Individuals with subclinical PTSD symptoms, on the other hand, 
show small differences in the episodic aspects of their memories but not the semantic aspects 
of their memories, the types of memories they recalled, and how they felt towards the 
memories. The differences in memory observed from the current thesis were small, and could 
be attributed to small differences in cognitive areas associated with memory recall. The 
findings from this thesis improve our understanding into memory recall in subclinical 
populations, and indicate that memory should be studied in a holistic manner. Possible 
clinical applications that can be hypothesised from the current theoratical findings are also 
discussed. 
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AMQ Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire 
AMT Autobiographical Memory Test 
CaR-FA-X Capture and Rumination – Functional Avoidance – Executive  
Functioning Model 
CES Centrality of Event Scale 
CES-D Center for Epidemiologic Studies – Depression scale 
CLS Cultural Life Scripts 
DASS-21 Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21 Items 
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
DSM-5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – 5th  
Edition 
ERQ Emotion-Regulation Questionnaire 
ILS Individual Life Stories 
MDD Major Depressive Disorder 
OGM Over-General Memory 
PCL-5 PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
RRS-SF Rumination Response Scale – Short Form 
RT Response Time 
SMS Self-Memory System 
SSRT Stop-Signal Reaction Time 
 
  




Attentional bias – increased or decreased attention allocated towards certain stimuli over 
other stimuli in the same environment 
Autobiographical memory – complex multidimensional memories an individual has about 
their past, consisting of various components of sensory, emotional, temporal, spatial, 
narrative information, and personal meaning, and are used for bonding, emotion 
regulation, problem solving, and creating self-concepts 
Avoidant coping – coping strategies that involve cognitive, emotional, and behavioural 
aversions towards distressing memories, thoughts, and emotions 
Basic executive functioning – executive functioning involved in processing less complex 
information and achieving simple goals 
Brooding – the tendency to compare their situation and symptoms to others and standards set 
by themselves, and negatively criticize themselves for the difference in situations and 
inability to achieve those set standards, and is perceived to be maladaptive 
CAR-FA-X model – model that proposes three mechanisms that explain the relationship 
between overgeneral autobiographical memory and psychopathology: capture and 
rumination (CaR), functional avoidance (FA), and executive functioning (X) 
Categorical memory – the recall of events that occurred repeatedly, or summaries of a 
number of similar events, or events that did not have a distinct time or place 
Centrality of event – the relevance and importance an event has towards a person’s current 
self-concept and life narrative, and how much the event is used as a point of reference 
for meaning making and future expectations 
Cognitive reappraisal – changing the meanings and perceptions associated with an event, 
which is turn changes the emotions attached to the event 
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Collectivism – viewing oneself as part of the group or society, and are bound by the norms 
and expectations of that said society 
Cultural Life Script – series of events that are expected by a culture to occur in a typical 
individual’s life at specified age ranges, and are used to structure the recall of 
autobiographical memory and the planning of future goals 
Depression – a fluctuation in normal mood ranging from unhappiness and discontent to an 
extreme feeling of sadness, pessimism, and despondency 
Executive functioning – a set of cognitive processes that are responsible for the planning, 
initiation, sequencing, and monitoring of complex goal-directed behaviour in the face 
of distracting information 
Expressive suppression – inhibiting or repressing any behaviours or actions that involve 
expressing emotions  
Extended memory – the recall of one event that lasted longer than a day 
Field perspective – viewing the memory from a first-person point of view or as the person 
primarily experiencing the memory during memory recall 
Functional avoidance – passive aversion towards negative memories, by halting the memory 
search process to remain at a general description level void of negative affect 
Individual life story – experienced autobiographical memories that form personal narratives 
Individualism – focusing on the wants, needs, and expectations of the self, prior to those of 
the society 
Inhibition – the ability to screen and supress task irrelevant information and responses 
Observer perspective – viewing the memory from a third-person point of view or from the 
standpoint of an audience during memory recall 
Omission – when there was no event recalled or no response was given  
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Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory – retrieved memories that lack specific events or 
details of time, place, and people involved, and have higher categoric components 
instead, and typically constitute of categorical memories and extended memories  
Perceived ability – a person’s perception and confidence of having the ability to engage in 
the actions and behaviours needed to achieve certain goals and outcomes  
Pressure – excessive demands and expectations that are real or imagined, by a group or 
individual, for a person to think or behave in a specific way  
Psychological distance – how far away and long ago the event feels from the current time, 
and how far away the self that experienced the event feels from the current self, 
independent of the objective time and distance 
Psychologically healthy – having below average to average range of symptoms of a 
psychological disorder 
Recollective experience – the ability to mentally travel back to the event and relive or re-
experience the past event in the present 
Reflection – the ability to reduce depressive symptoms and feelings by turning inward to 
conduct cognitive problem solving, and is perceived to be adaptive 
Rumination – persistent and continuous thoughts regarding the individuals’ difficulties and 
symptoms, as well as factors that lead to and result from their current state 
Self-Memory System – model that proposes that the retrieval of autobiographical memories 
depends on the working self and the long-term self  
Semantic association – the recall of any verbal or schematic associations, descriptions of cue 
word, or names of persons, animals or objects, or future thoughts 
Specific memory – the recall of one event that had happened at a particular time and place, 
and lasted less than a day 
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Subclinical – having above average symptoms of a psychological disorder, but the symptoms 
are insufficient to meet the diagnosis of the disorder in question 
Trauma – a negative experience that results in high helplessness, fear, confusion, and 
dissociation, and further changes one’s perception that the world is safe, fair, and 
predictable 
Typicality – how much the life script or life story generated matches the average Cultural 
Life Script 
Vantage perspective – viewpoint that a person sees when they recall a memory 
Verbal working memory – maintaining and manipulating verbal-based information during a 
certain span of time 
Vertical collectivism – acceptance of hierarchies and inequalities within a society and the 
willingness to sacrifice personal goals to meet the group goals even if it is against 
one’s personal values, as a sense of duty to the society
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Autobiographical Memory 
Autobiographical Memories 
Autobiographical memories are complex multidimensional recollections an individual 
has about their past (Rubin, 2005). These memories contain personal meaning and consist of 
different levels of narrative, emotional, spatial, temporal, and sensory information, such as 
auditory, visual, olfactory, and tactile characteristics (Rubin, 2005). Autobiographical 
memories involve not only the recollection of experienced events but also the processing and 
integration of viewpoints, insights, and appraisals across time and self to form a personal 
narrative or history (Fivush, 2011). These different dimensions or facets come together to 
form a coherent autobiographical memory. An example of a multidimensional 
autobiographical memory that belongs to the current researcher is as follows: 
“Two months ago (temporal), I went to the beach near my university (spatial) with 
seven of my classmates. Although we had been friends for years, this was the first time we 
took a trip together (narrative). It was the middle of the last semester of our degree 
(temporal), and we were all drowning under the workload and feeling stressed (emotional), 
which is why a trip to the beach seemed like a good break (narrative). Fortunately, it was a 
sunny day with clear skies (visual), the wind bringing about a slight chill to counter the heat 
of the sun (tactile). Since it was still early in the morning when we went (temporal), the beach 
was reasonably quiet and peaceful (auditory). Breathing in the salty air of the ocean 
(olfactory) the moment I stepped on the beach instantaneously brought about a calming effect 
on me (emotional).” 
Autobiographical memories are categorized as episodic memories (Rubin, 2005), 
which are defined as personal experiences of singular events that are stored in relation to 
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other memories and systems, but they can be discriminated as being a unique event during 
recall (Tulving, 1972). However, Fivush (2011) argued that autobiographical memories are 
not equivalent to but an advanced version of episodic memories, because they go beyond 
recalling personal experiences to incorporate higher levels of mental time travel, awareness 
of the self that had experienced the memory, and linkage of events temporally to create and 
consolidate an individual’s life story or narrative.  
Although autobiographical memories are considered as episodic memories, they 
include both episodic and semantic components (Conway, 1987; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, 
Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002). Whereas episodic components constitute of temporal, 
sensory, emotional, interpersonal, and intrapersonal information of the autobiographical 
memory, semantic components or autobiographical facts constitute of scripts, categorical, and 
factual knowledge that contain self-references (Conway, 1987, 2001; Tulving, 1972). For 
example, an autobiographical memory of “I celebrated my birthday this year by eating my 
favourite cake with my family at home” may be accompanied by autobiographical facts such 
as “my birthday is on the 15th of January” and “my favourite cake is the red velvet cake from 
the bakery down the street” and “my family consists of my father, mother, and brother”. In 
another example, a memory of “I watched a movie at the cinema yesterday” will likely be 
composed of a script of “buying movie tickets”, “buying popcorn and drinks”, “finding 
seats”, and “watching the movie”, all of which are typical behaviours that are associated with 
going to the cinema. These semantic components are included into the main autobiographical 
memory despite not being explicitly described. 
 
Self-Memory System Model 
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One model used to explain the process of retrieval of autobiographical memories is 
the Self-Memory System (SMS; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & 
Tagini, 2004). The SMS proposes that retrieval of autobiographical memories involves the 
interaction of the working self and the long-term self. The working self refers to the goals 
that need to be achieved at the current moment. The long-term self, meanwhile, consists of 
the conceptual self and the autobiographical knowledge base. The conceptual self refers to 
the schemas and beliefs about relations and views of the self, others, and the world.  
Autobiographical knowledge base contains the memories that individuals possess, 
stored in a hierarchy of varying levels of memory details or specificity (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). The hierarchy consists of four levels, with the upper level containing general 
information and the bottom level containing specific information. The memory search 
process follows a top-down approach, which allows the retrieved memory to become 
progressively specific with more levels that it searches. The hierarchy from top to bottom are 
conceptual themes, lifetime periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge (Conway 
& Loveday, 2015; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Structurally, the hierarchy has several 
conceptual themes; with each conceptual theme consisting of several lifetime periods; each 
lifetime period consisting of several general events; and each general event consisting of 
several event-specific knowledge (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). 
At the conceptual themes level, memories are organized according to overarching 
thematic knowledge that are used to create more coherent life stories, such as “education 
theme”, “relationship theme”, and “work theme”. Within the conceptual themes is the 
lifetime period level, whereby memories from each theme are further organized according to 
temporal knowledge and periods of time that have starting and ending points. For example, 
memories within the “education theme” could be categorized as “that time I was enrolled in 
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summer school” or “when I was studying at university”. Each lifetime period further contains 
a general event level, which consists of memories and events that can either be singular, 
repeated, or extended, but lacks the details necessary to make the event unique or identifiable. 
Continuing from the previous example, general memories within “when I was studying at 
university” could include “graduating” (i.e., singular event), or “attending lectures” (i.e., 
repeated event), or “going on a class trip” (i.e., extended event). Finally, within each general 
event is the event-specific knowledge level, which contains specific details and elements that 
makes each memory and event unique and identifiable. Examples of possible details that 
could be stored at this level include the place, time, people involved, sensory information, 
phenomenological details, emotions, and cognitions. Although the concepts are not viewed as 
parallel, lifetime periods and general events are suggested to be similar to semantic or 
autobiographical facts, whereas event specific knowledge has been suggested to be similar to 
episodic components (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
When the current goal of retrieval (i.e., working self) interacts with the beliefs about 
oneself and the world (i.e., conceptual self) and the autobiographical knowledge base, the 
memory search process within the base is activated. If the memory search process completes 
successfully and reaches the bottom level, a unique autobiographical memory with specific 
elements and details will be retrieved.  
 
Eliciting Autobiographical Memories 
Retrieval of autobiographical memories can be elicited using several different 
methods, depending on the type of memory that needs to be retrieved. Although these 
methods are typically used in laboratory settings, they can also be observed in the context of 
social situations, daily living events, and self-reflections (Wenzel & Rubin, 2005). There are 
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numerous methods that can be used depending on the facet or dimension of autobiographical 
memory that needs to be elicited (e.g., structured interviews, diaries, and self-body camera), 
but the three more typical methods used in the literature are requests for most important 
events, Galton-Crovitz word cueing, and questionnaires (Wenzel & Rubin, 2005). These 
three methods are discussed in more detail because they elicit the facet of memories that are 
studied in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
The first method, asking about most important events, are used to elicit a person’s life 
narrative or life story. Individuals are asked to retrieve the most important or significant or 
central events that they have experienced in their lifetime, from birth to present (e.g., Rubin 
& Schulkind, 1997a; Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutson, 2009; Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008). 
Variations of this method have been used to elicit the retrieval of the most emotional 
memories (e.g., Janssen, Hearne, & Takarangi, 2015; Niziurski, Johannessen, & Berntsen, 
2018), the most traumatic memories (e.g., Chu, Buchman-Schmitt, & Joiner, 2015; Rubin, 
2011), and the most vivid memories (e.g., Hoekstra, Harris, & Helmick, 1999; Kaya, 2018). 
The second method is Galton-Crovitz word cueing, which is used to elicit memories 
that are associated with the cues. Individuals are presented with cue words, one at a time, and 
asked to describe one memory for each cue word (e.g., Rubin & Schulkind, 1997a, 1997b). 
Often, individuals are instructed to recall events that occurred at a specific time and place and 
lasted less than a day (e.g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986), but the instructions can also be 
modified to allow free association towards any event (e.g., Debeer, Hermans, & Raes, 2009). 
A wide array of cues can be used, such as cues that are neutral (e.g., Zheng & Gray, 2018; 
Neshat-Doost, Dalgleish, & Golden, 2008), emotional (e.g., Champagne et al., 2016; 
Schönfeld, Ehlers, Böllinghaus, & Rief, 2007), self-relevant (e.g., Sumner, Griffith, & 
Mineka, 2010), or disorder-specific (e.g., Huber et al., 2015). In variations of this method, 
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cues can be also be presented in the form of visual or pictorial stimuli (e.g., Schönfeld & 
Ehlers, 2006; Ridout, Dritschel, Matthews, & O’Carroll, 2016), olfactory stimuli (e.g., El 
Haj, Gandolphe, Gallouj, Kapogiannis, & Antoine, 2018; Greenberg et al., 2011), or auditory 
stimuli (e.g., Herz, 2004; Willander, Sikström, & Karlsson, 2015).  
The third method, questionnaires, can either be used as complementary to the other 
methods or be administered independently. The former involves questions in reference to 
particular memories that have been retrieved (e.g., Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003), 
whereas the latter involves questions towards overall memory retrieval (e.g., Berntsen, Hoyle, 
& Rubin, 2019). Questions can be structured or semi-structured, and the type of questions 
that can be included into the questionnaires vary depending on the type of information 
needed. This information can include phenomenological characteristics of the memory, extra 
details of the memory, and insights and knowledge related to the memory (Wenzel & Rubin, 
2005).  
 
Purpose of Retrieving Autobiographical Memory 
Autobiographical memories in naturalistic settings can similarly be elicited using 
those methods previously discussed, but more often the memories in this setting are retrieved 
to tap into the four functions that these memories have (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 
2005). First, autobiographical memories are used to direct both present and future behaviours 
and thought processes. Past experiences of dealing with similar people, events, or problems 
are used as references to solve current problems as well as predict future events, and how to 
react to them. Second, autobiographical memories are linked to the process of defining and 
conceptualizing the self in a bidirectional relation. Autobiographical memories are used as 
references to create, evolve, and reinforce one’s self-concept and narrative. At the same time, 
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the current self-concept determines which autobiographical memories are more coherent and 
easily accessible for recall. Third, autobiographical memories help to bond with others in 
society. Sharing personal experiences and reminiscing about shared experiences creates, 
enhances, and maintains both emotional and social relations.  
Last, autobiographical memories relate to emotion regulation and well-being, in a 
bidirectional relation (Fivush, 2011; Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Pasupathi, 2003). Good 
abilities to integrate personal memories and create coherent life narratives that provide 
meaning to difficult and unpleasant experiences leads to better mental health, and vice versa 
(Pascuzzi & Smorti, 2017; Pasupathi, 2003; Waters & Fivush, 2013). However, the exact 
mechanisms underlying these relations are not fully understood yet. 
 
Mental Health and Psychopathology 
Psychopathology 
Mental health is a psychological state consisting of good emotional and behavioural 
adjustments, adequate coping skills towards daily stresses, and minimal psychological 
distress symptoms (American Psychological Association, 2013; World Health Organization, 
2018). Poor mental health and high psychological distress could lead to the development of 
psychopathology. Psychopathology is characterized as abnormalities and disturbances in 
cognition, emotion, behaviours, and functionality (American Psychological Association, 
2013). When these abnormalities exceed the ‘average’ or ‘acceptable’ range, also known as 
clinical cut-offs, and are further accompanied by significant psychological distress and 
impairments in daily functionality, a diagnosis of a specific psychopathology may be given. 
Approximately 450 million people worldwide suffer from some form of psychopathology, 
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with the onset of pervasive disorders (not including developmental and childhood disorders) 
starting as early as 14 years old (World Health Organization, 2001, 2019).  
Psychopathology has traditionally been viewed in terms of disorders with strict 
clinical cut-offs and classifications, as set by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, over time, the DSM 
classifications of disorders have come into heavy criticism due to its practitioner-consensus 
origins, poor grounds in empirical evidence, and a lack of recognition of variations in 
symptomology and functioning across individuals (Krueger & Markon, 2006; Lobo & Agius, 
2012; Rössler, 2013; Timimi, 2014). Hence, in addition to the clinical cut-offs, mental health 
is now also viewed as a continuous model, whereby psychological disorders or problems lie 
on a spectrum, with people experiencing different mental states and different degrees of 
symptoms on the same spectrum.  
This view indicates that besides clinical samples, a normal sample would also fall 
somewhere on the spectrum and may exhibit certain number of symptoms despite not being 
at clinical levels, suggesting that investigation of psychopathological variables in normal 
samples are equally as warranted as clinical samples. Individuals from the normal sample on 
the spectrum can exhibit symptoms within the average or ‘normal’ range (i.e., no symptoms 
or minimal symptoms), or within the subclinical range (i.e., above the average or ‘normal’ 
range of symptoms). Subclinical refers to individuals who do not have sufficient symptoms to 
meet the clinical cut-offs or clasifications needed to be diagnosed with a disorder but have 
high enough symptoms to be at risk for developing the disorder in question (Ji, 2012). 
Normal samples, inclusive of samples obtained from university students, have been shown to 
have similar types and number of symptoms and similar relations as clinical samples for 
psychopathological variables such as trauma (Boals, Contractor, & Blumenthal, 2020). This 
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similarity indicates that subclinical range of symptoms are comparable to clinical range of 
symptoms, and hence, studying psychopathological variables in normal or subclinical 
samples could produce similar results and trends as studying them in clinical samples. 
Despite majority of the literature using clinical samples when testing clinical variables 
and impairments, there may also be some value in investigating similar variables in 
subclinical samples. By doing so, impairments in functionality, cognition, and behaviours 
that are experienced before symptoms reach severe or clinical levels can be identified. This 
knowledge can be used to screen for potential disorders and to develop early treatment plans 
to manage the impairments (Ji, 2012; McCubbin et al., 2016). Symptoms and impairments 
experienced at subclinical levels can then be prevented from escalating, and this in turn can 
improve overall mental health and quality of life (Cuijpers et al., 2014; Cuijpers & Smit, 
2008; Ji, 2012; McCubbin et al., 2016).  
 
Depression 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5th edition (DSM-5) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) has a total of 21 umbrella-disorders or larger 
categories of disorders, each consisting of several specific psychopathologies. One example 
of a common umbrella-disorder is depressive disorders, which refer to an overarching 
category containing psychopathologies that revolve around moods of sadness, irritableness, 
and emptiness, along with changes in cognition and physiology, all of which affect 
functionality negatively. Depression, the primary factor of depressive disorders, is defined as 
“a fluctuation in normal mood ranging from unhappiness and discontent to an extreme feeling 
of sadness, pessimism, and despondency” (American Psychological Association, 2013, p. 
165).  
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It is a condition which affects approximately 264 million or 4.4% of the population 
globally (James et al., 2018; World Health Organization, 2017). From this global depression 
prevalence, the highest amount was traced back to the South-East Asia region (27%) and the 
Western Pacific region (21%) (World Health Organization, 2017). Although globally 
depression is most prevalent among older adults aged 60 to 64 years old, in populations from 
the United States, highest prevalence was recorded among adolescents aged 15 to 17 years 
old and young adults aged 18 to 25 years old (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, 2019; World Health Organization, 2017). Furthermore, age of onset of 
depression is highest in young adults (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Symptoms of depressive disorders typically include depressed mood, loss of interest 
in pleasurable activities, changes in psychomotor behaviours (i.e., agitation or retardation), 
changes in sleep (i.e., insomnia or hypersomnia), changes in weight or appetite (i.e., increase 
or decrease), difficulty concentrating or making decisions, easily tired, feelings of 
worthlessness or unreasonable guilt, and suicidal ideation or attempts (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Besides these symptoms, the other two criteria of depressive disorders 
are high psychological distress and impairments in functioning (i.e., daily, social, and 
occupational).  
High levels of these symptoms (i.e., 6 symptoms lasting 2 weeks) may classify an 
individual for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), whereas prolonged 
experience of these symptoms (i.e., 3 symptoms lasting 2 years) results in a diagnosis of 
Persistent Depressive Disorder (PDD) or dysthymia (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Above average levels of these symptoms that do not meet the clinical cut-off are 
viewed as subclinical depression, which are precursors for developing MDD and other mental 
health issues (Cuijpers et al., 2014; Cuijpers & Smit, 2008; Ji, 2012).  





Another common umbrella-disorder is trauma and stressor disorders, which refer to an 
overarching category containing psychopathologies that involve exposure to traumatic events, 
resulting in psychological distress and changes in cognition and physiology, all of which 
causes impairments in daily functioning. Trauma, the primary factor of trauma and stressor 
disorders, is defined as a negative experience that results in high levels of helplessness, fear, 
confusion, and dissociation, and that changes one’s perception that the world is safe, fair, and 
predictable (American Psychological Association, 2013).  
Approximately 70.4% of people globally experience at least one traumatic event in 
their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2017), but not everyone who experiences a traumatic event 
develops long-term trauma symptoms. It is estimated that 4% of people globally develop 
clinical-level trauma symptoms and trauma-related disorders upon exposure to a traumatic 
event. Globally, there is greater risk of trauma-related disorders developing in adolescents 
and older adults aged 65 years old and above. However, exposure to the traumatic events that 
have the highest risk of developing into trauma-related disorders (e.g., intimate partners or 
sexual violence) occurs most often in young adults aged 17 to 31 years old (Kessler et al., 
2017).  
Symptoms of trauma-related disorders begin upon exposure to traumatic events. 
Exposure can take different forms: direct experience, witnessing the event, associations with 
people who experienced the event, and receiving aversive details of the event repeatedly 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Trauma symptoms encompass four general areas; 
re-experiencing of traumatic event, avoidance of trauma related stimuli, having negative 
thoughts and emotions, and experiencing increased arousal. The first area, re-experiencing 
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traumatic events, encompasses any involuntary or intrusive memories, dreams, and 
flashbacks about the traumatic event that causes psychological distress. Avoidance of 
traumatic stimuli involves avoidance and aversion towards any thoughts, emotions, 
memories, and cues related to the traumatic event. The area of negative thoughts and 
emotions includes negative and distorted beliefs, negative and detached feelings, and loss of 
interest in pleasurable activities. The last area, experiencing increased arousal, is categorized 
by changes or difficulties in sleeping, attention, control of anger, and decision-making. Two 
other criteria of trauma-related disorders in addition to exposure and symptoms are high 
psychological distress and impairments in daily, social, and occupational functioning 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
According to the American Psychiatric Association (2013), high levels of these 
symptoms (i.e., 9 symptoms lasting less than 1 month) may be indicative of Acute Stress 
Disorder. If these symptoms persist (i.e., 6 symptoms lasting 1 month), they may be 
indicative of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Above average levels of these 
symptoms that do not meet the clinical cut-off are classified as subclinical PTSD or 
subclinical trauma, which are precursors for developing PTSD (McCubbin et al., 2016).  
 
Comparing Disorders of Depression and Trauma 
Depressive disorders and trauma-related disorders are separate umbrella disorders that 
consists of different types of specific disorders, diagnostic criteria, and aetiology (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Despite those differences, depressive disorders and trauma-
related disorders do share similarities and overlap in certain areas.  
Although the symptoms that characterize depressive disorders are focused on mood 
and the symptoms that characterize trauma disorders are focused on reactions following 
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trauma, there is an overlap of several symptoms between the two. For example, MDD and 
PTSD share four symptoms, which are loss of interest in pleasurable activities, feelings of 
unreasonable guilt, difficulties in sleeping, and difficulties in concentration (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Flory & Yehuda, 2015). Both also have a similar symptom 
involving the emotional state, whereby MDD is characterized as experiencing depressed 
mood, whereas PTSD is characterized as experiencing more general negative mood.  
Besides overlap in symptomology, both psychopathologies have impairments in 
cognitive functioning. Although not included in the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for disorders 
related to depression and trauma, both types of psychopathology have been associated with 
impairments and differences in the domains of executive functioning, processing speed, 
visuospatial processing, learning abilities, language, attention, and verbal and non-verbal 
memory recall (Schultz, Sepehry, & Greer, 2018). In addition to these domains, depression 
and trauma have also been associated with differences in autobiographical memory recall. 
 
Autobiographical Memory, Depression, and Trauma  
Differences in Autobiographical Memory 
 As previously described, autobiographical memories are muldimensional and consist 
of different facets with varying levels integrated together to form overall coherent 
recollections (Rubin, 2005). Any difficulties or differences in these facets of autobiographical 
memories could potentially affect the functions that these memories have, which could in turn 
affect daily functioning and quality of life. 
Individuals with psychological disorders, such as depression and PTSD, have been 
shown to have differences in some of the facets of autobiographical memory. Although there 
are many different dimensions and facets of autobiographical memories, only four will be 
Chapter 1: Introduction - 33 
 
 
explored in this thesis. These facets are episodic aspects, semantic aspects, types, and 
subjective feelings of autobiographical memories.  
 
Differences in Episodic Memories and Semantic Knowledge 
Individuals with depression and trauma symptoms have differences in the recall of 
episodic aspects of memories, such as Individual Life Stories (ILS). ILS are significant 
autobiographical memories that form the individual’s personal narrative (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2002). They are events that people narrate to others when asked to describe themselves and 
their lives. According to the SMS model, ILS are represented at the conceptual self and the 
higher levels of the autobiographical knowledge base that contains semantic or 
autobiographical facts about the self (Conway & Jobson, 2012). ILS are primarily utilized for 
the function of creating and maintaining one’s identity, which are the autobiographical facts 
about oneself, as well as creating emotional bonds (Conway & Jobson, 2012; Habermas, 
2012).  
ILS usually contain events that are positive and typical, which refers to events that are 
expected to be experienced by most people in the society (e.g., Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 
2011). When imagining future experiences as part of one’s ILS, a similar pattern is observed 
(e.g., Bohn & Berntsen, 2013). However, people with clinical depression and people with 
more depression and trauma symptoms recall less typical and more negative memories in the 
ILS (e.g., Dalgleish, Hill, Golden, Morant, & Dunn, 2011; Habermas, Ott, Schubert, 
Schneider, & Pate, 2008; Rubin et al., 2009).  
Those with depression and trauma symptoms may also have differences in semantic 
aspects of memories, such as Cultural Life Scripts (CLS). CLS are culturally shared semantic 
knowledge about events that most people experience and society deems as important, 
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transitional, and occur at predictable ages (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002). They are used as a 
framework to recall ILS events as well as plan for future events to achieve (Berntsen & 
Jacobsen, 2008; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003). The CLS is proposed to be able to trigger the 
autobiographical knowledge base to start the memory search process and create specific 
memories (Conway & Jobson, 2012). It is able to serve as a trigger or cue due to it being 
represented as part of the conceptual self and the working self in the SMS model. The CLS is 
part of the former due to its role as the ILS framework and it being a type of schema of the 
world, and is part of the latter as the present goal of organizing memories according to 
societal expectations (Conway & Jobson, 2012).  
Generally, people generate CLS events that are positive and typical of the culture they 
belong to (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004). Higher depression and trauma scores are, however, 
associated with generating CLS events that are less typical, but this association was 
concluded to still fall within the normal range (Rubin et al., 2009).  
 
Differences in Types of Autobiographical Memory 
Besides differences in episodic and semantic aspects of autobiographical memory, 
there are differences in the types of autobiographical memories retrieved by people with 
depression and trauma symptoms. Typically, people recall specific memories, which are 
unique memories that have occurred at a specific time and place, and contain specific 
phenomenological and sensory details (Williams et al., 2007). The inability or difficulty in 
recalling these specific memories results in the recall of overgeneral memories (OGM). OGM 
refers to autobiographical memories that are summaries or categoric in nature, lack specific 
phenomenological characteristics, and contain events that occurred longer than a day (Ono, 
Devilly, & Shum, 2016; Sumner, 2012; Sumner et al., 2010; Williams & Broadbent, 1986).  
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The recall of specific memories is the product of the completion of the memory search 
process within the autobiographical knowledge base, which requires the interaction of both 
the long-term self and working self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004; 
Williams et al., 2007). Thus, OGM becomes the substitute product of specific memories due 
to the incompletion of this memory search process. Specific memories tap into all the 
functions associated with autobiographical memories (i.e., problem solving, identity 
formation, socialization, and emotion regulation), and, hence, difficulties in recalling specific 
memories could result in inabilities to perform those functions (Fivush, 2011; Sutherland & 
Bryant, 2008). 
Those with clinical depression and PTSD and those with more depression and trauma 
symptoms have difficulties retrieving these specific memories and instead retrieve more 
OGM (e.g., Fisk, Ellis, & Reynolds, 2019; Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006; 
Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013; Williams et al., 2007). In terms of underlying 
mechanisms, components, such as rumination, functional avoidance, and executive 
functioning, have been shown to underlie the associations of depression and trauma with 
OGM and less specific memories independently (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2016; 
Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Watson et al., 2013).  
 
Differences in Feelings Towards Autobiographical Memories 
In addition to differences in episodic, semantic, and types of memories recalled, there 
also might be differences in how people with depression and trauma symptoms feel about the 
memories that they retrieve. Psychological distance is how near and recent autobiographical 
memories feel, independent of actual temporal distance, as well as how similar the past self in 
the events is to the current self (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Van Boven & Caruso, 2015). It is 
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quite likely that psychological distance relates to the conceptual self in the SMS model, with 
the distance of events depending on whether it fits aspects of the conceptual self.  
Individuals typically perceive themselves to be closer to memories that are recent and 
positive, and feel further away from memories that are older and negative. In contrast, those 
with higher levels of depression perceived themselves to be further away from positive 
memories, whereas those with higher levels of trauma perceived themselves to be nearer to 
negative memories (e.g., Janssen et al., 2015).  
 
The Current Thesis 
Rationale of Current Thesis 
 Autobiographical memory differences have been seen in clinical depression and 
PTSD populations. However, there is a lesser number of studies that have examined 
subclinical depression and PTSD samples, which means there are large gaps in our 
understanding of memory recall in these subclinical samples, and how much their memory 
impairments overlap with clinical samples. Filling these gaps will inform us whether the 
same type of memory-related difficulties is experienced by both samples, and whether the 
subclinical samples will likely benefit from the same type of memory-related interventions as 
the clinical samples.  
There is a substantial amount of literature in memory impairments and differences for 
depression and PTSD populations specifically, as compared to other types of 
psychopathologies. This large amount of studies suggests that people with depression and 
PTSD symptoms are more likely to experience memory impairments, along with the 
difficulties in daily functioning that typically accompanies those impairments. Therefore, 
there is a high likelihood that the subclinical populations of depression and PTSD will also 
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experience memory impairments, which increases the importance of studying memory recall 
in these populations before expanding to the populations of other psychopathologies. 
Futhermore, the different facets of autobiographical memory are typically studied 
individually. However, when considering the multidimensionality of autobiographcial 
memories, only studying one area or facet is not able to provide information beyond that one 
area, which makes it more difficult to obtain a macro-level understanding of memory recall. 
Therefore, investigating several different facets of autobiographical memory will enable a 
more holistic overview of memory recall and its differences to be established for subclinical 
depression and PTSD populations.  
 
Research Gaps 
Although the literature review has indicated that these differences in autobiographical 
memory exist in relations to depression and trauma, our current understanding of these areas 
–why and when these differences exist and the mechanisms involved in these differences– are 
still minimal. First, the differences in autobiographical memory from the literature were 
observed mostly for individuals with clinical depression and PTSD. Whether there are 
differences in autobiographical memory for individuals with subclinical symptoms of 
depression and PTSD, and how strong these differences will be present, has not been 
established in detail. Furthermore, it is not yet known how much these differences extend to 
the systems associated with autobiographical memory.  
Second, on the mental health spectrum, the subclinical range exist in between the 
clinical range and the psychologically healthy range. Whether the autobiographical memory 
recall of those with subclinical symptoms will be more similar to those with clinical 
symptoms or those who are psychologically healthy is, however, not yet known. If there are 
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any variations in autobiographical memory seen among people experiencing subclinical 
symptoms of depression or PTSD, whether those variations are same or different from the 
variations seen in clinical samples is still unclear. Third, although depression and PTSD are 
two distinct psychopathologies, both share similar impairments in cognitive functioning. 
Whether the variations observed in autobiographical memory recall for individuals with 
subclinical symptoms of depression will be similar to individuals with subclinical symptoms 
of PTSD has not been explored in detail.  
Fourth, the underlying mechanisms of why these differences in memory recall may 
exist among individuals with subclinical symptoms of depression and PTSD have not been 
fully understood yet. Whether similar mechanisms will be observed across the different 
memory components is also yet to be established. Last, factors that may strengthen or weaken 
these differences in autobiographical memory recall for people with subclinical depression 
and subclinical PTSD symptoms are still being investigated, with the weight of their roles yet 
to be established.  
 
Aim of Current Thesis 
 In line with these research gaps, the general objective of this thesis is therefore to gain 
a better understanding into the differences of autobiographical memory recall among 
individuals with subclinical symptoms of depression and PTSD, the overlap and variations in 
these differences, the underlying mechanisms of these differences, and the factors that may 
affect these differences. The specific aim of this thesis is to investigate whether differences in 
various facets of autobiographical memory may exist in individuals with subclinical 
depression and PTSD symptoms when compared to psychologically healthy individuals. This 
thesis aims to examine differences in the (1) episodic and semantic components of 
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autobiographical memory, (2) types of memory recalled, in terms of specificity, and (3) 
feelings towards memories, in the context of psychological distance, between individuals 
with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms and psychologically healthy individuals. In 
addition to identifying these differences, the overlap and variation of these memory 
differences with those observed in clinical samples from the literature will be discussed. 
Overlaps and variations of these memory differences between subclinical depression and 
PTSD groups in the current thesis will also be discussed. 
Another specific aim of this thesis is to investigate the underlying mechanisms of the 
differences in autobiographical memory recall among individuals with subclinical symptoms 
of depression and PTSD. Areas of cognitive functioning will be tested as potential underlying 
mechanisms of differences in types of memory recalled, and facets of memory 
phenomenology and emotion regulation will be tested as underlying mechanisms for 
differences in feelings towards the memory. The last specific aim of this thesis is to identify 
factors that may strengthen or weaken the differences in autobiographical memory recall 
among those with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms. Whether factors such as 
societal identification (episodic and semantic components), cognitive functioning (types of 
memory), and memory phenomenology (feelings towards memory) have the ability to 
strengthen or weaken the differences, respectively, will be explored. 
 
Participants 
In the current thesis, participants are recruited from the normal population and 
conceptualized as subclinical and psychologically healthy groups to examine whether there 
were clear memory differences upon crossing the subclinical symptom threshold. The 
subclinical depression group encompasses individuals with above average to high range of 
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depression symptoms, whereas the corresponding psychologically healthy group 
encompasses individuals with none to minimal range of depression symptoms. Similarly, the 
subclinical PTSD group consists of individuals with above average to high range of trauma 
symptoms, whereas the corresponding psychologically healthy group encompasses 
individuals with none to minimal range of trauma symptoms.  
Cut-off scores from the respective measures were used as opposed to a median split to 
allocate the participants into subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. To determine 
subclinical groups (above average symptoms), a fixed cut-off of average and above average 
depression and trauma symptoms which reflect the norms of the disorder within the general 
population are needed. This information can be obtained from the cut-offs of the 
questionnaires, which is the reason this method was selected for subclincal group allocation. 
Using a median split, on the other hand, would result in the groups being distributed 
according to the norms of only the current samples, forming high and low groups (sample 
based) instead of subclinical and psychologically healthy groups (population based). 
The choice to use the term subclinical and psychologically healthy groups instead of 
high and low groups was made because the conceptualization of the latter has too wide of a 
scope as compared to the former. A “high” group can encompass those who have symptoms 
(i.e., higher than no symptoms), those who have high symptoms within the sample (i.e., 
relative to the norms of the current sample), those who have above average symptoms (i.e., 
relative to the norms of the population), and those with clinical symptoms (i.e., compared to 
those without clinical symptoms). In comparison, the term “subclinical” refers to those with 
above average symptoms from normal populations who are at risk for developing 
psychological disorders (Ji, 2012), which better represents the aims of this thesis. 
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However, looking at the data in terms of groups only provides information of whether 
the pattern of relations of one group with certain range of scores (e.g., scores between 1 and 
10) are different or same to another group that has a different range of scores (e.g., scores 
between 11 and 20). It does not provide information about whether individuals within the 
same group (e.g., a score of 2 versus a score of 7) would have similar pattern in relations, or 
whether scores with a smaller difference across groups (e.g., a score of 10 versus a score of 
11) would have the same pattern in relations as those with a bigger difference across groups 
(e.g., a score of 1 versus a score of 20). Due to these reasons, the current study also 
conceptualizes depression and trauma as existing on a continuum, in addition to the 
categorical conceptualization of subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. Viewing the 
data both ways enables a more nuanced view of the differences and similarities in the 
relations to be captured. To accommodate these two approaches, group comparisons, such as 
independent-samples t-tests and Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs), as well as regression 
analyses will therefore be conducted. 
The current thesis focuses on memory recall in samples of young adults (i.e., 17 to 30 
years old), because this age group recorded high prevalences of depression and PTSD, and 
have high exposure to traumatic events that result in PTSD (Kessler et al., 2017; Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2019; World Health Organization, 2017). 
Hence, young adults with depression and trauma symptoms are likely to experience the 
possible autobiographical memory differences and difficulties associated with depression and 
trauma that we will test in this thesis.  
The studies in Chapter 2 require the culture of the participants to be controlled to 
match a culture or country with an already established CLS. The Malaysian CLS is one of the 
CLS that has been established from the literature (Janssen & Haque, 2018), and hence, fully 
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Malaysian samples will be recruited for both studies in that chapter. Malaysia has a 
depression prevalence ranging between 8% and 10%, and falls into the Western Pacific 
region, which reported the second highest depression prevalence among the global regions 
(Ng, 2014; World Health Organization, 2017). Depression appears to be a prevalent 
psychopathology among the Malaysian population and, hence, is also suitable to be used in 
studies examining depression. Other studies in this thesis will not control for culture, but will 
mostly consist of Malaysian participants. 
 
Variables and Components Tested  
Each chapter in this thesis examines different areas and components of 
autobiographical memory, to be able to create a profile of autobiographical memory recall of 
people with subclinical symptoms of depression and PTSD across episodic components, 
semantic components, specificity, and subjective closeness. The first and second studies (i.e., 
Chapter 2) in this thesis investigate differences in CLS and ILS in individuals with 
subclinical symptoms of depression and PTSD. The studies not only look at general 
characteristics (i.e., importance and emotional valence) and typicality, but also includes 
pressure and perceived ability associated with these memory components. The role of societal 
identification, consisting of collectivism and individualism components, in strengthening or 
weakening differences in CLS and ILS will be tested.  
The third and fourth studies (i.e., Chapter 3) investigate the phenomenon of OGM and 
memory specificity in individuals with subclinical symptoms of depression and PTSD. The 
roles of emotion valence (i.e., positive and negative) and intensity (i.e., high and low) of cues 
and instructions of memory recall (i.e., minimal and specific) on memory specificity of 
people with subclinical symptoms are also examined. The CaR-FA-X model, consisting of 
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the components of rumination, functional avoidance, and executive functioning, will be tested 
as to whether its components could explain, strengthen, or weaken differences in memory 
specificity.  
The fifth study (i.e., Chapter 4) investigates differences in psychological distance of 
significant memories in individuals with subclinical symptoms of depression and PTSD. The 
roles of emotion valence (i.e., positive and negative) and age of memory (i.e., recent and 
remote) on psychological distance of those with subclinical symptoms will be tested. 
Emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression, and 
memory phenomenology, such as recollective experience, vantage perspective, emotional 
intensity, and centrality, are also examined as to whether they could explain, strengthen, or 
weaken differences in psychological distance.  
 
Materials and Analyses Used  
 Materials. The studies included in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will be conducted using the 
desktop computers in the research laboratory of the university, except for Study 2 in Chapter 
2, which is a fully online study that participants can complete remotely. All the other studies 
are conducted in a safe and private space within the research laboratory because the tasks 
require participants to retrieve and provide personal and sensitive memories, whereas Study 2 
does not require such information, and hence, can be completed outside laboratory settings. 
All memory tasks and questionnaires in the studies in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will be 
administered using the Qualtrics survey software. In Chapter 3, the experimental tasks (i.e., 
executive functioning tasks) will be run using Psychopy software (version 2) in Study 3 and 
Presentation experimental software in Study 4. The memory tasks, experimental tasks, and 
questionnaires used in the current thesis are selected because the literature on the respective 
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areas that are being measured also used similar tasks, in addition to having good reliability 
scores.  
 Analyses. IBM SPSS Statistics (version 25) will be used for all statistical analyses in 
this thesis. To accommodate both categorical and continuous approaches, a wide range of 
analyses will be employed. Group differences will be analysed using independent-samples t-
tests, whereas interactions between variables will be analysed using either between- or 
within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Predictive effects on changes in dependent 
variables will be tested using linear regressions and associations between variables will be 
tested using Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
Mediation analyses will be conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 to test whether a variable 
(i.e., the mediator) is able to explain the relation between the independent variable and 
dependent variable (Hayes, 2013; Jose, 2013). Two hierarchical linear regressions (i.e., 
Regression 1: only IV; Regression 2: mediator in first step, and IV in second step) and a 
Sobel test (i.e., to determine whether the variance of Regression 1 is significantly different 
from the change of variance in Regression 2, which would indicate a mediation effect) are 
used to analyse the mediations. Moderation analyses will be conducted in Chapters 2, 3, and 
4 to test whether a variable (i.e., the moderator) interacts with the independent variable to 
strengthen or weaken an existing significant relation, or lead a previously not significant 
relation to become significant (Hayes, 2013; Jose, 2013). The PROCESS macro, an extension 
software in IBM SPSS Statistics, will be used to analyse the moderations.  
Because multiple analyses of similar nature are conducted in each study, the results 
will be corrected using Bonferroni to avoid family-wise errors (Field, 2009). Bonferroni 
corrections will be applied for all analyses involving group differences, predictive effects, 
and associations. The current thesis reports the results prior to and after Bonferroni 
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corrections in the Results sections, but discusses the results as per after Bonferroni 
corrections in the Discussion sections. The reason both type of results are reported is because 
the alpha value of the Bonferroni is not a standardized value, and instead varies according to 
the number of similar analyses conducted in the study. The results prior to Bonferroni 
correction can provide insight for future researchers about whether relations exist when 
taking into account the test individually, which can help them to decide future research 
directions. Meanwhile, results after Bonferroni correction provided insight into overall 
findings in the context of the current respective studies. Corrections are also done for 
independent-samples t-tests. One of the assumptions of t-test is that the variances of the 
groups need to be equal (Field, 2009). When this assumption is not met, Welch’s test for 
unequal variance is used instead of independent-samples t-tests. 
 
Implications 
 The results obtained from studying different areas of autobiographical memory recall 
in this thesis can be used to gain a holistic understanding of autobiographical memory recall 
among individuals with subclinical symptoms of depression and PTSD, which is needed to 
build a more complete and coherent theoretical framework of memory recall for these 
populations. The findings also will provide insight into overlaps of memory impairments with 
clinical populations, which could inform whether similar daily functioning difficulties arising 
from memory impairments are experienced, and whether the current memory-related 
interventions and trainings used for clinical populations would also be suited for subclinical 
populations. 
The theoratical findings could also have implications for the diagnosis and treatment 
of these disorders. The findings can contribute to the framework of symptoms and deficits 
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experienced in depressive and trauma-based disorders, and they can be used to improve 
diagnostics of MDD and PTSD. For example, prevalent and pervasive autobiographical 
memory differences and impairments could be evaluated as additional symptoms of MDD 
and PTSD, or they can be used to screen for the potential development of MDD and PTSD in 
the future. Screening for possible depression and PTSD at subclinical levels could identify 
people at risk and enable them to seek psychological help early, and hence, reduce the risk of 
these symptoms exacerbating to clinical levels (e.g., Leaman, Kearns, & Rothbaum, 2013; 
Muñoz, Beardslee, & Leykin, 2012). 
 The findings from the current thesis can also provide insight into the strength of 
memory difficulties and impairments specifically experienced by people who have 
subclinical levels of depression and PTSD. These results can help identify the possible 
autobiographical memory functions that may also be affected from the memory difficulties, 
to obtain a clearer view of the effects of the memory difficulties on overall daily functioning, 
worsening of symptoms, and well-being. By doing so, the importance and relevance of 
creating and implementing memory focused interventions for subclinical populations can be 
established. Furthermore, by examining how similar or different autobiographical memory 
recall and difficulties are between clinical (from the literature) and subclinical samples, the 
findings from the current thesis could further shed light into the appropriateness of using 
similar memory focused interventions for both clinical and subclinical populations.  
Besides these implications, clinical interventions for individuals with subclinical 
depression and PTSD can be modified to accommodate difficulties in autobiographical 
memory retrieval that may be observed in the findings of the current thesis. Psychotherapy 
modalities and techniques that rely on autobiographical memory recall could be substituted 
with other modalities and techniques that rely less on memory recall for those with 
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subclinical symptoms. For example, psychotherapy modalities such as narrative therapy and 
psychodynamic therapy use the recall of autobiographical memories, in terms of narratives, 
memory details, and associated feelings, to explore and understand the issues and life of the 
individual, as well as manage their issues and improve overall well-being (Corey, 2013). 
However, if there are deficits in autobiographical memory recall for subclinical populations, 
other psychotherapies that do not primarily rely on the recall of memories could be used 
instead, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, existential therapy, and solution-focused 
therapy. In another example, cognitive behavioural therapy uses the recall of 
autobiographical memory as a technique to oppose inaccurate beliefs and thoughts, and in 
turn, generate new adaptive beliefs and thoughts (Beck, 1995). In the event of difficulties in 
recalling the required memories, this technique could be modified to use imaginative and 
hypothetical situations or vicarious experiences instead. Therefore, by having a better 
understanding of their memory recall, appropriate modalities and techniques can be selected 
or modified for the psychotherapy of individuals with subclinical symptoms.  
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Chapter 2: Depression, Trauma, Cultural Life Scripts, and Individual Life Stories 
 
Two prominent facets of autobiographical memories are their episodic and semantic 
aspects. An example of an episodic aspect of autobiographical memory is the Individual Life 
Story, whereas an example of a semantic aspect is the Cultural Life Script. Individual Life 
Stories (ILS) are experienced personal narratives, whereas Cultural Life Scripts (CLS) are 
series of events that are expected by a culture to occur in a typical individual’s life and are 
used to structure the recall of autobiographical memories in the ILS and in the formation of 
future goals. The events in the CLS are often expected to occur in the second and third 
decades of life, are positive in nature, and stable within cultures. Although CLS are –unlike 
autobiographical memories– semantic knowledge, differences in CLS characteristics for 
individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD have not been fully understood 
yet. Differences in ILS are related to depression and trauma in older samples but not younger 
samples, due to a lack of experiencing many ILS events for the latter. Whether allowing 
younger samples to include future ILS events in addition to experienced ILS events would 
produce those differences and relations to depression and trauma, as seen in older samples, 
has not been studied. The differences in societal pressures and perceived ability in regard to 
achieving events in the CLS and the ILS among those with subclinical depression and PTSD 
symptoms have also not been explored. Societal identification has been theorized to affect 
memory recall, but its influence on CLS and ILS has yet to be tested. The present study aims 
to address these gaps of knowledge, which limit our understanding of the implications that 
CLS may have on mental health, and, hence, the application of this concept into clinical 
settings.  
 





Although memories are expected to be stored throughout one’s lifespan, the retrieval 
of autobiographical memories is not equally distributed throughout the lifespan. When 
individuals were asked to recall significant events from their lives, it was observed that a 
larger part of the memories were retrieved from the second and third decades of life (Rubin & 
Schulkind, 1997a, 1997b). This distribution of important events forms a bump in the temporal 
distribution of the recall of autobiographical memories, known as the reminiscence bump 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986). The reminiscence bump for 
important memories has been shown to exist for positive and transitional memories but not 
negative memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Dickson, Pillemer, & Bruehl, 2011; Glück & 
Bluck, 2007).  
Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain the reminiscence bump in the 
distribution of important events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002). The first hypothesis is the 
cognitive account, which states that novel events form the reminiscence bump. Novel events 
have a higher likelihood of being processed and remembered due to their distinctiveness, and 
its usage as reference points for future encounters increases the recall of those memories. The 
second hypothesis is the identity-formation account, which proposes the reminiscence bump 
consists of identity-related memories. Autobiographical memories are used as references and 
evidence when forming one’s identity or self-concepts, which means that these memories will 
be recalled more often when defining and describing the self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). Both novel memories and memories related to identity are formed during the second 
and third decades of life, indicating that memories from this time frame will be recalled more 
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often, in line with the reminiscence bump. The last hypothesis is the cultural life script 
account (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002).  
 
Cultural Life Scripts 
Cultural life scripts (CLS) consist of events in an individual’s lifespan which are 
determined and sanctioned by culture to be important, transitional, and expected to occur 
within a specified age range (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002). These life scripts are culturally 
shared semantic knowledge of agreed upon events expected to be experienced by most people 
within their society at a specific time in their lives (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002). For example, 
on average across several different cultures (i.e., the United States, Denmark, Australia, and 
Malaysia), graduation from university is a life script event that is expected to be achieved 
between the ages of 22 and 23 years; beginning one’s first fulltime job is believed to happen 
between the ages of 21 and 25 years; and marriage is expected to occur approximately 
between the ages of 26 and 28 years (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Janssen & Haque, 2018; 
Rubin et al., 2009). Events that do not have a specific age range for occurrence, such as death 
of a loved one or getting a promotion, are less likely to be included as a CLS event.  
Berntsen and Rubin (2004) compiled a total of ten properties and characteristics of a 
CLS, of which the first six characteristics were derived from Schank and Abelson (1977). 
These CLS characteristics are,: (1) semantic knowledge specific to a certain culture or 
society; (2) has a temporal distribution; (3) has a specific order of occurrence; (4) described 
based on specific slots and requirements; (5) these slots and requirements are based on 
culturally expected events and timing; (6) can process life stories; (7) transmitted from 
generation to generation within the society; (8) represents an idealized life; (9) favours 
positive events; and (10) favours events that typically occur in late adolescence and early 
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adulthood. These characteristics of the CLS enable it to function as a framework for the recall 
and narration of one’s life narratives (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004). Moreover, manipulating 
information of CLS events has been shown to result in changes in future life goals (Berntsen 
& Jacobsen, 2008; Shanahan & Busseri, 2016). 
When asked to retrieve important events, the CLS, which contains more events from 
adolescence and early adulthood is used as a framework for recall, and thus creating the 
reminiscence bump for the second and third decades of life (Koppel & Berntsen, 2015, 2016; 
Rubin & Schulkind, 1997a). Berntsen and Rubin (2002) asked participants to recall their 
most important, happy, sad, and traumatic memories, and found that the reminiscence bump 
was seen only for happiest and most important memories. This finding provides further 
support for the CLS as an explanation for the reminiscence bump. As CLS consist of 
predominantly positive and important events from the second and third decades of life, 
significant positive memories that occurred during this age range are likely to be rehearsed 
more often, which leads to easier and higher recall of these memories. Negative memories are 
less likely to be rehearsed due to less social acceptance and normality. Even when life 
narratives were viewed as chapters rather than individual events, a reminiscence bump 
consisting of CLS events was observed (Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008).  
Previous studies have investigated the content and the characteristics of CLS across 
many cultures such as Australia, China, Denmark, Germany, Greenland, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Qatar, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, and the United States (Alea, 
Ali, & Marcano, 2014, Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Bohn, 2010; Coleman, 2014; Erdoğan, 
Baran, Avlar, Taş, & Tekcan, 2008; Grysman & Dimakis, 2018; Habermas, 2007, Study 2; 
Hatiboğlu & Habermas, 2016; Janssen, 2015; Janssen & Haque, 2018; Janssen & Rubin, 
2011; Janssen, Uemiya, & Naka, 2014; Kawasaki & Uehara, 2020; Ottsen & Berntsen, 2014; 
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Rubin et al., 2009; Tekcan, Kaya-Kızılöz, & Odaman, 2012; Zaragoza Scherman, Salgado, 
Shao, & Berntsen, 2017). 
These studies have found that there are some culture-specific differences in the types 
of events listed, such as Seijinshiki ceremony and Shichi-go-san festival in the Japanese CLS, 
facing discrimination in the African-American CLS, Hajj pilgrimage in the Qatar CLS, 
military service in the Turkish CLS, and confirmation in the Danish and German CLS. 
Despite the culture-specific differences, these studies showed that there are large overlaps of 
the events and characteristics of the CLS, including listing more positive events and more 
events from the second and third decades of life. This bump was not observed for negative 
events, which were distributed more equally throughout the lifespan and did not have a fixed 
temporal point (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003). Besides a lower rate of rehearsal and higher social 
censure, negative events tend to be more unpredictable and not linked to a specific age range, 
which leads individuals to select positive predictable events when asked about their CLS 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Dickson et al., 2011).  
Tekcan et al. (2012) discovered that the CLS of older adults were different from the 
young and middle-aged adults, whereby the older adults in their Turkish sample reported 
more typical and positive events. However, Janssen and Rubin (2011) and Janssen et al. 
(2014) did not find substantial differences in the CLS between young, middle-aged, and older 
adults in Dutch and Japanese samples. Bohn (2010) found that older adults reported less 
typical and idealistic events in the CLS than the younger adults in their Danish sample, but 
these differences were concluded as normal due to the higher experienced events and lower 
idealism of the older adults. Similarly, CLS was also found to not vary substantially despite 
differences in gender and education levels (Janssen & Rubin, 2011; Janssen et al., 2014). 
These findings provide evidence that CLS are reasonably stable across age, gender, and 
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education levels when individuals are from the same cultural background, corroborating that 
CLS are culturally semantic in nature.  
 
Individual Life Stories 
The CLS are not to be confused with individual life stories (ILS), which are episodic 
memories of personally experienced events and personal narratives (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2002). The ILS contain events that are important and central, and are what we narrate to 
others when asked to describe ourselves and our lives. The ILS is typically retrieved and 
narrated in the form of individual significant events. Alternatively, the ILS can also be 
narrated as chapters, which are periods of time that contain a cluster of ILS individual events 
that may be organized by age, temporal time, or themes (Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008). It has a 
reminiscence bump for the positive events that peaks at late adolescence and early adulthood, 
and a recency effect for the negative events (Berntsen et al., 2011; Glück & Bluck, 2007; 
Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008). Positive events become part of the ILS due to them matching 
societal expectations and being part of the CLS, whereas negative events become part of the 
ILS due to the emotional distress they produce (Berntsen et al., 2011).  
The function of CLS as a framework for ILS recall indicates that a large number of 
the memories in the ILS should overlap with the events of the CLS. However, it is still 
possible for unexpected transitional events to be included in a personal narrative but not in 
the CLS (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002). The CLS do not determine which memories are encoded; 
rather they are used as a framework for recall during the self-narration of autobiographical 
memories (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003). Regardless whether their ILS matches the CLS, it is 
expected that individuals do possess the knowledge of societal expectations of events and age 
norms and whether they meet or stray from these norms (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).  




Scripts, Stories, Depression, and Trauma  
Associations between depression and trauma with CLS and ILS characteristics have 
been examined in the literature. Rubin et al. (2009) theorised that the ILS may vary from the 
CLS with different levels of psychological functioning, due to differences in centrality and 
identification with experienced events in the ILS. To test this theory, they asked Danish and 
American undergraduates to list and rate seven significant events in a prototypical infants’ 
life and seven significant events they had experienced in their own lives, and measured their 
depression and trauma levels. From the CLS and ILS obtained from the participants, they 
calculated typicality scores, which referred to how much the generated CLS and ILS matched 
the average CLS of their respective cultures.  
For both samples, higher depression and trauma scores were associated with ILS that 
were less positive. Higher depression and trauma related to lower typicality of ILS in the 
Danish sample, but not the American sample. The American sample (18–28 years old) was 
younger than the Danish sample (21–49 years old), and, therefore the absence of the effect in 
the American sample was attributed to them not having experienced a sufficient number of 
CLS events yet, which meant the participants were unable to include those events into their 
ILS, despite being aware that the event was a typical CLS event. They also found that higher 
depression related to low CLS typicality in the Danish sample, and higher trauma related to 
more negative CLS in the American sample and low CLS typicality for both samples. 
However, because there were less associations between measures of depression and trauma 
with CLS characteristics as compared to ILS characteristics, Rubin et al. (2009) concluded 
that the CLS is still stable and varies less amongst individuals regardless of the levels of 
psychological functioning.  
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Rubin, Boals, and Berntsen (2008) studied the differences in characteristics and 
typicality of CLS and ILS between high and low trauma groups in a sample of undergraduate 
students. Similar methods were used as Rubin et al. (2009) to elicit the CLS and ILS, but the 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire – a self-report questionnaire that is used to measure 
facets of memory phenomenology – was used to rate the ILS instead of the characteristics 
questions that typically accompany these tasks. Individuals with higher and lower trauma 
both generated CLS events that had similar importance, valence, and typicality. There were 
also no differences in importance and valence of ILS events between those with high and low 
trauma.  
Using similar methodology as Rubin et al. (2009), Jørgensen et al (2012) investigated 
the characteristics and typicality of CLS and ILS and depression levels in populations with 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and controls. Borderline 
Personality Disorder is characterized as having significant impulsivity and unpredictable 
mood, self-perceptions, and relationships with others, whereas Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder involve intrusive and repetitive thoughts or urges (i.e., obsessions) and repetitive 
and rigid behaviours in response to the obsessions (i.e., compulsions) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Across all groups, higher depression predicted more negative events 
retrieved in the ILS, but it did not predict the typicality of the CLS and ILS. However, the 
presence of Borderline Personality Disorder and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder in the 
samples used raises the possibility that any associations (or lack of associations) observed 
may reflect Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
symptoms instead of depressive symptoms. 
Bohn (2010) studied the associations of ILS characteristics and typicality with 
depression in young and older adults from the normal population. Having more negative ILS 
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events related to higher depression for the younger group but not the older group. The lack of 
association between depression and negative ILS in the older group was explained to be due 
to the ILS becoming less idealistic and positive with age, independent of depression levels. 
There were no associations between typicality of ILS with depression for both age groups.  
When Habermas et al. (2008) and Jobson et al. (2018) looked into the ILS events and 
chapters retrieved by middle-aged and older clinically depressed and control groups in 
German, British, and Malaysian samples, they found that the depressed groups recalled less 
typical and more negative ILS events or chapters than the control groups. Fromholt et al. 
(2003) tested ILS recall between groups with clinical depression, dementia, centenarians, and 
80-year-old controls. The clinical depression group recalled more negative ILS events as 
compared to the other groups. Dalgleish et al. (2011) similarly asked clinically depressed, 
remitted, and controlled groups to produce ILS in the form of chapters or themes, and found 
that the depressed group retrieved more negative ILS chapters, themes, and events. 
Associations between depression and the recall of higher negative events in the ILS were 
suggested to occur due to people with higher depression experiencing more negative events 
in their life (Bohn, 2010; da Silva et al., 2016) and having a higher negative attentional bias 
(Dalgleish et al., 2011), which makes these negative events more accessible during retrieval 
of ILS.  
The literature suggests that the characteristics of the CLS appear to be stable across 
different levels of depression and trauma, which is in line with the CLS being semantic 
knowledge that does not vary greatly within the respective cultures. For the ILS, individuals 
with depression symptoms appear to retrieve more negative events and chapters in their ILS. 
However, there were mixed findings for the associations of depression with typicality of the 
ILS, and the associations of trauma with typicality and emotional valence of the ILS.  




Pressure to achieve the CLS and ILS 
The narration of the ILS has been shown to be shaped by the CLS (Rubin & Berntsen, 
2003), and CLS are semantic knowledge suggested to be learnt from society (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2002). Bandura’s Social Learning Theory, also known as social cognitive theory, 
theorizes that people not only learn from their own direct experiences but are also able to 
learn from observing the experiences of others (i.e., vicarious experiences) and the 
occurrences in the surrounding environment (Bandura, 1977). Besides observations, people 
are also theorized to learn from the verbal suggestions, comments, and feedback provided 
from other people in the same environment.  
Janssen and Haque (2018) found that, following Bandura’s (1977) Social Learning 
Theory, CLS could be transmitted via vicarious experiences and via comments and feedback 
from family and friends. Comments and feedback from society are likely to help clarify 
expectations about which events are important or typical and when they are supposed to 
experience these events, but also increase the pressure to achieve these events at those ages. 
Pressure refers to excessive demands and expectations, that can either be real or imagined, by 
an external group or individual, for a person to think or behave in a certain manner 
(American Psychological Association, 2013). Societal norms and expectations have been 
associated with societal pressure to perform and meet those expectations (Ajzen, 1991). 
Hence, although everyone is expected to possess information regarding the CLS, the 
pressures to fulfil these societal expectations may vary.  
Rubin et al. (2009) suggested that being unaware or disconnected from these societal 
expectations about which events people are expected to achieve and its associated ages may 
be linked to higher levels of emotional distress. In line with that suggestion, people with 
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depression have been shown to be more disconnected from society and demonstrate higher 
apathy towards expectations and pressure from society (Cruwys, Alexander Haslam, Dingle, 
Haslam, & Jetten, 2014; Taylor & Vaughan, 1967). Therefore, it is possible that those with 
higher depression and trauma symptoms also experience a disconnect or unawareness 
towards the societal expectations of the CLS, which may manifest in differences of typicality 
and pressure for both the CLS and ILS.  
Hence, pressure to meet these societal expectations and achieve the events in the CLS 
and ILS may be important characteristics to take into account, but previous studies have not 
explored this facet yet. Especially, the pressure to achieve life events expected by society 
may be the highest among young adults, because many CLS events are supposed to occur in 
early adulthood (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).  
 
Societal identification 
How much the comments and feedback regarding typical CLS events become 
ingrained and how much a person experiences pressure towards those expectations could also 
depend on identification with society or collectivism. Collectivism refers to viewing oneself 
as part of the group or society and bound by the norms and expectations of the society with 
which one identifies (Triandis, 1995). Individualism, on the other hand, refers to focusing on 
the wants, needs, and expectations of the self, prior to those of the society.  
Both collectivism and individualism can be further divided into vertical dimensions, 
which are the perceptions of hierarchies and everyone being different from each other; and 
horizontal dimensions, which are perceptions of equality and everyone being same as each 
other. People who have high horizontal collectivism believe they and others within the group 
have the same personal goals as the group they belong to, whereas those with high vertical 
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collectivism perceive that they have different personal goals which they need to conform and 
sacrifice for the group goals. Meanwhile, people with high horizontal individualism want to 
achieve their own goals but are content with performing and achieving equally as others, 
whereas those with high vertical individualism similarly want to achieve their own goals but 
seek to outperform and be better than others (Triandis, 1995).  
Although collectivism and individualism were previously theorized as opposite ends 
of the same spectrum, these components have been shown not to be mutually exclusive 
(Paquet & Kline, 2009; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfland, 1998). This co-existence of the 
components means individuals can prioritize expectations and goals of the society without 
neglecting the goals of the individual. Higher collectivism is, however, related to higher 
adherence towards the norms and expectations of the society (Fukushima, Sharp, & 
Kobayashi, 2009). This finding indicates that those with higher collectivism may also be 
more aware of societal norms and expectations, such as typical CLS events, and this higher 
identification with society may further induce more pressure to meet the expectations by the 
society as it is viewed as important.  
 
Perceived ability of achieving the CLS and ILS 
Despite being expected by society to achieve events in the CLS at the specified ages, 
an individual may perceive that they are not able to meet those expectations. Perceived ability 
is similar to self-efficacy, which refers to an individual’s perception and confidence of having 
the ability to engage in actions and behaviours needed to achieve certain goals and outcomes 
(Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977). Although perception of one’s abilities differs accordingly with 
each situation or event, people with depression and trauma have been shown to exhibit lower 
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self-efficacy in general (Diehl & Prout, 2002; Kanfer & Zeiss, 1983; Saigh, Mroueh, 
Zimmerman, & Fairbank, 1995). 
To investigate the CLS of middle and late adulthood, Grysman and Dimakis (2018) 
asked middle-aged and older adults to list seven significant events in a prototypical middle 
and late adults’ life, and compared them to components of well-being. Although typicality of 
CLS was not related to any of the well-being measures, generating more positive events in 
the CLS and having higher perceived ability to achieve the events in the CLS predicted 
higher facets of well-being.  
 
Study 1 
The Current Study 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate how individuals with subclinical 
depression and PTSD symptoms may process CLS and ILS differently as compared to 
psychologically healthy individuals. The current study also aimed to explore whether the 
additional characteristics of pressure and ability related to achieving the CLS and ILS would 
be different among individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms. Last, the 
study aimed to investigate the role of societal identification on the relations of depression and 
trauma with the CLS and ILS.  
The outcomes from this study could provide insight into the processing of culturally 
obtained semantic information among individuals with mental health concerns. CLS serve as 
the underlying mechanism for the recall of autobiographical memories and the formation of 
future goals (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003), and the results of this 
study can be used to provide better understanding of the differences in the recall of 
autobiographical memories and future-directed behaviour between individuals with a risk of 
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developing mental health issues and individuals without mental health issues. Furthermore, 
the results of this study will be able to ascertain the significance of societal pressure and 
perceived ability of memory components in regards to mental health issues, which could be 
applied into creating more focused treatment for mental health issues. 
Although Rubin et al. (2009) and Habermas et al. (2008) found associations between 
typicality of ILS with depression and trauma in older samples, this result was not replicated 
in the younger sample. The lack of observed effect in the younger sample of Rubin et al. 
(2009)’s study was suggested to be due to participants being unable to include typical events 
that they had not experienced in their ILS, despite being aware that the event is typical. 
Modifying the ILS task to include future events may provide insight into future-directed 
goals and reduce possible pre-existing discrepancies between CLS and ILS in a young adult 
sample that have not experienced many of the events, although this modification has not been 
tested yet.  
Individuals with clinical or higher depression and trauma symptoms have been shown 
to display a negative attentional bias and greater ease at recalling negative autobiographical 
memories, causing more negative events to be included into the ILS (Bohn, 2010; Dalgleish 
et al., 2011; Fromholt et al., 2003; Habermas et al., 2008; Jobson et al., 2018; Jørgensen et 
al., 2012; Rubin et al., 2009). However, CLS are –unlike autobiographical memories– 
semantic knowledge, and are stable across age, gender, and education (Janssen & Rubin, 
2011; Janssen et al., 2014). Characteristics of the CLS have been shown not to differ for 
individuals with higher and lower trauma groups from the normal population (Rubin et al., 
2008), but whether there are differences in characteristics of the CLS for individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression has not been investigated.  
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Rubin et al. (2009) found associations between depression and trauma symptoms and 
typicality of the ILS, and further hypothesized that low typicality of the ILS indicates that 
individuals are also less aware of the typical events in the CLS. Contradictory to that 
hypothesis, Rubin et al. (2008) did not find any differences in CLS typicality for high and 
low trauma groups from the normal population. However, differences in typicality of CLS for 
individuals with subclinical depression symptoms has not been explored in detail. Expanding 
upon the studies that found higher depression symptoms related to less typical ILS 
(Habermas et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 2009), it would be valuable to investigate whether 
individuals with subclinical depression symptoms would also display an atypical CLS, as the 
recall of ILS are influenced by CLS.  
Janssen and Haque (2018) found that expectations regarding the CLS are transmitted 
and clarified via family and friends, which in turn could increase the pressure to achieve the 
CLS as well as the ILS. Individuals with clinical depression have been shown to become 
disconnected and develop apathy towards societal expectations and pressures (Cruwys 
Alexander Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, et al., 2014; Taylor & Vaughan, 1967), but whether 
those with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms would also display apathy towards 
societal pressures to achieve events in CLS and ILS has not been studied yet. Societal 
identification is associated with adherence to society’s expectations (Fukushima et al., 2009), 
which relates to areas, such as knowledge and pressures of societal expectations. However, 
the role of societal identification towards the awareness of typical CLS and ILS events and 
pressure of achieving CLS and ILS events experienced by those with higher depression and 
trauma symptoms have not been explored. Lower perceived ability of achieving CLS events 
has been shown to relate to poorer well-being (Grysman & Dimakis, 2018). Although people 
with depression and trauma have lower self-efficacy (Diehl & Prout, 2002; Kanfer & Zeiss, 
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1983; Saigh et al., 1995), it is not known whether there would also be differences in 
perceived ability to achieve the CLS and ILS.  
Based on the review of previous literature, the research questions that we aim to 
answer in our study include: 
1) Are there differences in the characteristics (i.e., importance, emotional valence) of the 
CLS generated between individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD 
and psychologically healthy individuals? 
2) Are there differences in the typicality of the CLS between individuals with subclinical 
levels of depression and PTSD and those who are psychologically healthy? 
3) Are there differences in the typicality of the ILS (consisting of past and future events) 
between individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD and those who 
are psychologically healthy? 
4) Are there differences in the pressure and perceived ability towards the CLS and ILS 
between individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD and those who 
are psychologically healthy? 
5) Will collectivism moderate the relations between depression and trauma with CLS 
and ILS typicality and pressure? 
 
Based on these research questions and the previous findings, we hypothesized for our 
current study that:  
1) Because CLS is semantic knowledge, the characteristics of the CLS (i.e., importance, 
emotional valence) generated by individuals with subclinical levels of depression and 
PTSD will be similar to those generated by psychologically healthy individuals. 
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2) As a result, individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD will have 
similar typicality of the CLS as those who are psychologically healthy. 
3) Individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD will report a less typical 
ILS (consisting of past and future events) than those who are psychologically healthy. 
4) Individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD will associate less 
pressure and perceived ability towards achieving CLS and ILS events than those who 
are psychologically healthy. 
5) Collectivism will moderate the relations between depression and trauma with CLS 
and ILS typicality and pressure. 
 
To test these hypotheses, Malaysian participants were asked to describe and rate 
seven significant events experienced by a prototypical infant from their culture, and seven 
significant events they had experienced or would experience in their own lifetime. 
Participants then answered the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales, the PTSD Checklist for 




CLS have been found to relate to the reminiscence bump, which indicates that 
individuals experience a large amount of important, positive, and transitional events during 
the second and third decades in life (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997a, 1997b; Berntsen & Rubin, 
2004). To obtain a mixture of experienced past life events and imagined future life events, a 
sample within the age range of 18 to 29 years appeared the most appropriate. It was also 
expected that the societal pressure to fulfil these events would be highest among this age 
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group. To study differences in types and characteristics of CLS events generated, the culture 
of the sample needs to be controlled for ease of comparison between the sample and the 
standard measures, and the culture chosen needs to have existing CLS measures to be 
compared against. Because of these reasons, only participants with a Malaysian background 
were included in the current study.  
Power analysis with a medium effect size of .50, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .20 (to 
give a power of .80) indicated that 102 participants would be needed to reach statistical 
significance in an independent-samples t-test. For all studies, only the power analyses of the 
t-test are reported because the number of participants needed to achieve statistical 
significance for the other analyses (i.e., correlation and regression) are lower, and hence are 
already encompassed within the sample size of the t-test. 
One-hundred fifty-two students from the University of Nottingham Malaysia were 
recruited for this study. Twenty-seven participants were excluded from the analyses due to 
errors in answering the CLS task (three listed recurrent religious events; five listed recurrent 
daily activities; three listed personal experiences; two listed all events from the same 
developmental stage; one listed emotions; thirteen made errors in categorization and ratings 
of events). An example of errors in categorization would be if the participant retrieved an 
event about starting university but categorized it as ‘marriage’, whereas an example of errors 
in rating would be if the participant retrieved an event categorized as ‘birth’ but allocated the 
age at which the event occurs as 10 years old. Another five participants were excluded from 
the analyses due to listing personality traits and self-concepts in the Individual Life Story 
task. The remaining 120 participants had a mean age of 20.49 (SD = 2.10, range = 18-29), 
and the sample consisted of 35 males and 85 females. As explained in the previous chapter, 
the data is conceptualized as both categorical groups and as existing on a continuum. 





Cultural Life Script task. To record the CLS, the methodology from Berntsen and 
Rubin (2004) was used. In the Cultural Life Script (CLS) task, participants were asked to 
describe seven important events that would most likely occur in a prototypical infant’s life 
from their culture from birth to death. Subsequently, they were given the events back one-by-
one. Participants categorized the events they had listed into 50 pre-existing options derived 
from Rubin et al. (2009), Janssen and Rubin (2011), and Janssen and Haque (2018). If the 
event retrieved by the participants did not fit into any of the pre-existing categories, they were 
asked to categorize the event as ‘other’. They then rated the prevalence of the event measured 
by number of people that will experience the event (0-100 people) and the expected age at 
occurrence (0-120 years old), and whether they had personally experienced the event (‘yes’ 
or ‘no’). Seven-point Likert scales were used to rate the events on importance (1 = 
‘unimportant’ to 7 = ‘of greatest importance’) and emotional valence (-3 = ‘very negative’ to 
3 = ‘very positive’). To measure societal pressure and perceived ability to achieve the events, 
ratings on societal expectations (1 = ‘no pressure’ to 7 = ‘extreme pressure’) and perceived 
ability to achieve the event (1 = ‘very unlikely’ to 7 = ‘extremely likely’) were added to the 
list of ratings.  
Individual Life Story task. To gather information of the ILS, the methodology from 
Rubin et al. (2009) was used. To reduce possible pre-existing discrepancies between the CLS 
and ILS, the instructions of the Individual Life Story (ILS) task was modified to 
accommodate the imagined component of the ILS, as the sample consisted of young adults 
who may not have experienced many of the events in the CLS. Participants were therefore 
asked to describe seven significant events that they had experienced or expected that they 
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would experience in their lifetime. Similar to the CLS Task, participants subsequently 
categorized the events and rated them on prevalence, (expected) age at occurrence, 
experience of event, importance, emotional valence, societal pressure, and perceived ability. 
Whereas the item on societal pressure in the CLS task asks about general societal pressure, 
the societal pressure item in the ILS task specifies pressure related to society, family, and 
friends. 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21). The DASS-21 (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1993) is a 21-item instrument developed to assess the presence of symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and stress/tension in the previous week (refer to Appendix A). It consists 
of a four-point Likert scale (0-3). Because the DASS-21 is the short form of the 42-item 
DASS, scores need to be doubled. Total scores for each domain range between 0 and 42, with 
higher scores reflecting a higher magnitude of symptoms. Total depression score was 
obtained by adding the items in the depression domain, with cut-off scores of 10 indicating a 
higher-than-average (i.e., mild to extremely severe) range of symptoms. This scale has 
Cronbach’s alphas of .94 for the depression domain (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 
1998).  
The PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5). The PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013) is a 
20-item instrument developed to screen individuals with PTSD symptoms (refer to Appendix 
B). It consists of a five-point Likert scale (0-4), and PTSD symptom severity scores are 
obtained by summing all the items. Total score ranges from 0 to 80, and a higher total score 
reflects stronger PTSD symptom severity. A cut-off score of 33 indicates clinical levels of 
PTSD symptoms. This scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .94 and a one-week test-retest 
reliability of .82 (Blevins, Weathers, Davis, Witte, & Domino, 2015). All studies in this 
thesis used the PCL-5 scale to measure trauma. 
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Individualism and Collectivism Scale. The Individualism and Collectivism Scale 
(Triandis & Gelfland, 1998) is a 16-item instrument developed to measure individualism and 
collectivism on vertical and horizontal dimensions (refer to Appendix C). It consists of a 
nine-point Likert scale (1-9), with total scores for each domain ranging between 4 and 36. 
Total collectivism is calculated by adding the score of vertical collectivism and horizontal 
collectivism. The collectivism scale has Cronbach’s alphas ranging between .62 and .78 
(Paquet & Kline, 2009). 
 
Procedure 
This study was approved by the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Nottingham Malaysia (MA260717). The study was conducted on a 
desktop computer in a controlled space in the university. Participants were first given an 
information sheet to read, and a consent form and demographic sheet to answer. After they 
had given their informed consent, participants answered the CLS task, ILS task, DASS-21, 
PCL-5, and the Individualism and Collectivism Scale. The order of the CLS task and the ILS 
task was counterbalanced. The session took approximately 30-45 minutes to complete. At the 
end of the session, the participants were thanked for their contribution, for which they 
received a small financial reward (RM10). 
 
Scoring 
From the literature, there are two methods to score the typicality measures obtained 
from the CLS and ILS. In the first typicality scoring method, used by Rubin et al. (2009) and 
Jørgensen et al. (2012), the typicality scores are obtained from a previous study that measured 
the CLS of the respective culture. The second typicality scoring method, used by Bohn 
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(2010) and Grysman and Dimakis (2018), obtains the typicality scores from the current 
sample of the study. The present study employed the first typicality scoring method, whereby 
the typicality scores were obtained from a previous study that measured the Malaysian CLS 
(i.e., Janssen & Haque, 2018). This choice was made to obtain independent Malaysian CLS 
typicality scores that were unaffected by the levels of depression and trauma of the current 
study.  
Hence, to obtain typicality scores for the events, the events generated in both the CLS 
and ILS tasks were compared to existing data of the Malaysian CLS (n=121) collected by 
Janssen and Haque (2018). The typicality score for the events generated in this study was 
taken from the percentage of times the event was mentioned in the Malaysian CLS as a 
significant event that is experienced by most people in Malaysian society (e.g., marriage was 
mentioned 89.3% of the times in the Malaysian CLS, and so the typicality score of marriage 
in the current study is 89.3). Berntsen and Rubin (2004) proposed a cut-off score of 4% for 
the typicality scores, whereby only events that were mentioned 4% or higher were considered 
as a typical CLS event and events that were mentioned less often were considered an atypical 
or idiosyncratic event. Following this cut-off score, events mentioned 4% or more times in 
the Malaysian CLS were given the corresponding typicality scores in the current study, but 
events that were mentioned less than 4% times in the Malaysian CLS were given a typicality 
score of zero. Total typicality of CLS was then calculated by summing the typicality scores 
for the seven events generated in the CLS task, whereas adding the typicality scores for the 
seven events in the ILS tasks produced total typicality of ILS.  
To calculate the mean societal pressure to achieve CLS events, the pressure ratings for 
the seven events generated in the CLS task were averaged, whereas to calculate the mean 
perceived ability of achieving the CLS events, the perceived ability of achieving event ratings 
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for the seven events generated in the CLS task were averaged. Similarly, averaging the 
importance ratings for the seven CLS events listed produced the mean CLS importance, and 
averaging the emotional valence ratings for the seven CLS events generated produced the 
mean CLS emotional valence. Following the same scoring method as the CLS, the pressure, 
perceived ability, importance, and emotional valence ratings for the events in the ILS tasks 
were similarly averaged to obtain the mean pressure to achieve ILS, mean perceived ability 
of achieving ILS, mean importance of ILS, and mean emotional valence of ILS.  
 
Results 
Cultural Life Script [Descriptives] 
Participants listed seven significant events that would most likely be experienced by a 
prototypical infant in their culture. In reference to the scales’ midpoints as being average, the 
listed events were important (M = 5.77, SD = 1.23), prevalent (M = 79.19, SD = 19.60), and 
had above medium pressure levels (M = 4.46, SD = 1.97). The majority of the events were 
rated positive (68.6%), and fewer events were rated negative (11.5%) or neutral (19.9%). 
Whereas 52.4% of events had been experienced, 47.6% of events had not been experienced 
yet. The events were mostly expected to occur in adolescence and early adulthood, with 
26.4% of the events expected to occur before the age of 11, 57.5% between the ages of 11 
and 30 years, and 16.1% after the age of 30.  
Table 2.1 shows the event categories selected by the participants and the ratings 
associated with those categories. Whereas 2.4% of the CLS events was categorised as 
‘others’, the participants assigned the remaining events to 43 categories. Thirty-four of these 
categories were Malaysian CLS events (representing 88.7% of the events), whereas the 
remaining 9 categories were atypical according to the norms of Janssen and Haque (2018). Of 
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the 43 event categories in the present study, 31 categories surpassed the 4% cut-off set by 
Berntsen and Rubin (2004). Twenty-eight of these categories were Malaysian CLS events 
from Janssen and Haque (2018). However, there were also three ‘new’ categories (“own 
birth”, “adulthood”, and “twenty-first birthday”) that surpassed the 4% cut-off.  
Although the typicality scores and rankings may not have been exactly the same 
between the Malaysian CLS categories (Janssen & Haque, 2018) and the current study’s CLS 
categories, both shared the same 8 categories in the ten most typical categories listed 
(“marriage”, “having children”, “university graduation”, “first full-time job”, “begin 
university”, “begin primary school”, “begin childcare”, and “own death”). The percentage of 
mentions of the categories in the current study was strongly and positively associated with the 
percentage of mentions of the same categories in the Malaysian CLS (r(46) = .80, p < .001), 
suggesting that the typicality scores of the Malaysian CLS and the current study do overlap 
largely for their corresponding categories.  
 
Individual Life Story [Descriptives] 
Participants also listed seven significant events they had experienced or perceived 
they would experience in their life. In reference to the scales’ midpoints as being average, the 
events were on average important (M = 5.91, SD = 1.25), prevalent (M = 63.39, SD = 26.94), 
and had medium pressure levels (M = 3.84, SD = 2.10). The majority of the events were rated 
positive (62.1%), and fewer events were rated negative (21.7%) or neutral (16.2%). Whereas 
66.4% of events had been experienced, 33.6% of events had not been experienced yet. 
Similar to the CLS, the majority of events occur during adolescence and early adulthood, 
with 15.0% of the events having occurred (or being expected to occur) before the age of 11, 
77.4% between the ages of 11 and 30 years, and 7.6% after the age of 30. 
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Table 2.2 provides information about the categories and ratings of the ILS events. 
Whereas 7.9% of the ILS events were categorised as ‘others’, the remaining events were 
divided into 45 categories. Thirty-three of these categories were Malaysian CLS events 
(representing 78.9% of the events), and 12 categories were atypical (Janssen & Haque, 2018). 
A total of 31 categories surpassed the 4% cut-off, whereby 24 events were part of the 
Malaysian CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018), and there were seven ‘new’ categories 
(“adulthood”, “problems at home”, “own birth”, “first part-time job”, “death grandparent”, 
“divorce parents”, and “moving to another house”).  
 
Life Scripts and Life Stories [Descriptives] 
Categories. The CLS and ILS of the current study were very similar. Of the 45 
categories in the ILS, 41 categories appeared in the CLS. Four ILS categories were not 
mentioned as CLS categories (“birth of younger sibling”, “death of friend or sibling”, 
“divorce parents”, and “eighteenth birthday”), whereas two CLS categories were not 
mentioned as ILS categories (“having grandchildren” and “learning to walk or first steps”). 
However, this large overlap did not mean that event categories were mentioned with the same 
frequencies, but there were similar trends in the mentions, r(45) = .55, p < .001. Although 31 
categories in both the CLS and ILS of the present study surpassed the 4% threshold, only 23 
categories were present in both subsets.  
Order effects. The order of the CLS and ILS tasks were counterbalanced, with half 
the participants answering CLS task first followed by the ILS task and the other half 
answering the ILS task first followed by the CLS task. To test for order effects, independent-
samples t-tests were conducted. Participants who answered the CLS task first listed ILS 
events that were more important (CLS-ILS: M = 6.05, SD = 0.68; ILS-CLS: M = 5.75, SD = 
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0.67; t(118) = 2.38, p = .019, d = 0.44), more typical (CLS-ILS: M = 155.83, SD = 64.83; 
ILS-CLS: M = 118.05, SD = 67.48; t(118) = 3.13, p = .002, d = 0.57), and not yet 
experienced (CLS-ILS: M = 2.67, SD = 1.54; ILS-CLS: M = 2.00, SD = 1.65; t(118) = 2.30, p 
= .024, d = 0.42). However, after applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .005), there was only 
an order effect for typicality of the ILS, suggesting that the CLS is used as a framework for 
the recall of ILS events.  
Predictive effects of CLS on ILS. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to 
investigate the relations between and within the components of the CLS and ILS (see Table 
2.3). Because CLS has been theorised as the framework underlying the recall of 
autobiographical memories, linear regressions were calculated to investigate the predictive 
effects of CLS components towards its corresponding ILS components. The importance of 
the CLS significantly explained 23.8% of the variance in the importance of the ILS, F(1, 118) 
= 36.77, p < .001. Similarly, the corresponding variables of the CLS significantly explained 
13.7% of the variance in emotional valence, F(1, 118) = 18.70, p < .001; 10.3% of the 
variance in pressure, F(1, 118) = 13.49, p < .001; 4.6% of the variance in perceived ability, 
F(1, 118) = 5.70, p = .019; and 14.0% of the variance in typicality, F(1, 118) = 19.21, p < 
.001, of the ILS. However, application of a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .01) showed that 
perceived ability towards CLS did not predict perceived ability towards ILS. These findings 
further provide evidence that CLS is the underlying framework for the recall of ILS.  
 
Life Scripts, Depression, and Trauma [Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4] 
Scoring of subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. To examine the data 
from a categorical approach, participants were allocated into subclinical and psychologically 
healthy groups according to the cut-off scores of the measures. Participants who scored a 
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total of 10 and above in the depression sub-scale of the DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1993) were categorized as subclinical depression (n = 54; males = 12, females = 42), whereas 
those who scored a total of 9 and below were categorized as non-depressed (n = 66; males = 
23, females = 43). The depression scores did not vary significantly from the cut-off score (M 
= 10.62, SD = 10.16, t(119) = 0.67, p = .507), indicating the scores clustered around the cut-
off.  
For the PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013), individuals that scored a total of 33 and above 
were categorized as subclinical PTSD (n = 42; males = 10, females = 32), whereas those who 
scored a total of 32 and below were categorized as non-PTSD (n = 78; males = 25, females = 
53). The trauma scores varied significantly from the cut-off score (M = 26.73, SD = 18.58, 
t(119) = -3.70, p < .001), indicating that the scores were distributed away from the cut-off. 
Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences. To examine differences 
in CLS components between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and between 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, independent-samples t-tests were conducted (see 
Table 2.4, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4). The subclinical depression and non-
depressed groups gave similar ratings of importance, t(118) = 0.85, p = .398; emotional 
valence, t(97.45) = 0.33, p = .744; societal pressure, t(118) = 0.99, p = .323; and perceived 
ability, t(118) = 0.47, p = .637. However, the subclinical depression group reported less 
typical CLS events, t(118) = 2.80, p = .006, d = 0.51 . This difference remained significant 
after applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .01). The order of tasks did not affect the relation 
between depression and CLS typicality, F(1, 116) = 0.69, p = .408.  
Similarly to the depression groups, there was no difference in ratings of importance 
t(118) = -0.79, p = .430; emotional valence, t(67.20) = -0.44, p = .659; societal pressure, 
t(118) = -0.92, p = .360; and perceived ability, t(118) = -1.51, p = .133, between the 
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subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. Although the subclinical PTSD group reported CLS 
events that were less typical, t(118) = 2.12, p = .036, d = 0.42, this difference was no longer 
significant after correcting with Bonferroni (p ≤ .01). 
 Predictive effects of depression and trauma on CLS and ILS. To examine the data 
using a continuous approach, exploratory linear regression analyses were conducted, to 
investigate the possible predictive effects of depression and trauma severity on CLS 
characteristics. Although depression severity significantly explained 5% of the variance in 
CLS typicality (F(1, 118) = 6.16, p = .015, beta = -.22), it was no longer a predictor of CLS 
typicality after Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .01). Depression severity also did not significantly 
predict CLS importance, emotional valence, pressure, or perceived ability (ps > .05). 
Regression analyses also showed that trauma severity did not significantly predict any of the 
CLS characteristics (ps > .05).  
   
Life Stories, Depression, and Trauma [Hypotheses 3 and 4] 
 Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences. Independent-samples t-
tests were used to examine differences in ILS between subclinical depression and non-
depressed groups, and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups (see Table 2.4, 
Figure 2.2, Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6). This categorical approach showed that both 
subclinical depression and non-depressed groups had similar ratings for importance t(118) = 
0.40, p = .692; societal pressure, t(118) = -1.57, p = .118; perceived ability, t(118) = 0.06, p = 
.951; and typicality, t(118) = 1.70, p = .092, of the ILS events. Although the subclinical 
depression group reported less positive events as part of their ILS, t(118) = 2.39, p = .018, d = 
0.43, this difference did not remain significant after applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ 
.01).  
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Similar to the depression groups, there was no difference between importance, t(118) 
= -0.78, p = .436; perceived ability to achieve the events, t(118) = 0.35, p = .727; and 
typicality, t(118) = 1.51, p = .134, of ILS events for subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. 
However, the subclinical PTSD group reported less positive events, t(118) = 2.67, p = .009, d 
= 0.49, and higher societal pressure to experience events perceived as significant to their ILS, 
t(118) = -3.15, p = .002, d = 0.60. These differences remained significant after applying a 
Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .01). The order of tasks did not affect the relations of trauma with 
emotional valence, F(1, 116) = 0.26, p = .615, and pressure, F(1, 116) = 1.30, p = .257. 
Because there was a difference in ILS valence but not ILS typicality between the 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, additional analyses were conducted to test whether 
there were differences in the emotional valence ratings between the PTSD groups for each 
ILS event that was typical (i.e., events that had more than 4% rating in the Malaysian CLS) 
and had a minimum of 10 participants per group. Ten ILS events met these criteria, and, 
although the mean ratings of the subclinical PTSD group were more negative than the mean 
ratings of the non-PTSD group for 8 out of the 10 events (see Table 2.5), there were no 
significant differences (ps > .05).  
 Predictive effects of depression and trauma on CLS and ILS. To investigate 
whether depression and trauma severity could be predictors of ILS characteristics, 
exploratory linear regression analyses were conducted using a continuous approach. 
Although depression severity explained 5.4% of variance in ILS emotional valence (F(1, 118) 
= 6.71, p = .011, beta = -.23), it was no longer a predictor of ILS valence after correcting with 
Bonferroni (p ≤ .01). On the other hand, trauma severity explained 5.9% of the variance in 
ILS emotional valence (F(1, 118) = 7.42, p = .007), with higher trauma scores predicting the 
listing of less positive events in the ILS (beta = -.24, p = .007). Trauma severity also 
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explained 6.7% of variance in ILS pressure (F(1, 118) = 8.48, p = .004), with higher trauma 
scores predicting higher pressure to achieve ILS events (beta = .26, p = .004). These 
associations were still significant after correcting for family-wise errors (p ≤ .01). Other ILS 
characteristics were not predicted by depression or trauma severity (ps > .05). 
 
Moderators of Depression, Trauma, Life Scripts, and Life Stories [Hypothesis 5] 
To investigate the effects societal identification on the relations of depression and 
trauma with CLS typicality and pressure, moderation analyses were conducted. Total 
collectivism was found to only moderate the relation between depression and CLS typicality 
(ΔR2 = .04, B = .18, SE = .08, p = .022). Higher depression predicted lower CLS typicality 
more strongly as collectivism levels decreased. However, this moderating effect was only 
present at low collectivism levels. Upon further exploration, it was found that having less 
vertical collectivism specifically strengthened the predictive effects of depression on the 
typicality of CLS (ΔR2 = .04, B = .20, SE = .10, p = .035), but only at low levels of vertical 
collectivism. Horizontal collectivism did not significantly moderate this association (ΔR2 = 
.01, B = .12, SE = .12, p = .322). Total collectivism did not moderate the relations between 
depression and CLS pressure (ΔR2 = .02, B = .00, SE = .00, p = .108), trauma and CLS 
typicality (ΔR2 = .02, B = .06, SE = .04, p = .111), and trauma and CLS pressure (ΔR2 = .01, B 
= .00, SE = .00, p = .262).   
Moderation analyses were also conducted to test the effects societal identification on 
the relations between depression and trauma with ILS typicality and pressure. Total 
collectivism moderated the relation between depression and ILS pressure (ΔR2 = .07, B = .00, 
SE = .00, p = .004), from a non-significant relation to a significant relation. Higher 
depression predicted higher ILS pressure more strongly as collectivism levels increased. 
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Similarly, total collectivism also moderated the relation between trauma and ILS pressure 
(ΔR2 = .03, B = .00, SE = .00, p = .049), whereby higher trauma predicted higher ILS pressure 
more strongly as collectivism levels increased. These moderating effects were observed at 
moderate and high levels of collectivism. Additional analyses indicated that having more 
vertical collectivism specifically strengthened the predictive effects of depression on the 
pressure towards ILS (ΔR2 = .06, B = .01, SE = .00, p = .009), and trauma on the pressure 
towards ILS (ΔR2 = .03, B = .00, SE = .00, p = .046), at both moderate and high levels of 
vertical collectivism. Horizontal collectivism was not a significant moderator of the 
depression and ILS pressure (ΔR2 = .00, B = .00, SE = .00, p = .710) and trauma and ILS 
pressure (ΔR2 = .00, B = .00, SE = .00, p = .782) relations. Total collectivism did not 
moderate the relations between depression and ILS typicality (ΔR2 = .00, B = -.03, SE = .09, p 
= .775), and trauma and ILS typicality (ΔR2 = .00, B = -.01, SE = .05, p = .778).  
 
Discussion 
The current study examined differences in the recall of CLS and ILS for participants 
with subclinical depression and PTSD and participants who are psychologically healthy. It 
also aimed to examine whether the societal pressure and perceived ability related to achieving 
the CLS and ILS events would be different for those with subclinical levels of depression and 
PTSD. Last, it aimed to study the role of societal identification on the relations of depression 
and trauma with CLS and ILS. To investigate these questions, participants completed the 
CLS and ILS tasks, along with measures of trauma, depression, and societal identification.  
Overall findings indicate that: 
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1) There were no differences in importance and emotional valence of the CLS between 
individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy 
individuals (Hypothesis 1 was accepted). 
2) Individuals with subclinical levels of depression generated CLS events that were less 
typical as compared to those who are psychologically healthy (part of Hypothesis 2 
was not accepted), but there were no differences in typicality of the CLS between 
individuals with subclinical PTSD and those who are psychologically healthy (part of 
Hypothesis 2 was accepted).  
3) There was no difference in typicality of ILS events between individuals with 
subclinical depression and PTSD and those who are psychologically healthy 
(Hypothesis 3 was not accepted). 
4) There were no differences in CLS pressure, CLS perceived ability, and ILS perceived 
ability between individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD and those who are 
psychologically healthy. There was also no difference in ILS pressure between 
individuals with subclinical depression and those who are psychologically healthy 
(Hypothesis 4 was not accepted). 
5) Individuals with subclinical levels of PTSD retrieved ILS events that were more 
negative and associated higher pressure towards ILS events than psychologically 
healthy individuals (Hypothesis 4 was not accepted). Similarly, higher trauma severity 
predicted more negative ILS and higher ILS pressure. 
6) Collectivism moderated the relation between depression with CLS typicality, 
depression with ILS pressure, and trauma with ILS pressure (part of Hypothesis 5 was 
accepted). Lower collectivism strengthened relations of higher depression and lower 
typicality of CLS, whereas higher collectivism strengthened relations of higher 
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depression and trauma with higher pressure of ILS. Collectivism did not moderate the 
relations between depression and trauma with CLS pressure and ILS typicality, and 
trauma with CLS typicality (part of Hypothesis 5 was not accepted).  
 
Characteristics of Life Scripts and Life Stories  
 The CLS in the current study had large overlaps with the existing Malaysian CLS 
(Janssen & Haque, 2018), in terms of the types of events mentioned often (i.e., typical events) 
and the frequency of mentions for the respective CLS events (i.e., typicality scores). Despite 
largely overlapping, there were still small differences in the events and frequency between 
the two CLS. These small differences may be because, although the CLS is a type of 
semantic knowledge that does not change much, there is still room for some variation due to 
noise. The characteristics of the CLS were also shown to be related to the parallel 
characteristics of the ILS, suggesting that CLS may indeed be used as a framework for the 
narration of ILS (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).  
 
Life Scripts, Depression, and Trauma 
 Most characteristics of the CLS were alike (i.e., importance, emotional valence, 
pressure, and perceived ability) for subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and for 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. The lack of differences in these CLS characteristics 
between the groups matched previous findings (Rubin et al., 2008). CLS are semantic 
knowledge about events which are culturally shared, and are stable across age, gender, and 
education (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Janssen & Rubin, 2011; Janssen et al., 2014). Semantic 
memory consists of factual knowledge and schemas of the world, which is why it is not 
expected to vary widely between individuals (Binder & Desai, 2011; Tulving, 1972). This 
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explanation indicates that individuals should possess the same range of information about 
which are the typical events in a CLS and would account for the lack of variation in the 
characteristics of CLS.  
In line with the expectation that everyone has similar information about the CLS, the 
current study did not find differences in the typicality of the CLS for the subclinical PTSD 
and non-PTSD groups, similar to the findings of Rubin et al. (2008) but different from the 
findings of Rubin et al. (2009). However, the current study found that the subclinical 
depression group listed CLS events that were less typical than the non-depressed group. 
Rubin et al. (2009) similarly found a relation between high depression and low CLS 
typicality for their older sample. This finding was, however, not discussed in detail and the 
CLS was concluded as still stable due to the smaller associations as compared to the ILS. 
Although when using a categorical approach there were differences in the typicality of the 
CLS between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, when using a continuous 
approach depression severity was not a predictor of typicality of the CLS, similar to the 
results of Jørgensen et al. (2012). This finding suggests that there may be other mechanisms 
that may explain the group difference instead of depression levels directly.  
Provided that information about the CLS is still stable regardless of levels of 
depression, there may be a difference instead in the method of selection of events to be 
included. There was a total of 35 events classified as ‘typical’, with a rating of at least 4%, in 
the Malaysian CLS obtained by Janssen and Haque (2018). However, the CLS task only 
requires participants to list seven events. Hence, the method, or criterion, used to narrow 
down 35 events to seven events may be different for individuals with subclinical depression 
symptoms. People with subclinical depression symptoms may choose events that, while still 
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passing the threshold, are mentioned less often in the CLS than people who are 
psychologically healthy.  
Besides selection methods, low typicality is theorized to be due to low awareness of 
societal expectations (Rubin et al., 2009). Previous research has shown that people with 
higher depression become more disconnected and apathetic towards the expectations of the 
society (Cruwys Alexander Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, et al., 2014; Matthews et al., 2016; 
Taylor & Vaughan, 1967). This disconnect from society could potentially decrease the 
feedback and vicarious experiences involved in the transmission of the CLS. Additionally, 
individuals with depression have been shown to not keep up with the news, events, and 
occurrences in society, making their semantic memory and knowledge regarding societal 
events to be less accurate (Söderlund et al., 2014). These less accurate schematic 
representations may cause them to select less typical or not typical events when asked about 
the CLS. To test whether there are differences in the selection of CLS events or differences in 
the knowledge of the CLS for subclinical depression and PTSD groups and psychologically 
healthy groups, a second study was conducted. 
 
Study 2 
The Current Study 
Study 2 aimed to investigate the cognitive mechanism that may explain the 
differences in the typicality of the CLS between individuals with subclinical levels of 
depression and psychologically healthy individuals. This study was conducted to test whether 
there are differences in the selection of events to be included in the CLS among individuals 
with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms. This study also investigated whether there 
are differences in the knowledge of which events are typical and atypical in regards to the 
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CLS for individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms. The results of this 
study could provide further insight into the factors that may be causing differences in 
culturally shared semantic knowledge that are typically stable across other demographic 
factors. The findings could also help identify memory-related cognitive differences and 
difficulties that are experienced by individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD 
symptoms.  
The research questions that we aim to answer in the second study include: 
1) Are there differences in the selection of CLS events between individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals? 
2) Are there differences in the knowledge of typical CLS events between individuals 
with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy 
individuals? 
 
Based on these research questions and the literature, we hypothesized for the second 
study that: 
1) There will be differences in the selection of typical CLS events between individuals 
with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy 
individuals 
2) The knowledge of typical CLS events of individuals with subclinical levels of 
depression and PTSD will be different from psychologically healthy individuals 
 
To test both these hypotheses, Malaysian participants were asked whether events were 
typical events experienced within their culture, and to describe and rate seven significant 
Chapter 2: Cultural Life Scripts and Individual Life Stories - 84 
 
 
events experienced by a prototypical infant from their culture. Participants then answered the 




 Similar to Study 1, a Malaysian sample was used for the second study. Power analysis 
with a medium effect size of .50, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .20 (to give a power of .80) 
indicated that 102 participants would be needed to reach statistical significance in an 
independent-samples t-test. Two-hundred forty-three students from the University of 
Nottingham Malaysia were recruited for the second study. Thirty-two participants were 
excluded from the analyses due to errors in answering the CLS task (four listed religious 
events and commercial holidays; three listed personal experiences; ten listed abstract values 
and principles; thirteen made errors in categorization of events; two did not complete the 
task). The remaining 211 participants had a mean age of 20.55 (SD = 2.04, range = 17-31), 
and the sample consisted of 57 males and 154 females. The data was once again viewed as 
both categorical and on a continuum. 
 
Materials 
Cultural Life Script (CLS) knowledge task. A CLS knowledge task was created for 
the present study by the current researchers to record the knowledge a person has about 
events that are typical and atypical to the CLS of the culture. Participants were given a list of 
60 events, comprising of 35 typical Malaysian CLS events (Janssen & Haque, 2018), 24 
atypical events, and 1 ‘others’ option for participants to fill in an event that may not have 
been present in the list. The 24 atypical events were obtained from a mixture of events below 
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the 4% cut-off in the Malaysian CLS, events from CLS of different cultures, events from ILS 
of past studies (Bohn, 2010; Janssen & Haque, 2018; Rubin et al., 2009), and new events that 
were created by the current researchers. The participants were asked to decide whether each 
event will take place in a typical life course of a person from their culture (‘yes’ or ‘no’). 
Cultural Life Script (CLS) task. The CLS task derived from Berntsen and Rubin 
(2004) was used, similar to Study 1, but in the second study it was targeted to record the 
selection of CLS events made by individuals. Participants described seven important events 
that would most likely occur in a prototypical infant’s life from their culture from birth to 
death, and categorized the events they listed into 59 pre-existing options that were also used 
in the CLS knowledge task (Bohn, 2010; Janssen & Haque, 2018; Rubin et al., 2009). If the 
event retrieved by the participants did not fit into any of the pre-existing categories, they were 
asked to categorize the event as ‘other’. 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) and PCL-5. Similar 
to Study 1, the PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013) was used to measure symptoms of PTSD or 
trauma (refer to Appendix B). But unlike Study 1, the CES-D scale was used to measure the 
depression scores instead of the DASS-21 in Study 2. The DASS-21 has a total of four 
different depression cut-offs (i.e., mild, moderate, severe, and extreme) (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1993). The lowest cut-off (i.e., mild) was used to allocate the subclinical 
depression groups in Study 1, as it was perceived to most likely reflect the baseline of above 
average depression scores in a normal population, whereas the other cut-offs possibly reflect 
differing severities within the above average range. However, there is no empirical evidence 
for which cut-off would actually be best to identify those with subclinical level of symptoms 
in normal populations (e.g., mild or moderate cut-off). The CES-D, on the other hand, has 
been shown to be suitable to measure depression in normal populations, and has one cut-off 
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score that clearly reflect above average depression symptoms in regards to a normal 
population (Radloff, 1977). For this reason, the current study (and all subsequent studies in 
this thesis) used the CES-D scale to measure depression. Despite the difference in 
measurements used, strong correlations have been found between the DASS-21 and CES-D 
(Weiss, Aderka, Lee, Beard, & Björgvinsson, 2015), suggesting that the results are still 
comparable between Study 1 and Study 2. 
The CES-D scale (Radloff, 1977) is a 20-item instrument developed to measure the 
epidemiology of depression symptomology in the general population (refer to Appendix D). 
It consists of a four-point Likert scale (ranging from 0 to 3), and the depression score is 
obtained by adding all the items together. Higher total scores represent more and stronger 
depression symptoms. Although the original cut-off score for the CES-D that indicates a risk 
of depression is 16 (Radloff, 1977), more recent reviews and meta-analyses have found that a 
cut-off of 20 is more appropriate for the general population in current times (Vilagut, Forero, 
Barbaglia, & Alonso, 2016). This scale has a Cronbach’s alphas ranging between .85 and .90, 
and a one-year test-retest reliability ranging between .45 and .70 (Radloff, 1977).  
 
Procedure 
This study was approved by the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Nottingham Malaysia (SJ111019). The study was conducted as an online 
survey. Participants were first given an information sheet to read, and a consent form and 
demographic sheet to answer. After they had given their informed consent, participants 
answered the CLS knowledge task, the CLS task, CES-D, and PCL-5. The order of the CLS 
knowledge task and the CLS task were counterbalanced. The session took approximately 20-
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30 minutes to complete. At the end of the session, the participants were thanked for their 
contribution, for which they received a small financial reward (RM5). 
 
Scoring 
Similar to Study 1, the events generated in the traditional CLS task were compared to 
the Malaysian CLS in Janssen and Haque (2018)’s study to obtain the typicality scores. The 
percentage of times each event was mentioned in the Malaysian CLS was used as the 
respective events’ typicality scores but only for typical events (i.e., events mentioned 4% and 
more times in the Malaysian CLS), whereas the atypical events (i.e., events mentioned less 
than 4% of the times) were scored as zero (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin et al., 2009). 
Total typicality of CLS was calculated by summing the typicality scores for the seven events 
generated in the CLS task.  
The total number of events rated as being typical, a measure of CLS knowledge, was 
calculated by summing all the events that had “yes” responses in the CLS knowledge task. To 
determine the accuracy of CLS knowledge, the number of events correctly identified as being 
typical and atypical were calculated. The number of events correctly identified as being 
typical was obtained by adding all the typical events based on the norms of the Malaysian 
CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018) that were responded with “yes” in the CLS knowledge task. In 
a similar manner, the number of events correctly identified as being atypical was obtained by 
adding all the atypical events in the CLS knowledge task that were answered with a “no”. 
 
Results 
Cultural Life Script Events [Descriptives] 
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On the traditional CLS task, participants listed seven significant events that would be 
experienced by a prototypical infant from their culture. Table 2.6 shows the event categories 
selected by participants. Only 3.1% of the CLS events were categorised as ‘others’, whereas 
the remaining events were assigned into 55 categories. Based on the norms from Janssen and 
Haque (2018), 35 of these categories were Malaysian CLS events (representing 78.7% of the 
events), whereas the remaining 20 categories were atypical. From the total of 55 categories in 
the current study, 35 categories surpassed the 4% cut-off (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), whereby 
27 of these categories were Malaysian CLS events (Janssen & Haque, 2018) and the other 8 
were ‘new’ categories ( “own birth”, “adulthood”, “engagement / proposal”, major failure”, 
“first part-time job”, “death of grandparents”, “eighteenth birthday”, and “twenty-first 
birthday”).  
The Malaysian CLS categories (Janssen & Haque, 2018) and the current study’s CLS 
categories shared 9 categories in the ten most typical categories listed (“marriage”, “begin 
childcare”, “university graduation”, “first full-time job”, “having children”, “begin 
university”, “begin primary school”, “fall in love”, and “own death”). There was strong a 
positive correlation for the percentage of mentions of the categories between the current 
study and the Malaysian CLS (r(57) = .84, p < .001), suggesting that there are large overlaps 
in the frequency of mentions for the CLS categories of both studies.  
The CLS of the current study also shared similarities with the CLS from Study 1. All 
43 categories from the CLS in Study 1 also appeared in the CLS of the current study. 
However, there were 12 categories that were only mentioned in the CLS of Study 2, but not 
in the CLS of Study 1 (“engagement / proposal”, “major failure”, “eighteenth birthday”, 
“birth of younger sibling”, “death of sibling or friend”, “getting a pet”, “take post-graduate or 
professional courses”, “first tooth / teething”, “death of partner”, “hajj / pilgrimage”, 
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“become an aunt / uncle”, and “learning to read and write”). Although 35 categories in the 
CLS of the current study and 31 categories in the CLS of Study 1 surpassed the 4% threshold, 
only 29 categories were present in both CLS.  
The CLS from Studies 1 and 2 shared 9 categories in the ten most typical categories 
listed in both studies (“marriage”, “begin childcare”, “university graduation”, “first full-time 
job”, “having children”, “begin university”, “own birth”, “begin primary school”, and “own 
death”). There was also a strong positive correlation for the percentage of mentions of the 
categories between the CLSs from the Studies 1 and 2 (r(47) = .96, p < .001), highlighting 
that there are large overlaps in the frequency of mentions for both CLS.  
 
Typicality of Cultural Life Script Events [Descriptives] 
 On the CLS knowledge task, participants rated whether each event presented was a 
typical or atypical CLS event in their culture. Table 2.6 shows the percentage of ratings for 
each event category being a typical CLS event (M = 78.01, SD = 14.93). The event category 
that had the highest rating of being a typical CLS event was “adulthood” (96.21%), whereas 
the event category with the lowest rating was “hajj / pilgrimage” (25.12%). Thirty-two events 
had a rating of 80% and above (M = 88.15, SD = 4.12). Twenty-six of these events were 
Malaysian CLS events according to the norms of Janssen and Haque (2018), and 6 of these 
events were atypical events. The other 27 events had ratings of less than 80% (M = 65.98, SD 
= 14.15). They consisted of 9 Malaysian CLS events (Janssen & Haque, 2018) and 18 
atypical events.  
Typical events according to the Malaysian CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018) were more 
often rated as being a typical event on the CLS knowledge task as compared to the atypical 
events (M typical = 177.23, SD = 17.64; M atypical = 146.17, SD = 38.03; t(29.85) = 3.74, p 
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= .001). Although there were no large overlaps, there were similar trends in the ratings of 
typical events on the CLS knowledge task and frequency of mentions on the traditional CLS 
task for the respective events in the current study (r(57) = .54, p < .001). These findings 
suggest that the CLS events that are considered as typical are consistent across the tasks.  
 
Life Scripts, Depression, and Trauma [Hypotheses 1 and 2] 
Scoring of subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. Participants were 
allocated into subclinical and psychologically healthy groups to analyse the data using a 
categorical approach. Participants who scored a total of 20 and above in the CES-D (Vilagut 
et al., 2016) were categorized as subclinical depression (n = 112; males = 28, females = 84), 
whereas those who scored a total of 19 and below were categorized as non-depressed (n = 99; 
males = 29, females = 70). The depression scores varied significantly from the cut-off score 
(M = 21.89, SD = 11.48, t(210) = 2.39, p = .018), indicating that the scores were distributed 
away from the cut-off. 
For the PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013), individuals that scored a total of 33 and above 
were categorized as subclinical PTSD (n = 82; males = 21, females = 61), whereas those who 
scored a total of 32 and below were categorized as non-PTSD (n = 129; males = 36, females 
= 93). The trauma scores varied significantly from the cut-off score (M = 28.68, SD = 18.19, 
t(210) = -3.45, p = .001), indicating that the scores were distributed away from the cut-off. 
Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences. To examine differences 
in CLS typicality and knowledge between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, 
and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, independent-samples t-tests were 
conducted (see Table 2.7, Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8). On the traditional CLS task, the subclinical 
depression and non-depressed groups generated CLS events that have similar typicality 
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(t(209) = 1.65, p = .101). However, on the CLS knowledge task, although they had similar 
accuracy in identifying typical CLS events (t(209) = 1.76, p = .079), the subclinical 
depression group rated more events as being typical CLS events overall (t(209) = 2.53, p = 
.012, d = 0.35) and was less accurate in identifying atypical CLS events (t(209) = -3.22, p = 
.002, d = 0.44) than the non-depressed group. These differences remained significant after 
applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .013). The order of tasks did not affect the relation 
between depression and total CLS typical events, F(1, 207) = 2.24, p = .589, and depression 
and accuracy of atypical events, F(1, 207) = 2.66, p = .512.  
Similar to the depression groups, there was no difference in typicality of the CLS 
events generated for the subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups (t(209) = -0.57, p = .569) 
on the traditional CLS task. The total number of events rated as being typical CLS events 
(t(209) = 1.97, p = .051), and the number of events accurately identified as typical CLS 
events (t(209) = 1.03, p = .304) also did not differ between the subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups on the CLS knowledge task. However, the subclinical PTSD group was less 
accurate in identifying atypical CLS events (t(209) = -2.95, p = .004, d = 0.41) than the non-
PTSD group, even after Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .013). The order of tasks did not affect 
the relation between trauma and accuracy of atypical events, F(1, 207) = 0.14, p = .712. 
 Predictive effects of depression and trauma on CLS and ILS. Looking at the data 
as a continuum, exploratory linear regression analyses were conducted to investigate the 
possible predictive effects of depression and trauma severity on CLS typicality and 
knowledge. Depression severity significantly explained 3.5% of the variance in the accuracy 
of atypical CLS events (F(1, 209) = 7.58, p = .006), with higher depression scores predicting 
lower accuracy in identifying atypical CLS events (beta = -.19, p = .006). This association 
was still significant after correcting for family-wise errors (p ≤ .013). Depression severity did 
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not significantly predict CLS typicality, total events rated as typical, and accuracy of typical 
events (ps > .05).  
Although trauma severity significantly explained 2.2% of the variance in the accuracy 
of atypical CLS events (F(1, 209) = 4.78, p = .030, beta = -.15), it was no longer a predictor 
of accuracy of atypical CLS events after Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .013). Trauma severity 
also did not predict CLS typicality, total events rated as typical, and accuracy of typical 
events (ps > .05).  
 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate whether there were differences in knowledge 
of the CLS or differences in selections of CLS events between subclinical depression and 
PTSD groups and psychologically healthy groups. To investigate these aims, participants 
completed the traditional CLS task, the newly developed CLS knowledge task, and 
questionnaires measuring depression and trauma. Overall findings indicate that:  
1) There were no differences in typicality of the CLS events (i.e., selection) on the 
traditional CLS task generated by individuals with subclinical levels depression and 
PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals (Hypothesis 1 was not accepted). 
2) Individuals with subclinical levels of depression rated more events overall as being 
typical CLS events (i.e., knowledge) than psychologically healthy individuals on the 
CLS knowledge task (part of Hypothesis 2 was accepted), but there were no 
differences in overall rating of typical CLS events between those with subclinical 
levels of PTSD and those who are psychologically healthy (part of Hypothesis 2 was 
not accepted). 
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3) Those with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD had similar accuracy in 
identifying typical CLS events (i.e., knowledge) as those who are psychologically 
healthy on the CLS knowledge task (part of Hypothesis 2 was not accepted). 
4) Individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD had lower accuracy in 
identifying atypical CLS events (i.e., knowledge) than psychologically healthy 
individuals on the CLS knowledge task (part of Hypothesis 2 was accepted). 
 
Characteristics of Life Scripts 
There were large overlaps in the type of events mentioned and the frequency of those 
mentions between the CLS in the current study, the CLS from Study 1, and the Malaysian 
CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018). Both the knowledge and traditional measures of the CLS in 
the current study also had similar types and ratings of typical CLS events. Both these findings 
indicate that the CLS is culturally shared semantic knowledge. Although there were large 
overlaps and similarities between the three CLS, the CLS from this study, Study 1, and the 
Malaysian CLS were not one-hundred-percent identical to each other, suggesting that, due to 
noise, minor variations may exist in this type of semantic knowledge.  
In the CLS knowledge task of the current study, more Malaysian CLS events (Janssen 
& Haque, 2018) than atypical events were rated as being “typical CLS events”, whereas more 
atypical events than Malaysian CLS events were rated as “not typical CLS events”. However, 
the event that had the highest rating of being a typical event (“adulthood”) in the CLS 
knowledge task was not the same as the event that had the highest frequency of mentions in 
the CLS from the traditional CLS task in the current study, the CLS from Study 1, and the 
Malaysian CLS (“marriage”). Moreover, despite having the highest rating of being a “typical 
CLS event” in the CLS knowledge task, the event “adulthood” is not a typical event 
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according to the norms of the Malaysian CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018). These findings once 
again suggest that there are slight variations in the semantic knowledge shared within the 
culture.  
 
Life Scripts, Depression, and Trauma 
 CLS are semantic knowledge that is stable and not expected to vary significantly 
between individuals within the same culture (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Binder & Desai, 2011; 
Janssen & Rubin, 2011; Janssen et al., 2014; Tulving, 1972). In line with the literature, there 
were no differences in the typicality of the events listed in the traditional CLS task between 
subclinical depression and PTSD groups and psychologically healthy groups in the current 
study when looking at the data using a categorical approach. The lack of differences in 
typicality indicates that the participants selected similar types of events for the CLS 
regardless of their depression and trauma symptoms. This result matches those of Rubin et al. 
(2008) but is different from those of Rubin et al. (2009).  
 There were also no differences in the number of events identified as “typical CLS 
events” between the subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups on the CLS knowledge task. 
However, there were differences for the depression groups, whereby individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression rated a higher number of events as being “typical CLS 
events” than individuals who were psychologically healthy. Further exploration revealed that 
individuals with subclinical levels of depression and trauma were able to identify typical CLS 
events as accurately as psychologically healthy individuals but had poorer accuracy in 
identifying atypical events. This result shows that individuals with subclinical levels of 
depression mistake more atypical events as being typical CLS events, which explains why 
they perceive a higher number of events are typically experienced within the Malaysian 
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society. When viewing the data as a continuum, higher depression severity was found to 
predict more inaccuracy towards discriminating atypical events from typical events. This 
increased inaccuracy could be due to those with more depression symptoms becoming less 
interested and connected with society and its norms (Cruwys Alexander Haslam, Dingle, 
Haslam, et al., 2014; Matthews et al., 2016; Taylor & Vaughan, 1967), and hence, having 
higher amounts of inaccurate knowledge of which events are more common and typical in the 
society (Söderlund et al., 2014).  
 Although individuals with subclinical levels of PTSD also perceived more atypical 
events as being typical CLS events, it did not have a large impact on the overall number of 
events they perceived as typical events when using a categorical approach. This finding 
suggests that there is a difference, but those with subclinical PTSD symptoms may not differ 
greatly from people who are psychologically healthy in their abilities to accurately 
discriminate atypical events. Despite the presence of a group difference, when using a 
continuous approach, trauma severity did not predict the accuracy of identifying atypical 
events, indicating that other mechanisms may be underlying the differences in accuracy for 
the trauma groups. For example, having higher or lower personal meaning attached towards 
certain events that may influence decisions and perceptions as to whether an event is typical 
or atypical (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985).  
 
General Discussion 
Characteristics of Life Scripts and Life Stories 
The ILS overlapped with the CLS in Study 1 and the Malaysian CLS (Janssen & 
Haque, 2018) in terms of types of events retrieved and frequency of the events being 
mentioned. The ratings of the characteristics of the CLS (i.e., typicality, importance, 
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emotional valence, and pressure) were also shown to predict the ratings of similar ILS 
characteristics. These findings indicate that the CLS is used as a framework for the recall and 
narration of the ILS (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003). Meanwhile, the 
CLS obtained in Study 1, Study 2, and the Malaysian CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018) had 
large overlaps with each other in terms of the types of events listed and frequency of 
mentions for those events respectively. The three CLSs also shared the same eight or nine 
events that were mentioned more often, with “marriage” being the event mentioned most 
often in all three CLSs. These findings provide evidence that CLS is indeed a type of 
semantic knowledge shared between people of the same culture and is stable within the 
specified culture.  
Despite being a type of semantic knowledge, there were still slight variations in the 
events and their frequencies between the CLS in Study 1, the CLS in Study 2, and the 
Malaysian CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018). There were also variations in identifying CLS 
events that were typical and atypical when compared to the norms of the Malaysian CLS 
(Janssen & Haque, 2018). Part of this variation is due to noise which encompases expected 
variations and standard errors (e.g., individual differences), whereas the other part may be 
due to societal norms and expectations evolving over time (Ehrlich & Levin, 2005). 
However, these changes may not be large or explicit, and instead, may manifest as smaller 
forms of variations. Furthermore, knowledge of societal expectations can be affected by a 
person’s own experiences and memories, which could then further affect the transmission and 
evolution of those expectations. These reasons may be why the CLSs and its range of typical 
events are not one-hundred percentage alike despite being from the same culture, but the 
large overlap signifies that the culturally semantic knowledge is indeed a reasonably stable 
structure.  




Differences in Cultural Life Scripts 
The subclinical depression and PTSD groups were shown to have similar ratings as 
the psychologically healthy groups for the importance, emotional valence, pressure to achieve 
events, and perceived ability to achieve events of the CLS. The lack of variation in the 
characteristics of the CLS further corroborates that CLS are culturally shared semantic 
knowledge that are stable across various factors (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Binder & Desai, 
2011; Janssen & Rubin, 2011; Janssen et al., 2014; Tulving, 1972). The subclinical PTSD 
and non-PTSD groups also generated CLS that had similar typicality and were able to 
accurately identify typical events at a similar level, in line with CLS being a type of semantic 
knowledge shared within the culture. The absence of difference in CLS typicality indicates 
that there are no differences in the selection of only seven typical events to be included from 
the 35 choices of typical CLS events (Janssen & Haque, 2018) for the trauma groups.  
However, the subclinical PTSD group had difficulties in identifying atypical events as 
accurately as the non-PTSD group, perceiving atypical events as typical CLS events instead. 
These results suggest that individuals with subclinical levels of PTSD may have small 
differences in their CLS knowledge. Trauma severity did not, however, predict this difference 
in the knowledge of the CLS, implying that other mechanisms may be involved. Differences 
in personal experiences, vicarious experiences, personal meaning, and value associated with 
the events may influence the perceptions, decisions of information to intake, transmissions of 
the semantic information related to the CLS (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Janssen & Haque, 
2018), all of which has the potential to affect the overall knowledge base of the CLS.  
Despite having these differences in atypical event accuracy, there were no significant 
increases in the overall events perceived as typical, which suggest that the CLS knowledge of 
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people with subclinical PTSD may not differ too greatly from people who are 
psychologically healthy. The lack of differences in CLS typicality also suggests that the 
difference in CLS knowledge for individuals with subclinical PTSD levels did not have a 
significant impact on their selection of events to be included into the CLS, or that they were 
able to accommodate the differences in CLS knowledge that exist.  
Individuals with subclinical levels of depression, on the other hand, were found to 
generated a less typical CLS than the psychologically healthy individuals in Study 1, which 
contradicts the expectation that the CLS is semantic knowledge that is stable and does not 
vary within the same culture. Because depression severity did not predict changes in the 
typicality of the CLS despite the presence of group differences, other mechanisms were 
theorized to explain the differences, such as differences in selection of typical events to 
include from the 35 available typical CLS events, and differences in knowledge of CLS 
events. There were, however, no differences in the typicality of CLS generated by the 
subclinical depression and non-depressed groups in Study 2, suggesting that the process of 
selecting typical events to be included into the CLS was similar across the groups, and 
unlikely to be the mechanism involved in explaining possible differences.  
Further investigation revealed that although the subclinical depression groups were 
able to identify typical events as well as the psychologically healthy groups, they had poorer 
accuracy in identifying atypical events, whereby they perceived the atypical events as being 
typical events. This inaccuracy resulted in those with subclinical depression symptoms 
having a larger number of events they perceived as being typical CLS events. These findings 
indicate that there are differences in the knowledge of the CLS for individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression, which may have caused them to include atypical events into 
the CLS they generated, and hence, coud explain the difference in CLS typicality as seen in 
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Study 1. The overall results from these studies suggest differences in the typicality of the 
CLS for individuals with subclinical levels of depression are more likely to be attributed to 
differences in their knowledge of the CLS rather than differences in selection of typical CLS 
events.  
Individuals who suffer from depression also experience social isolation (Matthews et 
al., 2016), which could decrease the feedback and vicarious experiences involved in the 
transmission of the CLS (Janssen & Haque, 2018), and thus, result in them possessing 
different or inaccurate knowledge regarding the events of the CLS. Moreover, as individuals 
with higher depression levels become apathetic and disconnected from society over time 
(Cruwys Alexander Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, et al., 2014; Matthews et al., 2016; Taylor & 
Vaughan, 1967), they demonstrate lower interest and effort in being updated about the events 
and occurrences in society, which could in turn also reduce the accuracy of their semantic 
knowledge of societal events (Söderlund et al., 2014) and cause differences in their 
knowledge of the CLS.  
Although the same CLS task and instructions were used in both Studies 1 and 2, the 
results obtained in Study 2 on the CLS typicality was different from Study 1. One possible 
reason for the differences in results between the two studies is the depression measure used. 
Study 1 used the DASS-21 to measure depression and allocate the subclinical groups, 
whereas Study 2 used the CES-D instead. Although the DASS-21 is strongly associated to the 
CES-D (Weiss et al., 2015) and both measurements are based on norms from normal 
populations (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993; Radloff, 1977), the cut-off scores for both 
measurements may not have been parallel to each other. The uncertain parallelism raises the 
possibility that the allocation of participants into the subclinical depression groups may not 
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have been identical for both studies, and hence, may explain the difference in results obtained 
for the typicality of CLS in Studies 1 and 2.  
Another possible reason for the difference in results lies in the number of categories 
provided to participants to categorize the CLS events into. Forty-five categories were 
provided in Study 1 to categorize the CLS events, whereas 59 events were provided in Study 
2 for the same purpose. Both Study 1 and Study 2 used the same 45 categories, but Study 2 
had an additional 14 categories included. The additional categories were included in the 
traditional CLS task of Study 2 to match the categories presented in the CLS knowledge task 
that was administered in the same study, so the same categories would be presented in both 
tasks and participants were not pre-empted as to which events were the atypical categories. It 
is possible that these additional categories and choices may have caused the categorization of 
events to be more spread out, especially for categories that were under the same umbrella and 
previously may have been categorized together (e.g., engagement / proposal and marriage; 
begin university and taking postgraduate courses), which may explain why the results 
obtained for the CLS typicality in Study 1 was not replicated in Study 2.  
 
Differences in Individual Life Stories  
There were differences in ILS characteristics for the subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD 
groups but not for the subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. Individuals with 
subclinical depression reported ILS with similar valence as individuals who are 
psychologically healthy, unlike the results of previous studies using normal (Bohn, 2010; 
Jørgensen et al., 2012; Rubin et al., 2009) and clinical (Dalgleish et al., 2011; Fromholt et al., 
2003; Habermas et al., 2008; Jobson et al., 2018) samples. Although individuals with clinical 
depression have been shown to have greater ease in recalling negative memories (Anderson 
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& Evans, 2015; Biedermann et al., 2017, Dalgleish et al., 2011; Dickson & Bates, 2006; 
Lloyd & Lishman, 1975) and have an increased attentional bias towards negative events 
(Baert, de Raedt, & Koster, 2010; Dalgleish et al., 2011), individuals with subclinical 
depression symptoms did not retrieve more negative events. This result suggests that any 
negative attentional biases and tendencies to retrieve negative memories in individuals with 
subclinical depression symptoms may not be detrimental enough to affect the retrieval of 
their life narrative.  
Individuals with subclinical PTSD reported a less positive ILS overall for both 
categorical and continuous approaches, similar to Rubin et al. (2009) but different from 
Rubin et al. (2008). Past research has shown that those with PTSD do demonstrate negative 
attentional biases (El Khoury-Malhame et al., 2011; Vythilingam et al., 2007). This negative 
attentional bias may ease accessibility towards negative events and increases difficulty to 
focus on positive events, which could explain the smaller proportion of positive ILS events 
listed by those with subclinical levels of PTSD. However, this negative attentional bias is 
limited to the ILS and does not extend to the CLS.  
There was no difference in importance, perceived ability, and typicality of the ILS 
events generated by the different groups. The lack of difference or association is similar to 
several past studies (Bohn, 2010; Jørgensen et al., 2012; Rubin et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 
2009, Study 1), but contradicts the results of Habermas et al. (2008) and the older sample in 
Rubin et al. (2009), whereby there was an association between higher depression and trauma 
levels with lower ILS typicality.  
This lack of association in the current study may be due to similar reasons illustrated 
by Rubin et al. (2009), whereby the sample is too young and may not have experienced many 
CLS events yet. Although the ILS task was modified to allow participants to also lists events 
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they had not experienced but did expect to experience in the future, about two-thirds of the 
events listed had been experienced. In comparison, for the CLS task, approximately only half 
the events had been experienced. It may have been easier for participants to recall past events 
they had experienced over imagining future events they had not yet experienced, leading to a 
preference in listing experienced events despite the allowances made to the task. Hence, the 
modified ILS task may not have been sufficient to reduce the effect of age and experience on 
the generation of ILS events. The limited experience of typical CLS events and the ease of 
recalling experienced events may also explain why the typicality of the ILS does not mimic 
the typicality of the CLS, although CLS is believed to be the underlying framework of ILS 
narration. Bohn (2010) further suggested that a lack of association may be due to the less 
idealistic nature of an ILS in comparison to the CLS. ILS reflect events which are central and 
personally meaningful, which may not necessarily overlap with the idealistic events typically 
listed in the CLS, even if the individual has knowledge about the CLS (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2002, 2004).  
The difference in emotional valence of the ILS but not typicality indicates that all 
groups may list a similar range of events, but individuals with subclinical PTSD symptoms 
attach more negative emotions to the same events. For example, both groups might mention 
university graduation as an ILS event, but the event might have been less positive for people 
with subclinical PTSD symptoms than for people who are psychologically healthy. This 
suggestion was corroborated by the subclinical PTSD group rating individual typical ILS 
events as more negative. Although the negative ratings were not significantly higher at the 
individual event level, it is likely to have greater effect when added together to form the ILS. 
Individuals with trauma symptoms have been noted to have negative and pessimistic 
attribution tendencies towards the past and future (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; 
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Elwood, Hahn, Olatunji, & Williams, 2009; Gray, Pumphrey, & Lombardo, 2003; Lehmann, 
1997; Paunovic, 1998; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014), 
which may explain why the subclinical PTSD group rated typically positive events 
(experienced and expect to experience) as more negative.  
There was a further difference of pressure to fulfil the ILS events, with the subclinical 
PSTD group perceiving more pressure. However, there was no difference in pressure 
observed for the subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. People with subclinical 
PTSD experienced significantly more pressure to achieve the events in the ILS but not the 
events in the CLS when viewed as categorical groups and on a continuum. Pressure to 
achieve ILS events refers to both pressure from society as well as family and friends, in 
comparison to pressure to achieve CLS events that only refers to pressure from society. 
Hence, the difference in ILS pressure but not CLS pressure may be due to the additional 
influence of family and friends. Traumatic events are more central and defining for people 
with high trauma (Berntsen et al., 2011; da Silva et al., 2016; Lloyd & Lishman, 1975). It is 
possible that family, friends, and society may place emphasis and pressure the individual with 
trauma symptoms to achieve significant, positive, and central events in the ILS, as an attempt 
to move on and bring back a sense of normality for the traumatized individual and replace the 
traumatic events from being a central event. Furthermore, expectations towards ILS from 
one’s immediate surroundings could have greater weight due to personal importance, value, 
and closeness towards the relations with and opinions of those individuals, which is also 
likely to induce higher feelings of pressure to meet those expectations.  
 
Societal Identification 
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 Collectivism, or how much one views themselves as part of the society (Triandis, 
1995), was found to strengthen the association between depression and CLS typicality, but 
only at low levels of collectivism. This moderation means when an individual has symptoms 
of depression and low collectivism, the likelihood that this individual will generate a less 
typical CLS increases. Having high collectivism, however, does not weaken this relation or 
serve as a protective factor against those with depression generating an atypical CLS. Having 
low identification and bonds with society is likely to further reduce the connection one has 
with society, and the awareness and value of these societal expectations (Fukushima et al., 
2009). This disconnect, in addition to the social disconnect typically experienced by people 
with depression symptoms (Cruwys Alexander Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, et al., 2014; 
Matthews et al., 2016; Taylor & Vaughan, 1967), may result in the formation of less accurate 
schematic representations (Söderlund et al., 2014), as previously mentioned. Hence, 
differences in CLS knowledge for people with more depression symptoms that were observed 
in the current results – which were discussed in the previous sections – may be related to 
having lower collectivism, causing them to select atypical events as part of the CLS. 
However, collectivism did not moderate the association between trauma and CLS typicality, 
as well as the associations of depression and trauma with CLS pressure. 
 Collectivism was also found to strengthen the relation between depression and trauma 
with ILS pressure, when collectivism is at moderate and high levels. The relation between 
depression and ILS pressure was initially not significant but became significant upon adding 
the influence of collectivism. Individuals with higher depression and trauma symptoms who 
have average or stronger collectivism will experience higher pressure to achieve events in the 
ILS. However, having lower levels of collectivism does not weaken these associations. 
Having higher collectivism indicates that individuals have more knowledge of the societal 
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expectations and possibly place more value towards these expectations as they feel more 
bound towards the society and their norms (Ajzen, 1991; Fukushima et al., 2009; Triandis, 
1995), increasing the pressure of those with depression and trauma to achieve ILS events. 
Collectivism did not serve as a moderator for depression and trauma with ILS typicality.  
 Upon further investigation of the dimension of collectivism involved, vertical 
collectivism was found to specifically moderate the associations previously mentioned. 
Vertical collectivism refers to acceptance of hierarchies and inequalities within a society and 
the willingness to sacrifice personal goals to meet the group goals even if it is against one’s 
personal values, as a sense of duty to the society (Triandis & Gelfland, 1998). Vertical 
collectivism has been observed more in Asian communities and is a risk factor for people in 
these communities to develop depression (Ayçiçeği Dinn & Caldwell-Harris, 2016). Having 
low vertical collectivism means that individuals do not go out of their way to behave in 
accordance with group norms and do not place high value on group expectations (Triandis, 
2000), which may explain its strengthening effects on the relation between higher depression 
and lower CLS typicality. High vertical collectivism, which is an increase in consciously 
attempting to adhere with group norms (Triandis, 2000), also explains its strengthening 
effects on the associations between higher depression and trauma with higher ILS pressure.  
 
Implications 
 This study provides insight into the differences in the recall of both episodic and 
semantic components of autobiographical memory for subclinical depression and PTSD 
states. The findings suggest that there are other cognitive processes that may underlie the 
recall of CLS, and that these processes differ for individuals with subclinical levels of 
depression. More research needs to be conducted in this area to further understand and build a 
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more concrete theoretical framework of CLS, which will also contribute to greater 
understanding of recall of the ILS.  
The findings also suggest that perceptions and values attached for similar events differ 
for those with subclinical levels of PTSD, and this difference can be applied into clinical 
work. In the context of therapy, working on reconceptualizing and reframing negative 
memories to become more neutral or even positive could help to create a less negative life 
narrative, which could potentially manage or prevent the subclinical levels of trauma from 
escalating to clinical levels (e.g., Kar, 2011; Lely, Smid, Jongedijk, Knipscheer, & Kleber, 
2019). 
Moreover, the results highlight the role of societal identification for people with 
higher depression and trauma. Having too low societal identification results in less awareness 
of societal norms and, hence, less typical CLS events, whereas having too high societal 
identification results in more value towards meeting societal norms, and thus induces higher 
pressure towards ILS events. Instilling an average or healthy level of societal identification 
could help those with higher depression and trauma be more in touch with society without 
being overwhelmed by its expectations (e.g., Cruwys, Alexander Haslam, Dingle, Jetten, et 
al., 2014; Muldoon et al., 2019).  
 
Limitations 
 Like any study, the current one had some limitations. One limitation is different 
depression measurements were used for both studies. Although the depression measures were 
correlated with each other and the results were comparable, there may be still be small 
differences in the measurements, such as the cut-off scores, that could have affected the 
results obtained. Besides having different measurements, differences in categories in the CLS 
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task for both studies is also a limitation. Having different types and amounts of categories 
provided for categorization could result in differences in how participants categorize the CLS 
events they generated, which could, in turn, affect measures such as typicality of the CLS. 
Future studies should control and standardize aspects of the tasks and measurements used. 
Another limitation was that the study only tested participants younger than 30 years 
old. Although the ILS task was modified in an attempt to reduce this bias, the participants’ 
lack of life experience may still have limited the types of events generated. It is unclear 
whether the findings of this study would also be replicated in more experienced samples. 
Although these samples are more difficult to recruit, future research should attempt to include 
them to address this limitation.  
 Measuring the CLS and ILS using only quantitative methods may be another 
limitation. Participants in the current study briefly wrote the events and categorized it into 
existing categories. This method was used to simply the measurement and provide more 
validity to the results. However, using this method without incorporating qualitative methods 
limits the depth and breadth of the data obtained, as well as the opportunity to obtain more 
insight into the nuances and differences that may be observed in the CLS and ILS recorded. 
Future research could incorporate qualitative methods in addition to quantitative methods to 
obtain data that is more holistic and multidimensional. 
 
Conclusions 
 The similarity of characteristics of CLS events regardless of depression and trauma 
levels indicates that the CLS are culturally shared semantic knowledge. Although the CLS are 
stable structures, this study found a small difference in the typicality of CLS events for 
groups who reported subclinical levels of depression symptoms. Further investigation showed 
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that these differences in typicality is likely to be attributed to these individuals having 
differences in their knowledge of CLS events. The findings from these studies indicate that 
there are small differences in information processing of the CLS for individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression. 
Despite the subclinical PTSD group listing less positive ILS events, there was no 
difference in typicality of ILS. This finding indicates that individuals with subclinical PTSD 
symptoms list similar events in their ILS as psychologically healthy individuals, but those 
with subclinical PTSD attach more negative emotions to typically positively rated events, 
trends that were observed upon further analysis. The subclinical PTSD group also 
experienced higher pressure to achieve events in the ILS but not the events in the CLS. This 
difference was attributed to the extra pressure and expectations from significant people, such 
as family and friends. The findings from these studies demonstrate that knowledge of both 
CLS and ILS events are shared, but individuals with subclinical levels of PTSD may 
perceive, value, and attach different meanings to the events.  
The amount of societal identification was found to strengthen associations of 
depression with the typicality of CLS events and depression and trauma with the pressure to 
achieve ILS events. These results suggest that how much one views themselves as part of the 
society has an impact on the awareness towards societal expectations and the importance 
placed in adhering to societal norms. 
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Chapter 3: Depression, Trauma, and Overgeneral Memory 
 
Besides episodic and semantic aspects, another facet of autobiographical memory is 
the type of memory recalled. Often, people recall specific memories, but other types of 
memories can also be recalled. Overgeneral autobiographical memories (OGM) refer to 
difficulties recalling autobiographical memories that involve a specific event that happened at 
a certain place and at a certain time. Populations experiencing clinical depression and PTSD 
tend to recall fewer specific memories and more OGM, even during remission of symptoms. 
Similar associations with memory specificity have also been observed in high depression and 
trauma groups from the normal population, although these associations have not been studied 
as extensively in normal populations as compared to clinical populations. How these 
associations within the normal population may be affected by the emotional valence and 
intensity of cues has not been tested yet.  
The CaR-FA-X model proposes that the underlying mechanisms for the depression-
OGM and trauma-OGM relations are rumination, functional avoidance, and executive 
functioning. Studies have shown that rumination, avoidant coping, and executive functions 
relate independently to depression, trauma, and memory specificity. Rumination (i.e., overall 
and brooding) and higher order executive functions have been shown to mediate and 
moderate the relations of depression and trauma with specific memories and OGM, but 
whether avoidant coping and basic level executive functions (i.e., inhibition and verbal 
working memory) will also mediate or moderate those associations has not been examined. 
The findings from this study can be used to create more focused interventions for the memory 
deficits experienced by individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms.  
 
Background 
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Specificity of Autobiographical Memories 
Autobiographical memories are typically specific, which means that they refer to 
events that occurred at a certain place and time and lasted no longer than one day (Williams 
et al., 2007), such as “I went to the local theme park with my friends last Saturday”. 
However, individuals with psychopathology symptoms, poorer mental health, and cognitive 
deficits tend to recall autobiographical memories that are general summaries of events, events 
that lasted longer than a day, and events that lack specific details (Ono et al., 2016; Sumner, 
2012; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). This tendency, known as Overgeneral Autobiographical 
Memory (OGM), is characterized by recalling autobiographical memories with lower 
specificity, higher categoric traits, and higher inability to recall required memories (Sumner, 
2012; Sumner et al., 2010).  
Overgeneral memories can be further divided into categorical and extended memories 
(Liu et al., 2016; Sumner, 2012; Warne, Caseras, & Rice, 2020; Williams & Dritschel, 1992). 
Categorical memories are memories of events that occurred many times, or summaries of 
repetitive events, or memories without a distinct place or time (e.g., “attending lectures at 
university” or “driving to work”), whereas extended memories are memories of one event 
that had a duration of more than one day (e.g., “I went on holiday with my family to Paris for 
a week”).  
OGM and lower specific memories are used interchangeably in the literature to refer 
to the same impairments in memory specificity (e.g., Ros et al., 2017; Sumner, 2012; Sumner 
et al., 2010, 2014). However, they tend to be operationally defined or conceptualized 
differently when autobiographical memories are measured or categorized for specificity. 
Lower specific memories refer to either retrieving fewer specific memories, or retrieving 
events that have fewer or missing details about the time and place the event occurred, the 
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people involved, and phenomenological details (e.g., weather, clothes, emotions, thoughts) 
(e.g., Dalgleish, Rolfe, Golden, Dunn, & Barnard, 2008; Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Sumner et 
al., 2014). OGM, on the other hand, is associated with events that have less specific details 
(i.e., specific memories), are general summaries of events (i.e., categorical memories), events 
that lasted longer than a day (i.e., extended memories), or general semantic information (i.e., 
semantic associations). OGM has been operationally defined as either singular or various 
combinations of those memory categories (e.g., Debeer et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2016; Raes, 
Verstraeten, Bijttebier, Vasey, & Dalgleish, 2010). 
 
OGM and Depression 
Individuals with depression symptoms from clinical and normal populations have 
been found to exhibit a higher recall of OGM (e.g., Liu et al., 2016; Romero, Vazquez, & 
Sanchez, 2014) and categorical memories (e.g., Dritschel, Kao, Astell, Neufeind, & Lai, 
2011; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002; Raes et al., 2010; Ridout et al., 2016), and a lower 
recall of specific memories (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2007; Dritschel et al., 2011; Haque, Juliana, 
Khan, & Hasking, 2014; Hitchcock et al., 2019; Ridout et al., 2016). However, these relations 
were not always found; several studies did not find any association between depression and 
OGM and specific memories (e.g., Beyderman & Young, 2016; Hermans et al., 2004; Peters, 
Wessel, Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002).  
Although there is evidence for the existence of the relation between depression and 
OGM and specific memories, the direction of this relationship is less clear. Kleim and Ehlers 
(2008) found that having depression symptoms lead to the reduction of specific memories 
recalled, and having prolonged difficulties in recalling specific autobiographical memories 
subsequently predicted the worsening in the severity of depression. In addition to the 
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maintenance of depressive disorders, OGM has also been shown to serve as a vulnerability in 
the development of depressive symptoms (Liu et al., 2016; Van Daele, Griffith, Van den 
Bergh, & Hermans, 2014; Warne et al., 2020). These findings suggest that a bidirectional 
relation exists between depression and OGM and specific memories. However, OGM is not 
affected by the severity of depression for those with clinical depression, provided that the 
symptoms are already within the clinical range (Lievaart, van der Heiden, & Geraerts, 2013).  
Cues of various mediums (i.e., verbal and pictures) and valences (i.e., positive and 
negative) are able to elicit impairments in memory specificity among clinically depressed 
individuals (Champagne et al., 2016; Park et al., 2002; Ricarte et al., 2011; Ridout et al., 
2016). However, lower recall of specific memories and higher OGM tendencies and 
categorical memories were observed more when negative cues were presented as compared to 
positive cues (Park et al., 2002; Ricarte et al., 2011; Matsumoto, Takahashi, & Kawaguchi, 
2020), likely caused by the increase in negative attentional bias experienced by people with 
depression symptoms (Baert et al., 2010; Dalgleish et al., 2011; Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 
2014).  
Impairments in memory specificity for those with clinical depression have also been 
observed across cultures. Although Dritschel et al. (2011) found that Taiwanese participants 
were more overgeneral and less specific in memory retrieval as compared to British 
participants, the depressed groups across both samples retrieved more categorical and fewer 
specific memories than the non-depressed groups. These findings suggest that the recall of 
OGM and lower specific memories by individuals with clinical depression are stable across 
culture and type and valence of cues, but negative cues tend to trigger poorer memory 
specificity. 
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OGM and Trauma 
Individuals with trauma symptoms from clinical and normal populations exhibit a 
lower recall of specific memories (e.g., Humphries & Jobson, 2012; Nixon, Ball, Sterk, Best, 
& Beatty, 2013) and a higher recall of categorical memories (e.g., Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006, 
2017; Schönfeld et al., 2007). However, a lack of association between trauma symptoms in 
normal populations and specific memories have also been observed (e.g., Raymaekers, 
Smeets, Peters, & Merckelbach, 2010). These impairments in memory specificity for people 
with PTSD affect both episodic and semantic components of autobiographical memory 
(Moradi et al., 2008). 
Trauma symptoms have been shown to relate to OGM and specific memories, but 
similar to depression, the direction of the relation is less clear. Exposure to traumatic events 
and experiencing higher trauma symptoms predicted a decrease in the recall of specific 
memories and an increase in the recall of OGM (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Zheng & Gray, 
2018). This direction was further corroborated by the findings of Sutherland and Bryant 
(2007), who showed that following successful interventions to reduce PTSD symptoms, the 
specificity of recalled autobiographical memories also improved. At the same time, more 
difficulty in recalling specific memories among those with trauma symptoms has been shown 
to predict the subsequent increases in trauma symptoms to clinical levels (Kleim & Ehlers, 
2008). These findings suggest that a bidirectional relation also exists between trauma and 
OGM and specific memories. 
The duration of trauma symptoms has an effect of the specificity of memories. Higher 
OGM and lower specific memories were observed in individuals with prolonged trauma 
symptoms but not acute trauma exposure (Hitchcock, Nixon, & Weber, 2014; Nixon et al., 
2013), which is categorized as trauma symptoms experienced in the first month following a 
Chapter 3: Overgeneral Memory - 114 
 
 
traumatic incident (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), although this effect of symptom 
duration was not always observed (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). The severity of PTSD or trauma 
symptoms also affects memory specificity but not in the expected manner of higher symptom 
severity causing more impairments. Opposite to that, higher PTSD and trauma symptoms was 
discovered to relate to less OGM and higher generation of specific memories instead 
(Bunnell & Greenhoot, 2012; Schönfeld et al., 2007). This finding was theorized to be due to 
lower utilization of avoidant coping techniques for the trauma, which meant there was also 
less avoidance in cognitive aspects, such as accessing autobiographical memories, and hence, 
less obstruction to access the details of the memories.  
Various types (i.e., word and pictures) and valences (i.e., positive and negative) of 
cues are able to elicit memory specificity impairment among those with trauma symptoms 
from clinical and normal samples (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006). 
However, lower specific memories were more evident when presented with negative cues as 
compared to positive cues for those with trauma symptoms from normal samples (Zheng & 
Gray, 2018), which can be attributed to people with trauma symptoms having higher negative 
attentional bias (El Khoury-Malhame et al., 2011; Vythilingam et al., 2007).  
Similar to depressive populations, poor memory specificity has been observed across 
cultures for people from the normal population with higher trauma. Humphries and Jobson 
(2012) showed that despite the Chinese participants being generally less specific in memory 
retrieval than British participants, the high trauma groups of both samples retrieved fewer 
specific memories than the low trauma groups. These findings suggest that the recall of OGM 
and lower specific memories are stable across culture and cues for people with trauma 
symptoms, but negative cues trigger more impairments in memory specificity. 
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Cognitive Mechanism of Overgeneral Memory 
The generation of OGM instead of specific memories has been theorized to largely 
relate back to the Self Memory System (SMS) model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
which was described in greater detail in Chapter 1. To retrieve specific memories 
generatively, the memory search process within the autobiographical knowledge base needs 
to be completed and reach the bottom level of the hierarchy, which is the event-specific 
knowledge level. Generation of OGM is believed to occur when the memory search is cut-off 
prior to reaching the event-specific knowledge level and is not able to be completed 
(Williams et al., 2006). 
For premature memory truncation to be a possible explanation for the production of 
OGM and fewer specific memories as observed in depressed and traumatized populations, 
these groups need to exhibit differences or impairments in the memory search hierarchy. 
Haque et al. (2014) investigated this hierarchical search process in clinically depressed and 
non-depressed groups. Non-depressed individuals were able to carry on the search process all 
the way from the top level to the bottom level to retrieve specific memories, whereas 
individuals with depression had a tendency to truncate the search process at the general 
events level, which corresponds with their difficulties in retrieving specific memories. The 
finding suggests that early cut-off in the memory search hierarchy is indeed a possible 
explanation for the OGM and lower specific memories seen in people with depression 
symptoms, and potentially in people with trauma symptoms too. 
Williams et al. (2006) suggested that this premature halting of the memory search 
process was due to insufficient cognitive resources. Building upon the SMS model, Williams 
et al. (2006, 2007) developed the CaR-FA-X model in an attempt to explain the relation 
between psychopathology, such as depression and PTSD, and poorer memory specificity. The 
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CaR-FA-X model proposes that there are three mechanisms that underlie the relation between 
psychopathology and OGM: capture and rumination (CaR), functional avoidance (FA), and 
executive functioning (X). The CaR-FA-X model theorises that the insufficient cognitive 
resources which cause OGM arise from higher capture and rumination, higher functional 
avoidance, and poorer executive functioning (Williams, 2006; Williams et al. 2007). 
Individuals with depression and trauma tend to have existing low cognitive resources, and the 
mechanism proposed in this model further reduces the already low cognitive resources 
available for the search process, increasing the likelihood of OGM.  
 
Rumination 
The first component of the CaR-FA-X model is rumination, which refers to persistent 
and continuous thoughts regarding the individuals’ difficulties, symptoms, and factors that 
led to or resulted from their current state (Williams et al., 2007). According to the Response 
Style Theory, rumination is characterized by self-reflection and repetitive focus on negative 
emotions (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). From this characterization, rumination can be further 
divided into the components of reflection and brooding (Debeer et al., 2009; Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Reflection is the ability to reduce depressive 
symptoms and feelings by turning inward to conduct cognitive problem solving and is 
perceived to be more adaptive. Brooding is the tendency to compare their situation and 
symptoms to others and standards set by themselves and to negatively criticize themselves for 
the difference in situations and inability to achieve those set standards. Brooding is perceived 
to be more maladaptive. Continuous thinking about all these areas is believed to reduce 
cognitive resources available for memory searches, which may cause premature truncation of 
the memory search process (Williams et al., 2007).  
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Watkins (2004) proposed that rumination is alternatively divided into the components 
of conceptual-evaluative and experiential. The conceptual-evaluative subtype is the tendency 
to compare their situation to standards set by themselves and to focus on the difference in 
situations, which matches Treynor et al.’s (2003) description of brooding. The experiential 
subtype refers to awareness of experiences that occur at the current moment. Although the 
description of experiential appears to be reflective in nature, it does not match Treynor et al.’s 
(2003) description of reflection which involves cognitive problem solving. Unlike Watkins’s 
(2004) rumination subtypes that were derived theoratically, the subtypes of rumination 
discussed by Treynor et al. (2003) were obtained from a posthoc factor analysis. Literature 
has subsequently further supported the existence of brooding and reflection as the two 
subtypes of rumination and have used these two subtypes in numerous studies related to 
autobiographical memory (e.g., Debeer et al., 2009; Romero et al., 2014; Schoofs, Hermans, 
& Raes, 2010). 
The retrieval of OGM and lower specific memories in depressed samples are 
associated with rumination, whereby brooding and reflection either relate to or predict poorer 
memory specificity (Crane, Barnhofer, Visser, Nightingale, & Williams, 2007; Raes, 
Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere et al., 2006; Romero et al., 2014; Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001; Watson et al., 2013; Wessel et al., 2014). Rumination was found to mediate the 
relations of OGM and lower specific memories with the worsening of depression symptoms 
at future follow-ups in clinically depression populations (Liu et al., 2016; Raes, Hermans, 
Williams, Beyers et al., 2006). However, Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers et al. (2006) 
found these relations in response to only negative cues. Using a sample of undergraduate 
students, Debeer et al. (2009) showed that brooding mediated the association between lower 
specific memories and higher depression, whereas reflection was unrelated. The results from 
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these studies show that OGM and lower specific memories play a role in the existence and 
maintenance of depression symptoms, but their effects can be explained by rumination, and 
specifically by the brooding component. Besides serving as a mediator, rumination has also 
been suggested to moderate memory specificity in clinically depressed samples (King et al., 
2010). In the study by Smets, Griffith, Wessel, Walschaerts, and Raes (2013), rumination was 
not able to predict OGM on its own but was able to do so when depression was present. This 
result suggests that depression and rumination need to be present together to cause higher 
OGM tendencies.  
Higher rumination also contributed to more OGM retrieval in PTSD groups but not 
non-PTSD groups (Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006). Kleim and Ehlers (2008) found that 
rumination partially mediated the relation between lower specific memories and the 
development of PTSD at future follow-ups in normal populations, but Hitchcock et al. (2014) 
did not replicate this mediation finding when using a sample of children. This finding 
suggests that lower specific memories contribute to the worsening of trauma symptoms, but 
its effects could be explained by rumination.  
 
Functional Avoidance 
The second component of the CaR-FA-X model is functional avoidance (or affect 
regulation), which is a passive aversion towards negative memories, by halting the memory 
search process to remain at a general description level devoid of negative affect instead of 
completing the memory search process all the way to the bottom (Williams, 2006; Williams 
et al., 2007). Truncating the search at that higher level prevents the retrieval of specific 
details related to the memory, including negative emotions attached to the memory. This 
interruption in retrieval serves as an emotion regulation strategy and enables the individual to 
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continue functioning and achieving current goals without being influenced by the negative 
emotions of the memory. Because functional avoidance serves as a protection against 
negative memories and their negative affect, the recall of negative memories is expected to be 
slower and more difficult than the recall of positive memories (Ridout et al., 2016). The 
literature in this area includes avoidance, disengagement, denial, and suppression coping 
styles as measures of functional avoidance. These terms are used interchangeably to refer to 
coping that utilizes aversions and dissociations from certain behaviours, cognitions, and 
emotions (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Sahler & Carr, 2009). 
The diagnostic criteria for PTSD consist of an avoidance domain, which constitutes of 
avoiding memories, stimuli, emotions, and thoughts associated with the traumatic event 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Having more symptoms in this domain has been 
shown to associate with lower specific memories (Dalgleish et al., 2008; Robinson & Jobson, 
2013), although there are also results that show the opposite, whereby higher avoidance 
relates to higher specific memories (Moradi et al., 2008). Higher PTSD symptoms together 
with avoidance towards negative cues also predicted lower specificity in autobiographical 
memories (Bunnell & Greenhoot, 2012). Schönfeld et al. (2007) found that PTSD groups 
recalled more OGM, but only when they were asked to avoid or suppress traumatic 
memories. Schönfeld and Ehlers (2006) found that higher cognitive avoidance predicted 
higher OGM only in the PTSD group; however, the avoidance did not explain any unique 
variance in OGM. These results suggest that although avoidant coping predicts higher OGM 
and lower specific memories in samples with PTSD, it may not be able to explain relations 
between trauma and OGM.  
The functional avoidance theory is argued as being less relevant for depressed 
populations despite their tendencies to engage in avoidant behaviours. Functional avoidance 
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is used to protect oneself from negative memories, but because depressed samples also show 
OGM tendencies for positive memories, this mechanism was thought to be not as relevant in 
underlying the relation (Williams et al., 2007). Although the depressed group in the study by 
Ridout et al. (2016) generated more categorical memories and less specific memories as 
compared to the non-depressed group, they retrieved negative memories faster than positive 
memories, indicating a lack of support for the functional avoidance theory for depressed 
populations. However, Biedermann et al. (2017) found that individuals with depression only 
had greater difficulty recalling details of memories from periods of adversity, suggesting that 
there may be some utilization of functional avoidance among those with depression 
depending on the type of memory recalled. Relations with memory specificity in depressed 
samples may also depend on the type of avoidant coping used. Behavioural avoidance has 
been shown to relate to less specific memories in depressed samples (Watson et al., 2013), 
whereas cognitive avoidance was unrelated (Sweeney, 2015). These findings indicate that 
although there are instances when avoidant coping is used in the depression and memory 
specificity relations, there are also instances when it is not used.  
 
Executive Functioning  
The third component of the CaR-FA-X model is executive functioning. There is no 
formal agreement for the definition of executive functioning, components that fall in this 
area, and measurements for said components (Packwood, Hodgetts, & Tremblay, 2011). 
However, a large body of literature has encompassed executive functioning as “a set of 
cognitive processes that are responsible for the planning, initiation, sequencing, and 
monitoring of complex goal-directed behaviour in the face of distracting information” 
(Dalgleish et al., 2007, p. 25). Executive functions are effortful and purposeful processes and 
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are viewed as more difficult and taxing as compared to automatic and instinctual cognitive 
processes (Diamond, 2013). Executive resources are needed to perform any goal orientated 
tasks, and hence, the executive control theory states that poor executive functioning and low 
resource capacity are the reasons that the memory search process cuts off at the general 
description level (Dalgleish et al., 2007, 2008; Rutherford, 2009; Williams et al., 2007).  
Executive functioning can be divided into basic executive functioning and higher-
order executive functioning. Basic or core domains of executive functioning are executive 
functioning involved in handling less complex information and achieving simple goals 
(Vestberg, Reinebo, Maurex, Ingvar, & Petrovic, 2017). Examples of basic executive 
functioning are inhibition and verbal working memory (Diamond, 2013; Neshat-Doost et al., 
2008; Snyder, 2013). Inhibition is the ability to screen and suppress task irrelevant 
information and responses, whereas verbal working memory involves maintaining and 
manipulating verbal-based information during a certain span of time. It is theorized that 
during the memory search process, inhibition is needed to suppress other memories which 
may be associated but are not the target memory, whereas working memory is needed to 
check whether the retrieved memory matches the goal of the retrieval (Williams et al., 2007). 
Thus, deficits in one of these domains of executive functioning may hinder the memory 
retrieval process.  
Higher-order domains of executive functioning (e.g., planning, verbal fluency, 
category fluency, fluid intelligence, and updating) are combinations of two or more basic 
executive functions, and is used for manipulating larger amounts of information and 
achieving more complex goals (Diamond, 2013; Neshat-Doost et al., 2008; Snyder, 2013; 
Vestberg et al., 2017). Higher-order executive functions have mixed relations to memory 
specificity. In clinical samples, verbal fluency has been shown to mediate the relation 
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between higher depression and lower specific memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007), whereas 
category fluency was found to not mediate but moderate the relations of depression and 
trauma with OGM (Valentino, Bridgett, Hayden, & Nuttall, 2012). However, verbal fluency 
has also been shown to not relate to memory specificity in clinically depressed samples 
(Raes, Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere, et al., 2006; Watson et al., 2013). 
Looking at the basic executive functioning that make up those higher-order executive 
functioning, there are mixed findings for the associations between inhibition and memory 
specificity in depressed and traumatized samples. Self-reported perceptions of poorer 
inhibition abilities have been shown to mediate the relation between higher depression and 
more categorical memories in normal samples (Raes et al., 2010), whereas inhibition did not 
serve as mediators in clinical depression samples (Burns, 2014). Inhibition has also been 
shown to be unrelated to OGM and depression in clinical samples and trauma in clinical and 
normal samples (Hitchcock et al., 2014; Valentino et al., 2012). The findings suggest that the 
relations between depression and memory specificity in normal samples can be explained by 
inhibition but they are unrelated for samples with clinical depression and for clinical and 
normal samples with trauma symptoms. 
Besides inhibition, poorer working memory has been found to be associated with the 
recall of fewer specific autobiographical memories and fewer categorical memories in 
samples with clinical depression and remitted depression but not in normal samples with 
depression symptoms (Haddad, Harmer, & Williams, 2014; Raes, Hermans, Williams, 
Demyttenaere, et al., 2006; Ros, Latorre, & Serrano, 2009). Working memory was also 
unrelated to OGM and trauma in clinical and normal samples (Hitchcock et al., 2014; 
Schönfeld et al., 2007). The results indicate that working memory is associated to memory 
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specificity in clinically depressed populations, but not in normal populations with depression 
symptoms or in clinical and normal populations with trauma symptoms. 
 
The CaR-FA-X model  
Williams (2006) theorised that when all three components of the CaR-FA-X model 
are present, there is a higher probability that depression and trauma will lead to poor memory 
specificity. Sumner et al. (2014) investigated memory specificity, brooding (CaR), intensity 
of episodic stressors (FA), avoidant coping (FA), and verbal fluency (X) in a remitted 
depression group and a non-depressed group. Fewer specific memories for individuals with 
remitted depression was predicted by interactions between low brooding and low verbal 
fluency, whereas interaction between high brooding and low verbal fluency predicted fewer 
specific memories for the non-depressed group. Episodic stressors and avoidant coping were 
not related to memory specificity for both groups. Meanwhile, Watson et al. (2013) tested 
specificity of memories, rumination (CaR), behavioural avoidance (FA), and verbal fluency 
(X) for groups with and without depression. Fewer specific memories were observed for the 
depressed group as compared to the non-depressed group. Higher rumination and behavioural 
avoidance related to less specific memories only for the depressed group, whereas verbal 
fluency was unrelated to memory specificity for both groups.  
Fisk et al. (2019) studied memory specificity in adolescent high and low depression 
groups from the normal sample, along with rumination (CaR), functional avoidance (FA), 
inhibition (X), working memory (X), and verbal fluency (X). High depression groups 
retrieved memories that were less specific, had higher rumination, and poorer working 
memory and verbal fluency as compared to the low depression group. Both groups did not 
differ on functional avoidance and inhibition scores. Although not tested directly, the 
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difference in scores led the researchers to conclude that rumination, working memory, and 
verbal fluency may explain lower memory specificity observed in the high depression group. 
These results support the CaR component predicting or associating with lower specific 
memories in populations with higher depression from clinical and normal populations, 
whereas there were mixed results for the FA and X components. There is, however, no 




The Current Study 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate whether the specificity of the 
autobiographical memories generated by individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD 
symptoms are different as compared to psychologically healthy individuals, and how these 
relations differ according to the characteristics of the word cues. The current study also aimed 
to gain more insight into the mechanisms that may underlie the relations between subclinical 
levels of depression and PTSD and memory specificity.  
Autobiographical memories and the specific details of those memories are also used 
in problem solving, socialization, creating self-concepts, and emotion regulation (Bluck et al., 
2005; Fivush, 2011; Pasupathi, 2003), and difficulties retrieving specific memories could 
affect these functions negatively. By having a better understanding into the underlying 
mechanisms of OGM, clinical interventions targeting these subclinical populations could 
address the mechanisms that influence memory recall directly, which could, in turn, reduce 
impairments in autobiographical memory specificity, and hence, improve their quality of life.  
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Past studies have found that in normal samples, depression groups retrieved fewer 
specific memories and more extended and categorical memories than non-depressed groups 
(Fisk et al., 2019; Romero et al., 2014), and there were associations between depression 
severity and higher OGM and fewer specific memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Raes et al., 
2010). Similarly, in normal samples, high trauma groups retrieved fewer specific memories 
than non-trauma groups (Humphries & Jobson, 2012), and trauma severity was associated 
with fewer specific memories (Zheng & Gray, 2018).  
In terms of the valence of word cues used, negative cues elicited poorer memory 
specificity than positive cues for those with trauma symptoms from normal populations 
(Zheng & Gray, 2018). However, at the time of this study, the effects of the valence of word 
cues on memory specificity of those with subclinical levels of depression have not been 
tested. Although cues of higher intensity or arousal have generally been associated with the 
retrieval of more specific memories (Sheldon & Donahue, 2017), the effects of the intensity 
of word cues on memory specificity of those with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD 
have not been studied. 
All three components of the CaR-FA-X model are related to depression and trauma 
and memory specificity (e.g., Fisk et al., 2019; Sumner et al., 2014; Watson et al., 2013), but 
it is not known whether this model serves as the underlying mechanism for memory 
specificity changes in subclinical and normal samples. Rumination has been shown to 
mediate the associations of OGM and lower specific memories with higher depression and 
trauma in clinical samples (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Liu et al., 2016; Raes, Hermans, Williams, 
Beyers et al., 2006). These associations between depression and trauma and memory 
specificity have been shown to be bidirectional, but whether rumination will still serve as a 
mediator or moderator for the opposite direction of depression and trauma with OGM and 
Chapter 3: Overgeneral Memory - 126 
 
 
lower specific memories, and in a normal sample, is not known. In terms of the 
subcomponents of rumination, brooding has been shown to mediate the relation between 
lower specific memories and depression in normal samples (Debeer et al., 2009), but whether 
brooding will still mediate the relation in the opposite direction of depression and trauma 
with OGM and lower specific memories is also not yet known. Moreover, whether functional 
avoidance will mediate or moderate the relations of depression, trauma, and memory 
specificity has not been tested.  
Higher order executive functioning mediates and moderates the relations between 
depression and trauma and memory specificity in clinical samples (Dalgleish et al., 2007; 
Valentino et al., 2012). Mediation and moderation analyses on basic executive functioning 
(i.e., inhibition and verbal working memory) as underlying the relations of depression and 
trauma with memory specificity in normal populations have not been explored in detail yet. 
Although inhibition was shown to mediate relations between depression and categorical 
memory in normal samples (Raes et al., 2010), the inhibition measure was obtained from a 
self-report questionnaire instead of experimentally, and hence, may not reflect accurate 
inhibition abilities. Furthermore, associations of all three components of the CaR-FA-X 
model with depression and memory specificity has been tested together (Fisk et al., 2019; 
Sumner et al., 2014; Watson et al., 2013), but the mediating and moderating role of the CaR-
FA-X components on the relations between depression and trauma and memory specificity 
have yet to be tested in the same sample. Hence, possible interactions that may exist between 
the various components have not been established. 
Several research questions that we aim to answer in this study based on the past 
literature include: 
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1) Are there differences in the specificity of autobiographical memories between 
individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD and psychologically 
healthy individuals? 
2) Does the emotional valence and intensity of cues have an effect on the relations of 
depression and trauma with memory specificity? 
3) Will the components of the CaR-FA-X model (i.e., rumination, functional avoidance, 
and executive functioning) mediate or moderate the relations of depression and 
trauma with memory specificity? 
4) For executive function component of the CaR-FA-X model, will basic-level executive 
functioning (i.e., inhibition, verbal working memory) mediate or moderate the 
relations of depression and trauma with memory specificity? 
 
 Based on the previous findings, we hypothesized that  
1) Individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD will demonstrate higher 
OGM tendencies and retrieve fewer specific memories than psychologically healthy 
individuals. 
2) Higher OGM and fewer specific memories will be retrieved by individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression and PTSD symptoms when the word cue is negative. 
3) Higher OGM and fewer specific memories will be retrieved by individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression and PTSD symptoms when the word cue has higher 
intensity.  
4) Rumination will mediate or moderate the relations of depression with OGM and 
specific memories and the relations of trauma with OGM and specific memories. In 
terms of subcomponents, brooding will serve as a mediator or moderator for the 
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relations of depression and trauma with OGM and specific memories, whereas 
reflection will not mediate or moderate any of the relations.  
5) Functional avoidance will mediate or moderate the relations of trauma with OGM and 
specific memories but not the relations of depression with OGM and specific 
memories.  
6) Inhibition and verbal working memory will mediate or moderate the relations of 
depression with OGM and specific memories but not the relations of trauma with 
OGM and specific memories. 
 
 To test these hypotheses, participants were asked to describe memories of events in 
response to 12 emotional cue words, which they subsequently categorized. Participants then 
completed the Digit Span and Flanker tasks, followed by the Center for Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression Scale, PTSD Checklist for DSM-5, Rumination Response Scale – Short 




Power analysis with a medium effect size of .50, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .20 (to 
give a power of .80) indicated that 102 participants would be needed to reach statistical 
significance in an independent-samples t-test. For this study, 123 students from the 
University of Nottingham Malaysia were recruited. Four participants were excluded from the 
analyses due errors in memory description (three did not provide descriptions of memories, 
and one provided one-word descriptions), and one participant was excluded for failing to 
categorize the memories. The remaining 118 participants had a mean age of 20.33 (SD = 
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1.62, range = 18-27), and the sample consisted of 37 males and 81 females. One-hundred 
participants were Malaysians and 18 were non-Malaysians (4 Sri Lankan, 4 Indian, 2 
Singaporean, 1 Bangladeshi, 1 British, 1 Bruneian, 1 Chinese, 1 Indonesian, 1 Jordanian, 1 
Kenyan, and 1 Pakistani). The data in the current study is conceptualized as categorical 
groups, as well as existing on a continuum. 
 
Materials 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT). The AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) 
is a task that elicits autobiographical memories using word cues. A total of 12 cue words 
(refer to Appendix E) were presented that differed in emotional valence and intensity 
(Russell, 1980; Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013): 3 low arousal positive (i.e., 
“satisfied”, “calm”, and “relaxed”), 3 high arousal positive (i.e., “happy”, “excited”, and 
“surprised”), 3 low arousal negative (i.e., “bored”, “sad”, and “depressed”), and 3 high 
arousal negative (i.e., “distressed”, “afraid”, and “angry”). The cue words were presented in 
the fixed order of high arousal positive, low arousal negative, high arousal negative, and low 
arousal positive for each cycle, running a total of 3 cycles.  
The words were shown on the screen, one at a time, and participants were given 1 
minute and 30 seconds to retrieve and describe a memory via typing it into the space 
provided. Similar to previous studies testing memory specificity in normal populations, the 
minimal-instructions version of the AMT was used (Debeer et al., 2009; Humphries & 
Jobson, 2012). Participants were only instructed to generate a memory for each cue word, 
with no further indication about the specificity of memory to be retrieved, and no examples or 
practice items were given. This version of the task was used because these instructions have 
been found to be able to better detect OGM in normal samples (Debeer et al., 2009).  
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After participants had retrieved all 12 memories, they were presented the memories 
back one-by-one, and were required to categorize them based on categories of specificity 
(i.e., specific, categorical, extended, semantic association, and omission), as obtained and 
defined from previous studies (e.g., Beyderman & Young, 2016; Debeer et al., 2009). 
Specific memories were defined as one event that had happened at a particular time and place 
and that had lasted less than one day (e.g., “last night, I had dinner at a café with my 
classmates”). Categorical memories included events that occurred repeatedly, summaries of a 
number of similar events, or events that did not have a distinct time or place (e.g., “I went 
swimming every Tuesday” or “I went grocery shopping”). Extended memories were 
described as one event that last longer than one day (e.g., “we went backpacking through 
Europe for two weeks”). Semantic associations were categorized as any verbal or schematic 
associations, descriptions of the cue word, or name of persons, animals or objects, or future 
thoughts (e.g., “eating cookies makes me happy”, “being with family”, or “graduating in a 
few weeks”). If no event was recalled or no response was given, it was categorized as an 
omission (e.g., “I don’t know”). Descriptions and examples for each memory category were 
given to the participants for the categorization part of the task to enable them to categorize 
their memories accordingly. The reason participants were asked to categorize their own 
memories is because the memories belong to them and hence, they know how specific the 
memories are and how many details are attached to the memories. This personal knowledge 
was perceived to be able to increase the reliability of the categorization of memory 
specificity. 
The Digit Span task. The Digit Span task assesses verbal working memory. This task 
involves presenting digits to participants and have them recall the sequence immediately in 
the same order of presentation, with the number of digits presented (i.e., span) increasing 
Chapter 3: Overgeneral Memory - 131 
 
 
gradually. Higher final span reflects larger verbal working memory capacity. This task has a 
Cronbach’s alpha ranging between .74 and .93 and a two-week test-retest reliability ranging 
between .39 and .89 (de Paula, Malloy-Diniz, & Romano-Silva, 2016; Gignac, Reynolds, & 
Kovacs, 2019; Woods et al., 2011). 
All instructions, fixation points, and digits in the Digit Span task were presented as 
black in the font Arial, against a white background, on a screen resolution of 1600 x 900 
(refer to Appendix F). A cross (+) was used as the fixation point at the centre of the screen 
[0,0], and was presented for 1 second with a size of 2cm x 2cm. The stimuli, which consisted 
of digits ranging between 1 and 9 were similarly presented at the centre of the screen [0,0] for 
1 second per number, with a size of 3cm x 3cm. Each trial involved digits being shown in a 
predetermined order on the screen, one at a time. Participants were required to recall the 
digits and the order shown per trial and to type the digits in order in the space provided when 
prompted. The practice trial consisted of two trials of 2-digit spans, for which participants 
were given feedback on whether their response was correct or incorrect. The spans in the 
experimental trials ranged between 2 and 9 digits, with two trials for each span, adding to a 
total of 16 trials (refer to Appendix G). Spans were presented hierarchically, starting with 
Span 2 (twice), all the way to Span 9. No feedback was provided for the experimental trials. 
When both trials within a span were answered incorrectly, the scoring was cut off, with all 
subsequent spans immediately scored as incorrect regardless of the answers provided. The 
final span, which is the longest span prior to this cut-off, can range between 2 and 9.  
The Flanker task. The Flanker test (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) is a task that assesses 
inhibition of task-irrelevant stimuli and responses. This task involves identifying the direction 
of the stimulus (or arrow) in the centre, while inhibiting the direction of the other stimuli (or 
arrows) located on the left and right side of the centre stimulus (arrow). Congruent trials, in 
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which the centre stimulus has the same direction as the other stimuli, serve as baseline 
measurements, whereas incongruent trials, in which the centre stimulus has a different 
direction as the other stimuli, serve as inhibition measurements. Fewer errors and shorter 
response times indicate larger inhibition capacity. The RT cost (i.e., the difference between 
the RT of congruent and incongruent trials) has a Cronbach’s alpha ranging between .53 and 
.68 and a test-retest reliability ranging between .40 and .91, whereas the error cost (i.e., the 
difference in the number of errors in congruent and incongruent trials) has a Cronbach’s 
alpha ranging between .27 and .32 and a one-month test-retest reliability ranging between .58 
and .72 (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018; Wöstmann et al., 2013). 
Similar to the Digit Span task, instructions and fixation points in the Flanker task 
were displayed using black Arial font on a white background with a 1600 x 900 resolution 
(refer to Appendix H). The fixation point (+) was 2cm x 2cm and presented at the centre [0,0] 
for 0.8 seconds. The stimuli were presented at the centre [0,0] of the screen at a size of 575 x 
159 pixels. It consisted of arrow heads pointing to the left (<) or right (>), with each trial 
involving 5 arrow heads being shown on the screen (refer to Appendix I). Participants were 
required to identify the direction of the middle arrow head (arrow head number 3). The 
stimuli were presented indefinitely until participants provided a response. They had to press 
the “left arrow key” if the middle arrow pointed left, or the “right arrow key” if the middle 
arrow pointed right. A total of 8 randomized practice trials and 80 randomized experimental 
trials were run (i.e., practice: 4 congruent and 4 incongruent; experiment: 40 congruent and 
40 incongruent). The number of stimuli with arrow heads that is pointing to the left is equal 
to the number that is pointing to the right (e.g., 20 congruent left and 20 congruent right).  
CES-D and PCL-5. Similar to the Study 2 in the previous chapter, the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977) was used to measure 
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depression symptomology in the general population (refer to Appendix D). Also similar to 
studies in the previous chapter, the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5) (Weathers et al., 
2013) was used to measure PTSD or trauma symptoms (refer to Appendix B).  
Rumination Response Scale – Short Form (RRS-SF). The RRS-SF (Treynor et al., 
2003) is a 10-item instrument developed to measure ruminative tendencies. It consists of a 
four-point Likert scale (1-4) (refer to Appendix J), and total rumination score is obtained by 
adding all the items together. The higher the total score, the higher the rumination tendencies. 
Summing items of the brooding subscale provides a brooding score, whereas summing items 
of the reflection subscale provides a reflection score. This scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .77 
for the brooding subscale, and .72 for the reflection subscale.  
COPE Inventory. The COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989) is a 60-item instrument 
developed to measure types of coping responses. It consists of a four-point Likert scale (1-4) 
(refer to Appendix K). In the current study, only the 16 items that make up the subscales of 
mental disengagement, denial, behavioural disengagement, and substance abuse were 
administered. The mental disengagement subscale measures cognitive distractions used to 
avoid thinking about stressors, problems, and affected goals; the denial subscale measures 
tendencies of acting as if the stressor is not real; the behavioural disengagement subscale 
measures reductions in efforts to deal with the stressor and achieve affected goals; and the 
substance abuse subscale measures the usage of alcohol and drugs to reduce distress. An 
avoidant-coping factor is obtained by summing items from the subscales of mental 
disengagement, denial, behaviour disengagement, and substance abuse (Litman, 2006; 
Sumner et al., 2014). Higher scores represent a stronger avoidant coping style. This scale has 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .71. for the denial subscale, .65 for the behavioural inhibition subscale, 
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.45 for the mental disengagement subscale, and .92 for the substance abuse scale (Carver et 
al., 1989; Fontaine, Manstead, & Wagner, 1993).  
 
Procedure 
This study was approved by the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Nottingham Malaysia (AM270318). The study was conducted using a 
desktop computer in a research lab within the University. Participants were first given an 
information sheet to read and a consent form and demographic sheet to answer. Participants 
begun the experiment by answering the AMT, followed by completing the Digit Span task 
and Flanker task. Last, participants answered the CES-D Scale, PCL-5, RRS-SF, and COPE 
Inventory. The order of the tasks was fixed, as listed above. The session took approximately 
50-60 minutes to complete. At the end of the session, the participants were thanked and given 
a small financial reward (RM15) for their participation.  
 
Scoring 
Total specific memories were calculated by summing the number of memories 
categorized as specific by the participants. Similarly, total categorical, extended, semantic, 
and omissions were obtained by adding the number of categorical, extended, semantic, and 
omissions categorized, respectively. Total overgeneral memory was calculated by summing 
the categorical and extended memories (Sumner, 2012; Williams & Dritschel, 1992).  
The scoring for the Digit Span task was cut off when both trials of a span were 
answered incorrectly. The final span was then calculated as the length of the last sequence 
accurately recalled prior to this cut-off. Higher final span reflects higher verbal working 
memory capacity.  
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Although previous studies using executive functioning tasks have focused on either 
only measuring reaction time or measuring number of errors (Hitchcock et al., 2014; 
Valentino et al., 2012) for basic executive functioning, Dalgleish et al. (2007) suggested 
using both measures to be able to encapsulate executive functioning better. One reason for 
this suggestion may be the speed-accuracy trade-off theory, which states that performance in 
task accuracy (or errors) and the response speed (or reaction time to complete the task) are 
interdependent components (Heitz, 2014). For these reasons, the current study uses these two 
measures for the inhibition component.  
Cost errors and cost RT in the Flanker task were used as indices of inhibition. Total 
errors for each condition was first obtained by summing the trials that had incorrect 
responses. Cost errors was then calculated by subtracting total errors of the incongruent 
condition with total errors of the congruent condition. Mean RT of correct trials for each 
condition was calculated by excluding the RT of all trials with incorrect responses and all 
correct trials with less than 100 ms and averaging the RT of trials with correct responses. 
Cost RT was then obtained by subtracting mean RT of correct trials for incongruent condition 
with mean RT of correct trials for congruent condition. Less cost errors and shorter cost RT 
reflect better inhibition.  
Because the Flanker task resulted in two final measures (i.e., Flanker cost error and 
Flanker cost RT), a principle component analysis was run on these two measures to create a 
composite inhibition score. The analysis revealed the presence of one inhibition component, 
explaining 100% of the variance. Hence, the composite inhibition score was obtained by 
adding the Z-scores of Flanker cost error and Flanker cost RT.  
 
Results 
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Autobiographical Memory Specificity [Descriptives] 
 Participants were asked to retrieve memories in response to emotional cue words of 
different valences and intensities, and then were required to categorize each memory as either 
specific, categorical, extended, semantic, or omission. Majority of the memories retrieved 
were specific (37.3%), followed by categorical (30.4%). A smaller amount of memories was 
extended memories (19.0%), semantic associations (8.1%), and omissions (5.3%). Out of 12 
recalled memories, the maximum total specific memories retrieved were 9, whereas a 
maximum total of 11 categorical memories were retrieved, and a maximum total of 10 for 
extended memories. Of the sample, 2.5% were unable to recall any specific memories. 
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to look at the associations within the various 
memory specification categories (see Table 3.1). 
 Positive cues elicited mostly specific memories (44.2%), followed by categorical 
(28.0%), whereas negative cues elicited mostly categorical memories (32.8%), followed by 
specific (30.4%). There were fewer extended memories (positive: 15.8%; negative: 22.2%), 
semantic associations (positive: 6.6%; negative: 9.5%), and omissions (positive: 5.4%; 
negative: 5.2%) retrieved for both positive and negative cues. High intensity cues generated 
specific memories (44.1%) highest, and then categorical memories (23.3%), whereas low 
intensity cues generated categorical memories (37.4%) highest, followed by specific 
memories (30.5%). Both high and low intensity cues generated less extended memories 
(high: 19.4%; low: 18.6%), semantic associations (high: 8.5%; low: 7.6%), and omissions 
(high: 4.8%; low: 5.8%).  
   
Memory Specificity, Depression, and Trauma [Hypothesis 1] 
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Scoring of subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. To examine the data 
from a categorical approach, participants who scored a total of 20 and above in the CES-D 
(Vilagut et al., 2016) were categorized as subclinical depression (n = 57; males = 14, females 
= 43), whereas those who scored a total of 19 and below were categorized as non-depressed 
(n = 61; males = 23, females = 38). The depression scores did not vary significantly from the 
cut-off score (M = 20.87, SD = 9.91, t(117) = 0.96, p = .340), indicating the scores clustered 
around the cut-off.  
For the PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013), individuals that scored a total of 33 and above 
were categorized as subclinical PTSD (n = 33; males = 11, females = 22), whereas those who 
scored a total of 32 and below were categorized as non-PTSD (n = 85; males = 26, females = 
59). The trauma scores varied significantly from the cut-off score (M = 25.24, SD = 15.15, 
t(117) = -5.57, p < .001), indicating that the scores were distributed away from the cut-off.  
Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences for memory specificity. 
To examine differences in memory specificity between subclinical depression and non-
depressed groups and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, independent-samples 
t-tests were conducted (see Table 3.2, Figure 3.1, and Figure 3.2). There were no differences 
in the number of specific memories (t(116) = -1.57, p = .119), OGM (t(116) = 1.72, p = .088), 
categorical memories (t(116) = 1.52, p = .132), extended memories (t(116) = 0.01, p = .994), 
semantic associations (t(116) = 0.82, p = .417), and omissions (t(116) = -1.12, p = .266) 
retrieved by the subclinical depression and non-depressed groups.  
The subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups retrieved similar numbers of OGM 
(t(116) = 1.04, p = .299), categorical memories (t(116) = 0.56, p = .579), extended memories 
(t(116) = 0.50, p = .618), and omissions (t(116) = -0.99, p = .322). Although the subclinical 
PTSD group retrieved fewer specific memories (t(116) = -2.25, p = .027) and more semantic 
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associations (t(43.25) = 2.25, p = .029) than the non-PTSD group, both differences were no 
longer significant after applying the Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .008).  
Predictive effects of depression and trauma on memory specificity. Besides taking 
a categorical approach, we also treated depression and trauma as continuous variables. 
Exploratory linear regression analyses were conducted to test the predictive effects of 
depression and trauma severity on memory specificity. Although depression severity 
explained 4.8% of the variance in specific memories (F(1, 116) = 5.85, p = .017, beta = -.22), 
and 4.1% of the variance in semantic associations (F(1, 116) = 4.93, p = .028, beta = .20), it 
was no longer a significant predictor of both memory specificities after applying Bonferroni 
corrections (p ≤ .008). Depression severity also did not explain other memory specificity 
categories (ps > .05). 
Trauma severity significantly explained 6.8% of the variance in semantic associations 
(F(1, 116) = 8.46, p = .004) even after Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .008), whereby higher 
trauma symptoms predicted more semantic associations (beta = .26, p = .004). Although 
trauma severity explained 4.2% of the variance of specific memories (F(1, 116) = 5.03, p = 
.027, beta = -.20, p = .027), it was no longer a significant predictor of specific memories after 
applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .008). Trauma severity also did not explain other 
memory specificity categories (ps > .05). 
Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences for CaR-FA-X 
components. Besides memory specificity, independent-samples t-tests were also conducted 
to test differences in components of the CaR-FA-X model between subclinical depression and 
non-depressed groups and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups (see Table 3.2). 
The subclinical depression group had higher rumination (t(116) = 3.15, p = .002) and 
avoidant coping (t(116) = 3.18, p = .002) levels than the non-depressed group. These 
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differences remained significant after applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .013). There were 
no differences in inhibition and final span between the subclinical depression and non-
depressed groups (ps > .05). 
The subclinical PTSD group had higher levels of rumination (t(116) = 5.27, p ≤ .001) 
and avoidant coping (t(40.48) = 4.99, p ≤ .001), and lower final span (t(116) = -2.66, p = 
.009) than the non-PTSD group. After applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .013), these 
differences were still significant. There was no difference in inhibition levels between the 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups (p = .153). 
 
Valence and Intensity of Cues [Hypotheses 2 and 3] 
Depression groups and memory specificity. To test the effects of valence and 
intensity of cues on the specificity of memory recalled between subclinical depression and 
non-depressed groups, and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, mixed-design 
multivariate analyses of variance were conducted. There was no interaction between 
depression groups and valence of cues, with subclinical depression and non-depressed groups 
retrieving similar numbers of specific memories (F(1,116) = 0.27, p = .603), OGM (F(1,116) 
= 0.82, p = .776), categorical memories (F(1,116) = 0.56, p = .456), extended memories 
(F(1,116) = 1.71, p = .194), semantic associations (F(1,116) = 0.01, p = .915), and omissions 
(F(1,116) = 0.14, p = .705) for both positive and negative cues. Depression groups and 
intensity of cues also did not interact, with subclinical depression and non-depressed groups 
retrieving similar numbers of specific memories (F(1,116) = 0.03, p = .857), OGM (F(1,116) 
= 0.01, p = .912), categorical memories (F(1,116) = 0.60, p = .440), extended memories 
(F(1,116) = 0.62, p = .432), semantic associations (F(1,116) = 1.49, p = .225), and omissions 
(F(1,116) = 3.25, p = .074) for both high and low intensity cues.  
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Trauma groups and memory specificity. Similarly, trauma groups and cue valence 
did not have an interaction, with subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups retrieving similar 
numbers of specific memories (F(1,116) = 0.51, p = .475), OGM (F(1,116) = 0.09, p = .770), 
categorical memories (F(1,116) = 0.10, p = .754), extended memories (F(1,116) = 0.00, p = 
.951), semantic associations (F(1,116) = 1.83, p = .179), and omissions (F(1,116) = 1.08, p = 
.300) for both positive and negative cues. There was also no interaction between trauma 
groups and cue intensity, with subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups also retrieving similar 
numbers of specific memories (F(1,116) = 0.12, p = .726), OGM (F(1,116) = 0.24, p = .623), 
categorical memories (F(1,116) = 0.07, p = .794), extended memories (F(1,116) = 0.14, p = 
.708), semantic associations (F(1,116) = 2.69, p = .104), and omissions (F(1,116) = 0.00, p = 
.990) for both high and low intensity cues. 
  
Mediators of Depression, Trauma, and Memory Specificity [Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6] 
To investigate the associations between rumination, avoidant coping, and executive 
functioning with depression, trauma, and memory specificity (see Table 3.1), Pearson 
correlation coefficients were calculated. As depression and trauma predicted specific 
memories and semantic associations but not OGM, prior to Bonferroni corrections, only 
correlations with specific memories and semantic associations will be discussed here. 
Higher levels of rumination were associated with higher levels of depression (r(116) 
= .54, p < .001) and higher levels of trauma (r(116) = .59, p < .001). However, there were no 
linear relations between rumination and specific memories (r(116) = -.16, p = .085) and 
semantic associations (r(116) = .16, p = .087). Higher levels of avoidant coping was 
associated with higher levels of depression (r(116) = .51, p < .001) and higher levels of 
trauma (r(116) = .64, p < .001). However, there were no linear relations between avoidant 
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coping and specific memories (r(116) = -.09, p = .363) and semantic associations (r(116) = 
.17, p = .060).  
There were no linear relations between depression and inhibition (r(116) = .08, p = 
.365) and final span (r(116) = -.07, p = .434). Higher levels of trauma were associated with 
lower final span (r(116) = -.23, p = .013) but not with inhibition (r(116) = .13, p = .178). 
There were no significant correlations between specific memories and inhibition (r(116) = 
.02, p = .853) and final span (r(116) = -.10, p = .288). There were also no significant 
associations between semantic associations and inhibition (r(116) = -.00, p = .978) and final 
span (r(116) = -.03, p = .792). Due to the lack of relations to both variables in each relation, 
no components of the CaR-FA-X model could be tested as mediators for the relations of 
depression and trauma with specific memories and semantic associations.  
 
Moderators of Depression, Trauma, and Memory Specificity [Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6] 
To test the effects of the CaR-FA-X model on the relations of depression and trauma 
with memory specificity, moderation analyses were conducted. Exploratory moderation 
analyses were performed for the relations of depression and trauma with categorical 
memories, extended memories, semantic associations, and omissions despite them not being 
included in the hypotheses. Although there are no relations for depression and trauma with 
OGM, categorical memories, extended memories, and omissions, exploratory moderation 
analyses were still conducted to test whether these relations would become significant upon 
the addition of the moderator. All components of the CaR-FA-X model were tested as 
moderators for the exploratory moderation analyses, due to its exploratory nature. 
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and specific memories. 
Rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .801), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .956), inhibition (ΔR2 = .01, 
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p = .357), and final span (ΔR2 = .00, p = .929) were found not to moderate the relation 
between depression and specific memories. Similarly, the relation between trauma and 
specific memories were also not moderated by rumination (ΔR2 = .01, p = .406), avoidant 
coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .865), inhibition (ΔR2 = .01, p = .401), and final span (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.491).  
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and OGM. For the relation 
between depression and OGM, rumination (ΔR2 = .02, p = .095), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .01, 
p = .392), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .609), and final span (ΔR2 = .00, p = .576) were found not 
to moderate the relation. Rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .835), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.862), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .734), and final span (ΔR2 = .01, p = .366) also did not 
moderate the relation between trauma and OGM. 
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and categorical memories. 
Rumination (ΔR2 = .02, p = .183), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .02, p = .171), inhibition (ΔR2 = .01, 
p = .407), and final span (ΔR2 = .00, p = .651) were shown to not moderate the relations 
between depression and categorical memories. Similarly, the relation between trauma and 
categorical memories were also not moderated by rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .693), avoidant 
coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .869), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .502), final span (ΔR2 = .01, p = .317).  
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and extended memories. For the 
relation between depression and extended memories, rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .843), 
avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .01, p = .418), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .612), and final span (ΔR2 = 
.02, p = .197) were shown to not moderate the relation. Rumination (ΔR2 = .01, p = .422), 
avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .990), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .617), and final span (ΔR2 = 
.00, p = .792) also did not moderate the relation between trauma and extended memories. 
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Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and semantic associations. 
Rumination was found to moderate the relation between depression and semantic associations 
(ΔR2 = .07, B = .01, SE = .00, p = .004). Depression predicted semantic associations more 
strongly when rumination levels increased. However, this moderation effect was only present 
at high rumination levels. In terms of the subcomponents of rumination, the relation between 
depression and semantic associations was moderated by both brooding (ΔR2 = .04, B = .01, 
SE = .00, p = .022) and reflection (ΔR2 = .06, B = .01, SE = .00, p = .005). When brooding 
and reflection increased, depression more strongly predicted semantic associations, but these 
effects occurred only at high brooding and reflection levels. Inhibition moderated the relation 
between depression and semantic associations (ΔR2 = .04, B = .03, SE = .02, p = .035), 
whereby depression predicted semantic associations more strongly when deficits in inhibition 
increased, but only at high deficit levels. Avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .01, p = .267) and final span 
(ΔR2 = .00, p = .526) did not moderate the depression and semantic associations relation.  
Similar to depression, rumination moderated the relation between trauma and 
semantic associations (ΔR2 = .03, B = .00, SE = .00, p = .043). Trauma predicted semantic 
associations more strongly when rumination levels increased, but this moderation effect only 
took place at high rumination levels. In terms of the subcomponents of rumination, brooding 
(ΔR2 = .03, p = .061) and reflection (ΔR2 = .02, p = .090) did not independently moderate the 
relation between trauma and semantic associations. Inhibition functioned as a moderator of 
the relation between trauma and semantic associations (ΔR2 = .04, B = .02, SE = .01, p = 
.023). Trauma predicted semantic associations more strongly when deficits in inhibition 
increased, at both moderate and high deficiency levels. Avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .645) 
and final span (ΔR2 = .00, p = .971) were not moderators of the relation between trauma and 
semantic associations.  
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Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and omissions. For the depression 
and omissions relation, rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .854), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.818), inhibition (ΔR2 = .03, p = .063), and final span (ΔR2 = .00, p = .977) did not moderate 
the relation. Rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .568), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .952), 
inhibition (ΔR2 = .03, p = .062), and final span (ΔR2 = .00, p = .770) also did not moderate the 
trauma and omissions relation. 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the associations between subclinical depression and 
PTSD levels with memory specificity, and how intensity and valence of cues affects those 
relations. The study also tested CaR-FA-X components as the underlying mechanisms of the 
depression and trauma with memory specificity relations. To investigate these aims, 
participants completed the AMT, Digit span test, and Flanker task, along with measures of 
depression, trauma, rumination, and avoidant coping. Overall findings indicate that:  
1) There were no differences in the specificity of memory between individuals with 
subclinical depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals (Hypothesis 
1 was not accepted). However, higher trauma severity predicted the generation of 
more semantic associations.  
2) Valence and intensity of cues did not have any effect on memory specificity for 
individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy 
individuals (Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not accepted).  
3) Rumination did not mediate or moderate the relations of depression and trauma with 
specific memories and OGM (Hypothesis 4 was not accepted). However, rumination 
moderated the relations of depression and trauma with semantic associations. Higher 
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rumination strengthened the relations between higher depression and trauma and 
higher semantic associations. The subcomponents of rumination, brooding and 
reflection, independently moderated the relation between depression and semantic 
associations but not the relation between trauma and semantic associations. 
4) Functional avoidance did not mediate or moderate the relations of depression (part of 
Hypothesis 5 was accepted) and trauma (part of Hypothesis 5 was not accepted) with 
specific memories and OGM. 
5) Inhibition and working memory did not mediate or moderate the relations of 
depression (part of Hypothesis 6 was not accepted) and trauma (part of Hypothesis 6 
was accepted) with specific memories and OGM. However, inhibition moderated the 
relations of depression and trauma with semantic associations. More deficits in 
inhibition strengthened the relations between higher depression and trauma and higher 
semantic associations.  
 
Memory Specificity, Depression, and Trauma 
In the current study, there were no differences in any of the categories of memory 
specificity between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups when the data was 
viewed from a categorical approach. The lack of differences was different from Fisk et al. 
(2018) and Romero et al. (2014), who found differences in specific, extended, and categorical 
memories between depressed and non-depressed groups in a normal sample. Similarly, from 
a continuous approach, depression severity also did not predict changes in the categories of 
memory specificity. This finding matched several past studies that used a normal sample 
(Hermans et al., 2004; Peters et al., 2002; Raymaekers et al., 2010), but was also different 
from a number of past studies that found depression severity related to specific memories and 
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OGM (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Raes et al., 2010). The current findings were also different from 
studies testing group differences using clinical samples (Dritschel et al., 2011; Hitchcock et 
al., 2019; Park et al., 2002; Ridout et al., 2016; Watson et al., 2013) and studies that tested the 
relation in the opposite direction (Debeer et al., 2009; Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Liu et al., 
2016).  
Similar to the findings with depression, when taking a categorical approach, there 
were no differences in the memory specificity categories between subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups. These results were different from the results of Humphries and Jobson (2012), 
who found differences in specific memories between high trauma and non-trauma groups in a 
normal sample. Using the continuous approach, trauma severity did not predict changes in all 
categories of memory specificity except semantic associations, which was different from 
Zheng and Gray (2018) who showed trauma severity predicted fewer specific memories in 
normal samples. The current results were different from studies on group differences in 
clinical samples (Nixon et al., 2013; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006, 2017; Schönfeld et al. 2007) 
and studies that tested the relation in the opposite direction (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). 
There were also no effects of emotional valence or intensity of the cues on memory 
specificity between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and between 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. The current finding is different from Matsumoto et 
al. (2020) and Zheng and Gray (2018)’s results of negative cues eliciting higher categorical 
memories in high depression groups and fewer specific memories in high trauma groups from 
the normal population. The lack of effect of valence of cues is also different from the results 
of clinical studies (Park et al., 2002; Ono et al., 2016; Ricarte et al., 2011; Schönfeld & 
Ehlers, 2006). 
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 Rumination, avoidant coping, inhibition, and working memory did not mediate or 
moderate the relations of depression and trauma with specific memories and OGM. Hence, 
the CaR-FA-X model was not supported as the underlying mechanisms of the relations of 
depression and trauma with specific memories and OGM. These results are different from 
past studies that found evidence for rumination as a mediator in samples with clinical levels 
of depression and PTSD (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Liu et al., 2016; Raes, Hermans, Williams, 
Beyers et al., 2006) and inhibition as a mediator in clinically depressed samples (Raes et al., 
2010). However, it should be noted that the studies that found rumination functioning as a 
mediator tested the relation in the opposite direction of the current study (i.e., OGM and 
memory specificity – depression and trauma). This difference in direction, in addition to the 
past studies using clinical samples may explain why these findings were not replicated.  
However, exploratory analyses showed that rumination and inhibition function as 
moderators by strengthening the relations of higher depression and trauma with more 
semantic associations. In terms of subcomponents, both brooding and reflection functioned 
independently as moderators for the depression and semantic association relation, whereas 
brooding and reflection were not able to function independently as moderators for the trauma 
and semantic association relation. 
 
Possible Explanations for Different Findings  
The results of the current study did not replicate the results of past studies on the 
groups differences in memory specificity, relations of depression and trauma severity and 
memory specificity, and effects of valence of cues on memory specificity. One possible 
explanation is that Asian samples have been noted to retrieve less specific and more 
categorical memories overall as compared to Caucasian samples, regardless of depression and 
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trauma levels (Dritschel et al., 2011; Humphries & Jobson, 2012; Wang, 2009). As the 
sample of the current study consists of mostly Asians, there is a possibility that without being 
instructed to retrieve specific memories, these individuals may have retrieved 
autobiographical memories in a more naturalistic style that is less specific and more 
categorical. However, this lack of specificity may not necessarily reflect an inability or 
difficulty in retrieving specific memories with which depression and trauma have been 
associated with and could therefore explain the lack of associations between depression and 
trauma and memory specificity. 
Another explanation is the type of AMT used to elicit autobiographical memories. 
The minimal instruction version of the AMT was used in the current study, which Debeer et 
al. (2009) found to be a better method to detect and measure OGM in normal populations, as 
compared to the original or specific instruction version of the AMT. Individuals with 
depression symptoms from normal populations were found to be able to retrieve specific 
memories when specifically instructed to, but not on an automatic basis, which is the reason 
minimal instructions AMT was found to better detect memory specificity in this population 
(Debeer et al., 2009). Although the minimal instruction AMT functions well in normal 
populations, it may not have been sufficient or sensitive enough to capture OGM tendencies 
and deficits in memory specificity in subclinical populations, who experience significantly 
higher symptoms than those typically associated with normal populations. Instead the specific 
version of the AMT that contains specific instructions which are more suited for clinical 
populations may be a better tool to capture the OGM tendencies, as subclinical populations 
share similar symptoms and difficulties as clinical populations but at lower severity (Ji, 
2012). As individuals with more clinical or severe depression tend to have difficulties 
recalling specific memories regardless of instructions (Debeer et al., 2009), the specific 
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instruction AMT may be able to better distinguish the people who can retrieve specific 
memories when specifically instructed to (e.g., average depression and trauma symptoms, 
non-disordered groups) from those who are unable to do so even when instructed (e.g., above 
average depression and trauma symptoms, subclinical depression and PTSD groups). 
Both possible reasons suggest that providing more specific instructions for memory 
retrieval may be more suitable for samples that have subclinical symptoms and consists of 
more Asians than Caucasians. Therefore, a second study was conducted using more specific 
instructions for memory retrieval to reduce effects of culture and task sensitivity. 
 
Study 4 
The Current study  
 Study 4 aimed to test whether memory specificity between individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals would be 
different when specific instructions are given for autobiographical memory recall instead of 
minimal instructions. The results of this study could be applied into clinical settings, by 
highlighting whether the way clinicians ask for narration of memories of people with 
depression and trauma symptoms could produce different narration and details, which could 
in turn affect the course of treatment. Changes in amount of details remembered could also 
increase or decrease utilization of the functions of autobiographical memory.  
Besides changes in instructions, there were also changes in the executive functioning 
tasks in Study 4. In contrast to Study 3, the Flanker test and the Digit Span task which 
measured inhibition and verbal working memory, respectively, were replaced by the Stop 
Signal task and the n-back task. The reason the tasks were changed was to improve the 
reliability of the inhibition and verbal working memory measures, which could in turn 
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improve the reliability of the findings on the relations tested. Higher number of trials in tasks 
have been shown to improve the reliability of the measure (e.g., Kelemen, Weinberg, Alford, 
Mulvey, & Kaeochinda, 2006; Salo, Grimshaw, & Viitasalo, 1997). For this reason, the 
executive functioning tasks selected for Study 4 (i.e., Stop Signal = 240 trials; n-back = 180 
trials) were tasks that had higher number of trials than the tasks in Study 3 (i.e., Flanker = 80 
trials; Digit Span = 16 trials). Despite the difference in tasks used, correlations have been 
found between the Flanker and Stop Signal tasks, and between the Digit Span and n-back 
tasks (Hedge et al., 2018; Redick & Lindsey, 2013), suggesting that the results are still 
comparable between Study 3 and 4. 
For Study 4, the research questions were the same as in Study 3. One research 
question was, however, added, which was whether using specific instructions to elicit 
memory will result in more specific memories being retrieved in samples that have 
subclinical level of symptoms and consists of more Asian participants. We hypothesized that  
1) The specific version of the AMT will elicit more specific memories than the minimal 
version of the AMT (from Study 3).  
2) Individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD will demonstrate higher 
OGM tendencies and retrieve fewer specific memories than psychologically healthy 
individuals. 
3) Higher OGM and fewer specific memories will be retrieved by individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression and PTSD symptoms when the word cue is negative. 
4) Higher OGM and fewer specific memories will be retrieved by individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression and PTSD symptoms when the word cue has higher 
intensity.  
Chapter 3: Overgeneral Memory - 151 
 
 
5) Rumination will mediate or moderate the relations of depression with OGM and 
specific memories, and the relations of trauma with OGM and specific memories. In 
terms of subcomponents, brooding will serve as a mediator or moderator for the 
relations of depression and trauma with OGM and specific memories, whereas 
reflection will not mediate or moderate any of the relations.  
6) Functional avoidance will mediate or moderate the relations of trauma with OGM and 
specific memories, but not the relations of depression with OGM and specific 
memories.  
7) Inhibition and verbal working memory will mediate or moderate the relations of 
depression with OGM and specific memories, but not the relations of trauma with 
OGM and specific memories. 
 
To test these hypotheses, participants described and categorized memories of events 
in response to 12 emotional cue words. Participants then completed the Stop Signal and n-
back tasks, followed by the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale, PTSD 





Similar to Study 3, power analysis indicated that 102 participants would be needed to 
reach statistical significance in an independent-samples t-test. For the fourth study, 139 
students from the University of Nottingham Malaysia were recruited. No participants were 
removed because there were no errors in answering the memory task. The participants had a 
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mean age of 19.96 (SD = 1.70, range = 17-26), and the sample consisted of 34 males and 105 
females. One-hundred twenty-two of the participants were Malaysians and 17 were non-
Malaysians (2 Korean, 2 Sri Lankan, 2 Indian, 2 Pakistani, 1 Singaporean, 1 British, 1 
Bruneian, 1 Chinese, 1 Indonesian, 1 Bangladeshi, 1 Jordanian, 1 Ugandan, and 1 Zambian). 




Questionnaires and AMT. Similar to Study 3, the CES-D (Radloff, 1977) was used 
to measure depression symptomology in the general population (refer to Appendix D), the 
PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013) was used to measure PTSD or trauma symptoms (refer to 
Appendix B), the RRS-SF (Treynor et al., 2003) was used to measure rumination levels (refer 
to Appendix J), and the COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989) was used to measure avoidant 
coping levels (refer to Appendix K). The AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was used 
again to elicit autobiographical memories, using the same 12 cue words as Study 3 (refer to 
Appendix E). Instead of the minimal-instructions version, the standard or specific version of 
the AMT was used, which contains more specific instructions. Participants were instructed to 
retrieve specific autobiographical memories that had occurred at a particular time and place 
and had lasted less than a day, for each cue word given. Prior to beginning the actual task, 
participants were given examples of specific memories and less specific memories using four 
cue words (i.e., “water”, “book”, “sun”, and “cookie”). Following the same procedure as 
Study 3, after describing the memories in the spaces provided, participants were presented the 
descriptions back one at a time and had to categorize them into the different categories of 
specificity.  
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Stop Signal Task. The Stop Signal task is used to assess inhibition towards 
irrelevant stimuli and responses. This task involves providing a response to stimuli as fast as 
possible, except when the inhibitory stimuli or “stop signal” is shown, to which participants 
would need to inhibit their responses. However, the presentation of the stop signal is not 
consistent across trials, with the time taken for the stop signal to appear (i.e., the stop signal 
delay) following a one-up / one-down staircase design. When participants are able inhibit 
their responses accurately towards the stop signal, the stop signal delay becomes longer, 
whereas when participants are not able to inhibit their responses accurately, the stop signal 
delay becomes faster. Longer stop signal delays are more difficult to inhibit as compared to 
faster stop signal delays. This design enables the Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) to be 
obtained, which is the time taken for the individual to inhibit their responses when necessary. 
Lower SSRT means the individual took a shorter time to successfully inhibit the responses 
and reflects higher inhibition abilities. This task has Cronbach’s alpha ranging between .29 
and .61, and a one-month test-retest reliability of .65 (Weafer, Baggott, & de Wit, 2013; 
Wöstmann et al., 2013). 
The Stop Signal task used in this study was taken from de Vries and Geurts (2014). 
All instructions and fixation points were shown in black font against a green background 
(refer to Appendix L). The fixation points were presented at the centre, with the inter-
stimulus interval randomized for each trial, at either 1750 ms, 1875 ms, 2000 ms, 2125 ms, or 
2250 ms, to reduce the predictability of when the stimuli will appear. The stimuli which were 
240 x 219 pixels and presented at the centre, consisted of a yellow dog and a red dog, with 
each facing either left or right (refer to Appendix M). During a go trial, a yellow dog 
appeared, and participants had to identify the direction the dog was facing, by pressing the 
“Z’ key when the dog was facing left and the “/” key when the dog was facing right. During a 
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stop trial, the yellow dog turned red, and this stop sign indicated that the participants had to 
refrain from providing any response, and wait for the next stimuli (i.e., yellow dog) to appear. 
The next trial automatically commenced once a response was given, or after 1200 ms if no 
response was given.  
The stop signal delay (i.e., time taken for the yellow dog to change into the red dog 
in stop- trials) started at 300 ms, with 50 ms being added to the time for every correct 
response on the stop trial, and 50 ms being deducted from the time for every incorrect 
response on the stop trial. The total time per trial is 1200 ms, with the go stimuli being shown 
for 1200 ms in go-trials. For stop trials, the go stimuli were shown according to the duration 
of the stop signal delay for the trial and the stop stimuli was shown with the remainder of 
time after deducting the stop signal delay from the total 1200 ms. There was one practice 
block and three experimental blocks, with each block consisting of 56 go trials and 24 stop 
trials, totalling to 80 trials per block. The practice block therefore contained a total of 80 
trials, whereas the experimental block contained a total of 240 trials. For each trial, accuracy 
and RT were recorded. 
n-back task. The n-back task assesses verbal working memory. This task involves 
stimuli being presented one at a time and participants having to indicate whether the stimulus 
shown was the same stimulus that was shown previously. The “n” in n-back refers to how 
many stimuli shown previously is the current stimulus being referenced to. A 1-back task 
requires participants to recall whether the current stimulus shown is the same as the 
immediate previous stimulus, whereas a 2-back task requires them to recall whether the 
current stimulus is the same as the stimulus presented two stimuli ago. Higher accuracy and 
shorter RT of correct responses reflects higher working memory capacity. The 2-back task is 
viewed as more difficult, because it requires higher storage capacity for more stimuli and 
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higher updating efforts as compared to the 1-back task. Thus, better performance on the 2-
back task reflects an even higher working memory capacity. This task has Cronbach’s alphas 
ranging between .54 and .84 and a six-week test-retest reliability of .64 for accuracy score 
and .79 for RT (Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007; Soveri et al., 2016). 
 The n-back task used in the current study was also taken from de Vries and Geurts 
(2014). All instructions and fixation points were shown in black font against a white 
background (refer to Appendix N). Fixation points were presented at the centre and the inter-
stimulus interval ranged between 900 ms to 1100 ms to make the stimuli appearance 
unpredictable. Fifteen neutral stimuli that were 200 x 200 pixels were presented at the centre 
of the screen for 1000 ms (refer to Appendix O). The three conditions were 0-back, 1-back, 
and 2-back. The 0-back was used as a baseline measure, whereby participants have to press 
“W” if the stimulus was a car and “O” if stimulus was not a car. In the 1-back, participants 
had to press “W” if the current stimulus was the same as the previous stimulus and “O” if the 
current stimulus was different from the previous stimulus. For the 2-back, participants had to 
press “W” if the current stimulus was the same as the stimulus shown two stimuli ago and 
“O” if the current stimulus was different from the stimulus shown two stimuli two ago. The 
next trial automatically commenced once a response was given, or after 1000 ms if no 
response was given. There was one practice block and four experimental blocks, with each 
block containing the three conditions (i.e., 0-back, 1-back, and 2-back) and each condition 
consisting of 15 trials (i.e., 5 trials where “W” is correct, and 10 trials where “O” is correct). 
The practice block had therefore a total of 45 trials, and the experimental block had a total of 
180 trials. For each trial, accuracy and RT were recorded. 
 
Procedure 
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This study was approved by the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Nottingham Malaysia (AM270318). The study was conducted using a 
desktop computer in a research lab within the University. Participants were first given an 
information sheet to read and a consent form and demographic sheet to answer. Participants 
began the experiment by answering the AMT, followed by completing the Stop Signal task 
and n-back task. Last, participants answered the CES-D Scale, PCL-5, RRS-SF, and COPE 
Inventory. The order of the tasks was fixed, as listed above, with only the Stop Signal task 
and n-back task being counterbalanced. The session took approximately 55-65 minutes to 
complete. At the end of the session, the participants were thanked and given a small financial 
reward (RM15) for their participation.  
 
Scoring 
Similar to Study 3, the total specific memories, categorical memories, extended 
memories, semantic associations, and omissions were obtained by adding the number of 
memories categorized under each respective category. The total OGM was similarly obtained 
by adding the categorical and extended memories (Sumner, 2012; Williams & Dritschel, 
1992).  
 In the Stop Signal task, SSRT was used as the measure of inhibition. The SSRT was 
calculated using go-trial RTs and stop-trial RTs, in term of distributions, and responses for 
stop-trials, in terms of probability (de Vries & Geurts, 2014). Lower SSRT reflects higher 
inhibition abilities.  
In the n-back task, cost accuracy and cost RT were used as indices of working 
memory. Total accuracy for each condition was first obtained by summing the trials with 
correct responses. Cost 2-back-1-back accuracy was then calculated by subtracting total 
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accuracy of the 2-back condition with total accuracy of the 1-back condition, whereas cost 2-
back-0-back accuracy was obtained by subtracting total accuracy of the 2-back condition with 
total accuracy of the 0-back condition. Mean RT of correct trials for each condition was 
calculated by excluding the RT of all trials with incorrect responses and all correct trials with 
less than 100 ms and averaging the RT of trials with correct responses. Cost 2-back-1-back 
RT was obtained by subtracting 2-back mean RT with 1-back mean RT, whereas cost 2-back-
0-back accuracy was obtained by subtracting 2-back mean RT with 0-back mean RT. Higher 
cost accuracies and lower cost RTs reflect higher verbal working memory. 
 Because there are four final cost measurements for accuracy and RT from the n-back 
task, principle component analysis was performed on these four measures to create composite 
scores. The analysis revealed the presence of two components, with working memory 
accuracy (i.e., cost 2-back-1-back accuracy and cost 2-back-0-back accuracy) explaining 
75.4% of variance and working memory RT (i.e., cost 2-back-1-back RT and cost 2-back-0-
back RT) explaining 24.6% of variance. Hence, the composite working memory accuracy 
score was obtained by adding the Z-scores of cost 2-back-1-back accuracy and cost 2-back-0-
back accuracy, whereas composite working memory RT score was obtained by adding the Z-
scores of cost 2-back-1-back RT and cost 2-back-0-back RT. Another principle component 
analysis was performed on the composite working memory accuracy and composite working 
memory RT to create an overall working memory composite. The second analysis revealed 
that both composites could be combined into one component. Therefore, the overall working 
memory composite was obtained by subtracting composite working memory accuracy with 
composite working memory RT. 
  
Results 
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Autobiographical Memory Specificity [Descriptives] 
Majority of the memories that were retrieved were specific (57.5%), followed by 
extended (16.5%) and categorical (15.1%). A smaller amount of the memories was semantic 
associations (6.7%) and omissions (4.2%). Out of the 12 recalled memories, the maximum 
total specific memories retrieved were 12, whereas a maximum total of 7 categorical 
memories and semantic associations were retrieved, and a maximum total of 5 extended 
memories and omissions were retrieved. Participants were able to recall a minimum of two 
specific memories. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to look at the associations 
within the various memory specification categories (see Table 3.3). 
 Both positive and negative cues elicited mostly specific memories (positive: 63.6%; 
negative: 51.4%), followed by extended (positive: 13.6%; negative: 19.5%) and categorical 
(positive: 13.0%; negative: 17.3%) memories. There were fewer semantic associations 
(positive: 6.4%; negative: 7.0%), and omissions (positive: 3.6%; negative: 4.8%) retrieved for 
both positive and negative cues. Both high and low intensity cues also elicited mostly specific 
memories (positive: 63.3%; negative: 51.7%). High intensity cues generated more extended 
(15.3%), followed by categorical (11.0%) memories, whereas low intensity cues generated 
more categorical (19.2%), followed by extended (17.7%) memories. Both high and low 
intensity cues generated less semantic associations (high: 6.8%; low: 6.5%), and omissions 
(high: 3.5%; low: 4.9%).  
 
Instructions of Memory Recall [Hypothesis 1] 
 To investigate whether memory specificity differs according to the instructions of 
memory recall and whether there is an interaction with depression and trauma, between-
subjects analyses of variance were conducted on the different categories of memory 
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specificity in Study 3 and Study 4 (see Figure 3.3). There was a main effect of type of 
instructions on specific memories (F(1,253) = 71.28, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .22), OGM 
(F(1,253) = 68.04, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .21), and categorical memories (F(1,253) = 65.44, p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = .21). When given specific recall instructions, participants recalled more 
specific memories (specific: M = 6.88, SE = 0.19; minimal: M = 4.47, SE = 0.21) and fewer 
OGM (specific: M = 3.82, SE = 0.17; minimal: M = 5.93, SE = 0.19) and categorical 
memories (specific: M = 1.83, SE = 0.15; minimal: M = 3.65, SE = 0.17) than when given 
minimal instructions. However, there was no main effect of instructions on extended 
memories (F(1,253) = 2.25, p = .135), semantic associations (F(1,253) = 1.06, p = .303), and 
omissions (F(1,253) = 1.14, p = .288). There were also no significant interactions between 
instructions and depression and trauma on all memory specificity categories, suggesting the 
effect of instructions influenced individuals with depression and PTSD symptoms and 
psychologically healthy individuals similarly.  
 
Memory Specificity, Depression, and Trauma [Hypothesis 2] 
Scoring of subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. To analyse the data 
using a categorical approach, participants who scored a total of 20 and above in the CES-D 
(Vilagut et al., 2016) were categorized as subclinical depression (n = 65; males = 14, females 
= 51), whereas those who scored a total of 19 and below were categorized as non-depressed 
(n = 74; males = 20, females = 54). The depression scores did not vary significantly from the 
cut-off score (M = 20.45, SD = 10.94, t(138) = 0.48, p = .632), indicating the scores clustered 
around the cut-off. 
For the PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013), individuals that scored a total of 33 and above 
were categorized as subclinical PTSD (n = 53; males = 14, females = 39), whereas those who 
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scored a total of 32 and below were categorized as non-PTSD (n = 86; males = 20, females = 
66). The trauma scores varied significantly from the cut-off score (M = 27.35, SD = 16.73, 
t(138) = -3.98, p < .001), indicating that the scores were distributed away from the cut-off.  
Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences for memory specificity. 
To examine differences in memory specificity between subclinical depression and non-
depressed groups and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, independent-samples 
t-tests were conducted (see Table 3.4, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5). The subclinical depression 
and non-depressed groups retrieved similar numbers of specific memories (t(137) = -1.12, p = 
.266), OGM (t(137) = 1.71, p = .089), categorical memories (t(137) = 1.71, p = .089), 
extended memories (t(137) = 0.78, p = .438), semantic associations (t(137) = 0.14, p = .886), 
and omissions (t(135.41) = -1.17, p = .244).  
There were no differences in extended memories (t(137) = 0.90, p = .372), and 
omissions (t(127.58) = -1.43, p = .157) retrieved between the subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups. Although the subclinical PTSD group retrieved fewer specific memories 
(t(137) = -2.39, p = .018), and higher OGM (t(137) = 2.14, p = .034), categorical memories 
(t(137) = 2.21, p = .029), and semantic associations (t(137) = 2.01, p = .046) than the non-
PTSD group, these differences were no longer significant after applying Bonferroni 
corrections (p ≤ .008).  
Predictive effects of depression and trauma on memory specificity. Exploratory 
linear regression analyses were conducted to test the predictive effects of depression and 
trauma severity on memory specificity, as a way of examining the data from a continuous 
approach. Although depression severity significantly explained 2.8% of the variance in 
specific memories (F(1, 137) = 3.98, p = .048, beta = -.17), 3.5% of the variance in OGM 
(F(1, 137) = 4.95, p = .028, beta = .19), and 3.0% of the variance in categorical memories 
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(F(1, 137) = 4.18, p = .043, beta = .17), it was no longer a significant predictor of those 
memory specificity categories after applying Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .008). Depression 
severity also did not explain other memory specificity categories (ps > .05). 
Trauma severity significantly explained 5.0% of the variance in OGM (F(1, 137) = 
7.19, p = .008) even after Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .008), whereby higher trauma symptoms 
predicted the retrieval of more OGM (beta = .22, p = .008). Although trauma severity 
explained 4.2% of the variance in specific memories (F(1, 137) = 5.60, p = .016, beta = -.21) 
and 4.7% of the variance in categorical memories (F(1, 137) = 6.80, p = .010, beta = .22), it 
was no longer a significant predictor of both memory specificity categories after applying a 
Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .008). Trauma severity also did not explain other memory 
specificity categories (ps > .05). 
Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences for CaR-FA-X 
components. Independent-samples t-tests were also performed to test differences in the CaR-
FA-X components between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups and between 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups (see Table 3.4). The subclinical depression group 
had higher rumination (t(137) = 6.68, p ≤ .001) and avoidant coping (t(137) = 3.67, p ≤ .001) 
levels than the non-depressed group, even after applying a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .013). 
There were no differences in SSRT and working memory between the subclinical depression 
and non-depressed groups (ps > .05). 
Similarly, the subclinical PTSD group had higher levels of rumination (t(137) = 6.35, 
p ≤ .001) and avoidant coping (t(88.71) = 5.61, p ≤ .001) than the non-PTSD group. After 
Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .013), these differences were still present. There was no 
difference in SSRT and working memory levels between the subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups (ps > .05). 




Valence and Intensity of Cues [Hypotheses 3 and 4] 
Depression groups and memory specificity. To test the effects of the valence and 
intensity of cues on the specificity of memory recalled between subclinical depression and 
non-depressed groups and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, mixed-design 
multivariate analyses of variances were conducted. There was no interaction between 
depression groups and the valence of cues, with subclinical depression and non-depressed 
groups retrieving similar numbers of specific memories (F(1,137) = 0.01, p = .936), OGM 
(F(1,137) = 1.42, p = .236), categorical memories (F(1,137) = 0.39, p = .533), extended 
memories (F(1,137) = 0.71, p = .401), semantic associations (F(1,137) = 1.85, p = .176), and 
omissions (F(1,137) = 0.60, p = .439) for both positive and negative cues.  
Depression groups and intensity of cues also did not have any interaction, with 
subclinical depression and non-depressed groups retrieving similar numbers of specific 
memories (F(1,137) = 0.24, p = .623), OGM (F(1,137) = 0.18, p = .672), categorical 
memories (F(1,137) = 0.22, p = .640), extended memories (F(1,137) = 0.01, p = .925), 
semantic associations (F(1,137) = 0.64, p = .426), and omissions (F(1,137) = 0.73, p = .394) 
for both high and low intensity cues. 
Trauma groups and memory specificity. Trauma groups and the valence of cues did 
not interact, with subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups retrieving similar numbers of 
specific memories (F(1,137) = 0.03, p = .872), OGM (F(1,137) = 0.35, p = .558), categorical 
memories (F(1,137) = 0.18, p = .675), extended memories (F(1,137) = 1.08, p = .301), 
semantic associations (F(1,137) = 0.04, p = .836), and omissions (F(1,137) = 2.08, p = .152) 
for both positive and negative cues.  
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There was also no interaction between trauma groups and cue intensity, with 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups retrieving similar numbers of specific memories 
(F(1,137) = 0.30, p = .585), OGM (F(1,137) = 0.00, p = .960), categorical memories 
(F(1,137) = 0.02, p = .889), extended memories (F(1,137) = 0.04, p = .838), and omissions 
(F(1,137) = 3.46, p = .065) for both high and low intensity cues. However, there was an 
interaction effect between trauma groups and intensity of cues on semantic associations 
retrieved (F(1,137) = 5.29, p = .023), whereby the subclinical PTSD group retrieved more 
semantic associations for low intensity cues (M = 0.64, SD = 1.08) than high intensity cues 
(M = 0.43, SD = 0.64) and the non-PTSD group retrieved more semantic associations for high 
intensity cues (M = 0.40, SD = 0.83) than low intensity cues (M = 0.23, SD = 0.59). After 
adjusting the results with a Bonferroni correction (p ≤ .008), the interaction was no longer 
significant.  
 
Mediators of Depression, Trauma, and Memory Specificity [Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7] 
Correlations with mediating variables. To investigate the associations between 
rumination, avoidant coping, and executive functioning with depression, trauma, and memory 
specificity (see Table 3.3), Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated. As depression 
and trauma predicted specific memories, OGM, and categorical memories prior to Bonferroni 
corrections, only correlations with specific memories, OGM, and categorical memories will 
be discussed here. 
Rumination was associated with depression (r(137) = .59, p < .001) and trauma 
(r(137) = .65, p < .001). However, there were no linear relations between rumination and 
specific memories (r(137) = -.14, p = .103), OGM (r(137) = .16, p = .058), and categorical 
memories (r(137) = .13, p = .141). Avoidant coping correlated with depression (r(137) = .41, 
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p < .001) and trauma (r(137) = .56, p < .001). Avoidant coping also related to OGM (r(137) = 
.18, p = .032), but not to specific memories (r(137) = -.12, p = .159) and categorical 
memories (r(137) = .16, p = .061).  
There were no linear relations between SSRT and depression (r(137) = .05, p = .598) 
and trauma (r(137) = .05, p = .567). There were also no significant correlations between 
SSRT and specific memories (r(137) = .06, p = .517), OGM (r(137) = .03, p = .822), and 
categorical memories (r(137) = -.03, p = .706). Similarly, there were no linear relations 
between working memory and depression (r(137) = -.03, p = .747) and trauma (r(137) = -.11, 
p = .186). There were also no associations between working memory and specific memories 
(r(137) = .08, p = .345), OGM (r(137) = -.02, p = .855), and categorical memories (r(137) = -
.15, p = .072). Due to the lack of relations with both depression and memory specificity, and 
both trauma and memory specificity, rumination, inhibition, and working memory could not 
be tested as mediators. Hence, only avoidant coping can be tested as a mediator for the 
relations of depression and trauma with OGM. 
Mediation analyses for depression and OGM. To examine avoidant coping as a 
mediator of depression and OGM, a hierarchical regression was conducted with avoidant 
coping (entered in the first step) and depression (entered in the second step) as independent 
variables, and OGM as the dependent variable. Adding depression did not result in a 
significant increase in the explained variance (ΔR2 = .015, p = .145), but the outcome of the 
Sobel test was not significant (Z = 1.31, p = .190). Avoidant coping did not mediate the 
relation between depression and OGM. 
Mediation analyses for trauma and OGM. Another hierarchical regression was 
conducted to test whether avoidant coping would mediate the trauma and OGM relation, 
whereby avoidant coping (entered in the first step) and trauma (entered in the second step) 
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were the independent variables, and OGM was the dependent variable. Avoidant coping also 
did not function as a mediator for the trauma and OGM relation. Adding trauma did not 
significantly increase the explained variance (ΔR2 = .021, p = .081), and, similarly, the results 
of the Sobel test were not significant (Z = 0.82, p = .414). 
 
Moderators of Depression, Trauma, and Memory Specificity [Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7] 
To test the effects of the CaR-FA-X model on the relations of depression and trauma 
with specific memories and OGM, moderation analyses were conducted. Similar to Study 3, 
exploratory moderation analyses were also carried out for the relations of depression and 
trauma with categorical memories, extended memories, semantic associations, and omissions. 
All components of the CaR-FA-X model were tested as moderators. None of the 48 
moderation analyses suggested that any of the four CaR-FA-X components acted as a 
moderator for the relations between depression and trauma and memory specificity.  
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and specific memories. 
Rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .609), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .01, p = .370), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, 
p = .761), and working memory (ΔR2 = .01, p = .173) were all found not to moderate the 
relation between depression and specific memories. Similarly, the relation between trauma 
and specific memories were also not moderated by rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .991), avoidant 
coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .479), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .797), and working memory (ΔR2 = 
.00, p = .494).  
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and OGM. For the relation 
between depression and OGM, rumination (ΔR2 = .01, p = .415), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, 
p = .603), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .699), and working memory (ΔR2 = .01, p = .175) were 
found not to moderate the relation. Rumination (ΔR2 = .01, p = .334), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = 
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.01, p = .414), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .890), and working memory (ΔR2 = .01, p = .371) 
also did not moderate the relation between trauma and OGM. 
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and categorical memories. 
Rumination (ΔR2 = .01, p = .181), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .865), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, 
p = .535), and working memory (ΔR2 = .00, p = .859) did not function as moderators for the 
relation between depression and categorical memories. The relation between trauma and 
categorical memories were not moderated by rumination (ΔR2 = .02, p = .090), avoidant 
coping (ΔR2 = .01, p = .408), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .609), and working memory (ΔR2 = 
.00, p = .909).  
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and extended memories. For the 
relation between depression and extended memories, rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .879), 
avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .564), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .953), and working memory 
(ΔR2 = .02, p = .072) were found not to moderate the relation. Similarly, rumination (ΔR2 = 
.00, p = .781), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p = .723), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .760), and 
working memory (ΔR2 = .01, p = .237) also did not moderate the relation between trauma and 
OGM. 
Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and semantic associations. 
Rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .857), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .01, p = .258), inhibition (ΔR2 = .00, 
p = .544), and working memory (ΔR2 = .00, p = .927) were shown to not moderate the relation 
between depression and semantic associations. The relation between trauma and semantic 
associations were also not moderated by rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .760), avoidant coping 
(ΔR2 = .00, p = .662), inhibition (ΔR2 = .01, p = .364), and working memory (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.696).  
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Moderation analyses for depression and trauma and omissions. For the relation 
between depression and omissions, rumination (ΔR2 = .00, p = .458), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = 
.00, p = .714), inhibition (ΔR2 = .01, p = .383), and working memory (ΔR2 = .00, p = .596) did 
not to moderate the relation. Rumination (ΔR2 = .02, p = .080), avoidant coping (ΔR2 = .00, p 
= .559), inhibition (ΔR2 = .01, p = .403), and working memory (ΔR2 = .00, p = .803) also did 
not moderate the trauma and omissions relation. 
 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate the associations between depression and 
trauma and memory specificity, and the CaR-FA-X model as the underlying mechanism, 
when using specific instructions instead of minimal instructions in the AMT. The effects of 
emotional valence and intensity of the cues on memory specificity were also tested. To 
investigate these aims, participants completed the specific version of the AMT, Stop Signal 
task, and n-back task, in addition to measures of depression, trauma, rumination, and avoidant 
coping. Overall findings indicate that:  
1) Individuals who were given specific memory recall instructions retrieved more 
specific memories and fewer OGM and categorical memories than individuals who 
were given minimal memory recall instructions (Hypothesis 1 was accepted). 
Depression and trauma symptoms did not affect the relation between memory recall 
instructions and memory specificity. 
2) There were no differences in the specificity of memory between individuals with 
subclinical depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals (Hypothesis 
2 was not accepted). However, higher trauma severity predicted the generation of 
more OGM.  
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3) Valence and intensity of cues did not have any effect on memory specificity for 
individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy 
individuals (Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not accepted).  
4) Rumination did not mediate or moderate the relations of depression and trauma with 
specific memories and OGM (Hypothesis 5 was not accepted).  
5) Functional avoidance, as expected, did not mediate or moderate the relations of 
depression with specific memories and OGM (part of Hypothesis 6 was accepted), 
but, unexpectedly, it also did not mediate or moderate the relations of trauma with 
specific memories and OGM (part of Hypothesis 6 was not accepted). 
6) Inhibition and working memory, as expected, did not mediate or moderate the 
relations of trauma with specific memories and OGM (part of Hypothesis 7 was 
accepted), but, unexpectedly, they also did not mediate or moderate the relations of 
depression with specific memories and OGM (part of Hypothesis 7 was not accepted).  
 
In the current study, there were no differences in any of the categories of memory 
specificity between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups when viewing the data 
from a categorical approach, unlike the results of other studies that also used normal samples 
(Fisk et al., 2019; Romero et al., 2014), and studies that used clinical samples (Dritschel et 
al., 2011; Hitchcock et al., 2019; Park et al., 2002; Ridout et al., 2016; Watson et al., 2013). 
Similar to some past studies that used a normal sample (Hermans et al., 2004; Peters et al., 
2002; Raymaekers et al., 2010), the current study found depression severity did not explain 
changes in memory specificity when using a continuous approach. However, this result also 
contradicts several past studies that used normal samples (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Raes et al., 
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2010), and studies that tested the relation in the opposite direction (Debeer et al., 2009; Kleim 
& Ehlers, 2008; Liu et al., 2016).  
Contradictory to previous studies using normal samples (Humphries & Jobson, 2012) 
and clinical samples (Nixon et al., 2013; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006, 2017; Schönfeld et al. 
2007), the current study found no differences in any of the categories of memory specificity 
between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. Trauma severity in the current study did 
not significantly predict specific memories, unlike the results of studies testing normal 
samples (Zheng & Gray, 2018) and studies testing the relation in the opposite direction 
(Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). However, unlike the categorical approach, higher trauma severity 
was shown to significantly predict higher OGM tendencies when using a continuous 
approach. 
The emotional valence or intensity of the cues had no effects on the memory 
specificity between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups and between subclinical 
PTSD and non-PTSD groups. The current finding is different from similar studies that used 
normal samples (Matsumoto et al., 2020; Zheng & Gray, 2018) and clinical samples (Park et 
al., 2002; Ono et al., 2016; Ricarte et al., 2011; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006). 
 Rumination, avoidant coping, inhibition, and working memory were not mediators or 
moderators for the relations of depression and trauma with memory specificity. Hence, the 
CaR-FA-X model was not supported as the underlying mechanisms of the relations of 
depression and trauma with memory specificity. This finding does not match the literature 
that tested the mediators on the relation in the opposite direction and those that used clinical 
samples (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Liu et al., 2016; Raes et al., 2010; Raes, Hermans, Williams, 
Beyers et al., 2006).  
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General Discussion  
Memory Retrieval Instructions  
The results of the current study showed that instructions given for memory recall can 
affect the specificity of the subsequent recalled memories. Giving clearer instructions to 
retrieve specific memories and providing examples of expected memories (i.e., Study 4) 
resulted in individuals retrieving more specific memories and a reduction in the OGM and 
categorical memories retrieved as compared to those who only received minimal instructions 
and no examples (i.e., Study 3). It may be possible that those in the minimal instruction 
condition may have been less clear about the type of memories they were expected to recall, 
which is why they did not recall as many specific memories as the specific instruction 
condition, where the expectations to recall specific memories were clearly outlined.  
Asian samples tend to automatically retrieve autobiographical memories in a less 
specific and more overgeneral manner as compared to Western samples (Dritschel et al., 
2011; Humphries & Jobson, 2012; Wang, 2009), and a larger number of participants in the 
current studies were Asians. Having specific instructions in the AMT appeared to counter 
their naturalistic style of retrieval (i.e., Study 3) to become less overgeneral and more specific 
(i.e., Study 4). This finding suggests that individuals from Asian samples are capable of 
retrieving specific memories despite their automatic or naturalistic retrieval styles, but only 
when explicitly instructed to do so.  
 
Differences in Memory Specificity  
Despite the increase in specific memories and decrease in OGM and categorical 
memories from Study 3 to Study 4, there were no differences in memory specificity between 
subclinical depression and non-depressed group and between subclinical PTSD and non-
Chapter 3: Overgeneral Memory - 171 
 
 
PTSD groups for both Studies 3 and 4. Changing the memory retrieval instructions did not 
alter the results regarding depression and trauma, indicating that memory specificity for 
individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms and psychological healthy 
individuals does not depend on how specific or minimal the retrieval instructions are. 
However, which type of AMT (i.e., specific or minimal) may be better suited for subclinical 
populations cannot be ascertained from the current results. 
The current findings did not match the results of studies using clinical samples, which 
suggests that memory impairments in terms of specificity only occur at more severe and 
diagnosable levels of depression and PTSD. Although the subclinical depression and PTSD 
groups in the current study did exceed the cut-offs for above average depression and trauma 
levels, it still may not have been severe enough to reach clinical levels and the impairments 
associated with clinical levels yet. Because individuals with subclinical levels of depression 
and PTSD do not suffer difficulties recalling specific memories, they would be able to still 
utilize and benefit from the functions associated with autobiographical memories (Bluck et 
al., 2005, Fivush, 2011; Pasupathi, 2003), which in turn could also improve their 
functionality and serve as a protective factor from developing more symptoms.  
Although Fisk et al. (2019) and Romero et al. (2014) also used normal samples, they 
found that the higher depression group retrieved fewer specific memories and more extended 
and categorical memories, whereas both current studies did not. Fisk et al. (2019) and 
Romero et al. (2014) only included the lower quartile for their low depression group and 
omitted the participants that had scores close to the clinical cut-off, causing the groups to be 
more polarized from each other. Omitting those median-range participants, relative to the 
clinical cut-off may be a reason that Fisk et al. (2019) and Romero et al. (2014) were able to 
obtain differences in memory specificity whereas the current studies were not able to.  
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Another difference between the current studies and Fisk et al. (2019) that could 
explain the difference in results obtained is the age of the samples, whereby the current 
studies tested only young adults and Fisk et al. (2009) tested only adolescents. The difference 
in results of memory specificity could suggest that experiencing above average depression 
symptoms at younger ages may be more detrimental to the recall of autobiographical 
memories but experiencing above average depression symptoms as adults may not have as 
much of an impact of memory specificity during autobiographical memory recall.  
The current study also did not replicate Humphries and Jobson (2012)’s finding of 
fewer specific memories in the high trauma group than low trauma group despite similarly 
testing normal samples. Whereas the current studies allocated the subclinical PTSD and 
psychologically healthy groups using the clinical cut-off obtained from the questionnaire 
used, Humphries and Jobson (2012) used a median split to allocate their high and low trauma 
groups. This difference in grouping methods may explain why Humphries and Jobson (2012) 
obtained group differences but the current studies did not. 
 
The Influence of Valence and Intensity of Cues 
There were no differences in memory specificity between the groups regardless of the 
emotional valence and intensity of cues for both Studies 3 and 4. Previous studies that have 
found negative cues causes poorer memory specificity for individuals with clinical depression 
(Park et al., 2002; Ricarte et al., 2011). On the other hand, the samples from the current 
studies were from the normal population and may not have suffered from severe depressive 
symptoms or the negative attentional bias that typically accompanies those severe symptoms 
(Baert et al., 2010). The absence of attention and resources being captured due to negative 
stimuli (Beck, 1995; Feng et al., 2015) may explain the lack increase in OGM for the 
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subclinical depression group when negative cues were presented. However, Matsumoto et al., 
(2020) similarly used a normal sample but found that the higher depression group retrieved 
higher categorical memories for negative cues, unlike the current studies. One possible 
explanation for the difference in results is that Matsumoto et al. (2020) only included the 
lower quartile for their low depression group and omitted the participants that had median 
levels scores close to the clinical cut-off, which may have resulted in the different 
associations observed. 
Although Zheng and Gray (2018) showed negative cue words related to poorer 
memory specificity in normal samples with trauma symptoms, they did not test this effect in 
relation to severity of trauma symptoms or subclinical group differences as tested in the 
current studies. Those with higher levels of trauma have been shown to exhibit more 
attentional bias when the cues were threatening and related to the traumatic event (Bryant & 
Harvey, 1997; Pineles, Shipherd, Mostoufi, Abramovitz, & Yovel, 2009). The cues shown in 
the current studies were negative but may not have been viewed as threatening by the 
individuals with subclinical levels of PTSD, which is why they did not retrieve memories any 
differently in the presence of these cues. As the effect of negative cues on memory specificity 
has been seen in more often in clinical samples (Park et al., 2002; Ono et al., 2016; Ricarte et 
al., 2011; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006), it is also possible that the negative attentional bias 
experienced by people with trauma symptoms (El Khoury-Malhame et al., 2011; Vythilingam 
et al., 2007) is only severe enough to impair memory specificity once the trauma symptoms 
reaches clinical levels. 
 
Depression and Trauma as Predictors 
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 In Study 4, having higher severity of trauma predicted higher OGM tendencies, 
although there were no differences in OGM for subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. 
This finding suggests that, with a categorical approach, there are no observable memory 
specificity differences upon crossing the subclinical PTSD threshold, but, with a continuous 
approach, a higher amount of trauma symptoms could be one of the many predictors that 
contributes to the development of OGM. However, both depression and trauma severity did 
not predict specific memories.  
In Study 3, depression and trauma severity did not predict specific memories and 
OGM. However, higher trauma severity predicted the generation of more semantic 
associations, despite the lack of difference in semantic associations between subclinical 
PTSD and non-PTSD groups. Similar to the results regarding OGM in Study 3, crossing the 
subclinical PTSD threshold does not result in observable memory specificity changes, but 
higher trauma symptoms could contribute to the development of semantic associations.  
The SMS model proposed the retrieval of autobiographical memories uses a 
hierarchical search (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rutherford, 2009), starting with 
semantic associations (i.e., conceptual themes) in the upper levels, progressing to categorical 
and generic memories (i.e., general events), before finally reaching specific memories (i.e., 
event-specific knowledge). In line with this model, the findings of Study 3 indicate that 
individuals with more symptoms of trauma tended to halt their memory search process at the 
very top level –conceptual themes– instead of the typical categorical level –general events– 
(as seen in Study 4), leading to higher generation of semantic associations.  
The different AMT instructions in Study 3 and Study 4 may have potentially caused 
the truncation of the memory search to occur at different levels for those with higher trauma 
symptoms. It is possible that minimal instructions, which are less clear, resulted in truncation 
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higher up in the search hierarchy, but specific instructions which clearly indicate the need for 
completion of the memory search process, pushed the memory search process further to the 
general events level, but not all the way to the event-specific knowledge due to insufficient 
cognitive resources (Williams et al., 2006). 
Semantic associations have been proposed to be a higher order OGM despite not 
existing on the same levels in the memory hierarchy, because it similarly uses summarizing 
of events and contain fewer details and less emotional intensity (Raes, Hermans, Williams, & 
Eelen, 2007). Debeer et al. (2009) did not find associations between depression and OGM, as 
measured by categorical memories, but the relation became significant after adding semantic 
associations as an index of OGM, further suggesting that semantic association are a type of 
higher order OGM. Viewing semantic associations as a higher order OGM, trauma severity 
can be argued to overall predict overgeneral styles of retrieval across both studies (i.e., 
higher-order OGM in Study 3 and OGM in Study 4).  
Although OGM and specific memories have been shown to be unidimensional 
(Griffith et al., 2012), are used interchangeably in the literature, and both components are 
related to each other in the current studies, the associations of OGM to depression and trauma 
were not alike to the associations of specific memories to depression and trauma in the 
current studies. In Study 4, trauma severity did not predict specific memories but did predict 
OGM, and similarly in Study 3, trauma severity did not predict specific memories but did 
predict a higher order OGM (i.e., semantic associations). The findings of both studies 
indicate that these components of memory specificity should not be used interchangeably 
when testing against depression and trauma but should instead be treated as independent 
components that could have different types of associations.  
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The CaR-FA-X model 
 Although those with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms had higher 
rumination tendencies, rumination did not mediate or moderate the relations of depression 
and trauma with specific memories and OGM for both studies. Studies that have found 
rumination was the underlying mechanism (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Liu et al., 2016; Raes, 
Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006) only found it in relations tested in the opposite 
direction of the current associations (i.e., specific memory and OGM – depression and 
trauma). When taken together, the current findings indicate that rumination does not function 
as the underlying mechanism of the associations in the directions tested in the current studies, 
and instead may only underlie the associations in the opposite direction. However, besides 
testing the associations in the opposite direction, those past studies used clinical samples 
(Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Liu et al., 2016; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006). 
Hence, another alternative explanation is in normal populations, rumination is not sufficiently 
high to underlie the associations between depression, trauma, and memory specificity.  
Functional avoidance also did not mediate or moderate the relations of depression and 
trauma symptoms with memory specificity for both studies, despite individuals with 
subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms utilizing more avoidant coping strategies. 
Avoidant coping style has been shown to be triggered when recalling distressing memories, 
or when the cues presented were threatening, as a form of self-protection from unpleasant 
memories and emotions (Debeer et al., 2012; Debeer, Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2011; 
Hermans et al., 2004; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006). Hence, one possible 
explanation for the lack of relation is that the type of cues used in this study did not elicit 
sufficiently threatening or distressing memories that would require the functional avoidance 
mechanism.  
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 Inhibition and verbal working memory did not mediate or moderate the relations of 
depression and trauma with specific memories and OGM. Raes et al. (2010) found inhibition 
was a significant mediator for depression and memory specificity, but they used self-reported 
perceptions of inhibition abilities instead of experimentally obtained inhibition like the 
current studies did. This finding suggests that there may be discrepancies between 
performance-based and self-perception inhibition abilities, which may further affect its 
function as the underlying mechanism. Despite including the number of errors as well as the 
reaction time as measurements in the executive functioning tasks as suggested by Dalgleish et 
al. (2007), the current study was still unable to find significant associations for the executive 
functioning tasks with depression, trauma, and memory specificity.  
Inhibition and verbal working memory are basic-level executive functioning, which 
may not be sufficient to serve as underlying mechanisms independently for the depression, 
trauma, and memory specificity relations. Higher-order executing functioning, which are 
made up of several basic-level executive functioning, have been shown to mediate or 
moderate the depression and trauma and memory specificity relations (Dalgleish et al., 2007; 
Valentino et al., 2012), indicating that a combination of deficits in more than one basic-level 
executive functioning may be needed to impair the specificity of memory. Having greater 
deficits in more than one domain of executive functioning is also associated with reduced 
overall cognitive resources, which has been further associated with higher OGM tendencies 
(Dalgleish et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2006). The results from both current studies do not 
support the CaR-FA-X model as the underlying mechanisms of depression and trauma with 
OGM and lower specific memories in normal samples.  
Although the model does not explain the associations, the presence of some 
components of the CaR-FA-X model does still affect several of the depression, trauma, and 
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memory specificity relations. Rumination and inhibition strengthened the relation of 
depression and trauma with semantic associations when minimal retrieval instructions were 
given (i.e., Study 3) but not when specific instructions were given (i.e., Study 4). Only at high 
levels of rumination, more attention is likely to be captured, leaving less cognitive resources 
for memory search, and increasing the probability that these people with depression and 
trauma will truncate the search at conceptual themes level and generate semantic associations 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Haque & Conway, 2001; Williams et al., 2006, 2007).  
Brooding and reflection independently strengthened the relation between depression 
and semantic associations but not the relation between trauma and semantic associations. 
Although previous studies showed that brooding was maladaptive and reflection was more 
often adaptive (Crane et al., 2007; Debeer et al., 2009; Romero et al., 2014), the current 
findings suggest that both components of rumination are maladaptive towards memory 
specificity of people with higher depression. Reflection may involve fewer negative thoughts 
and criticism as compared to brooding, but it still involves thoughts surrounding the problem 
(Debeer et al., 2009; Treynor et al., 2003), which do similarly take up cognitive resources 
when done at high levels.  
For inhibition, only high impairments strengthened the relation between depression 
and semantic associations, whereas moderate and high impairments strengthened the relation 
between trauma and semantic associations. These impairments in inhibition reduces the 
suppression of irrelevant memories and ruminative thoughts that use up cognitive resources, 
leaving less resources for memory search, resulting in higher chance that people with 
depression and trauma will truncate the search at conceptual themes level and the generate 
semantic associations (Williams et al., 2007). However, it appears those with higher levels of 
trauma are more easily susceptible to the effects of these impairments as compared to those 
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with higher levels of depression. The other components of the CaR-FA-X model did not have 
an effect on the remaining relations between depression, trauma, and memory specificity 
across both studies. 
 
Implications 
  These two studies provide insight into the relation between subclinical depression 
and PTSD, and memory specificity, and the factors that influence these relations. There are 
numerous psychotherapy interventions that use the recall of specific memories or details of 
personal events (e.g., cognitive behavioural therapy, narrative therapy, psychodynamic 
therapy) to gain better understanding into the individuals’ concerns and find exceptions to 
contradict inaccurate beliefs and thoughts individuals have (Beck, 1995; Corey, 2013). As 
individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD do not have impairments in 
memory specificity, there is a higher likelihood that the specific-memory aspects of these 
interventions would be effective in these populations. Having these individuals recall more 
negative or intense memories would similarly not reduce the effectiveness of the specific-
memory-aspects of the interventions. Furthermore, in the context of general psychotherapy, 
providing more specific instructions and examples regarding the memories that need to be 
retrieved, especially when dealing with individuals that automatically narrate 
autobiographical memories in less specific manners, such as individuals from Asian 
backgrounds, could help increase the details of memories narrated. 
The findings suggest that trauma symptoms do contribute to the development of more 
overgeneral styles of memory. Hence, managing or reducing individuals’ symptoms of 
trauma via psychotherapy could help improve memory specificity, and in turn allow 
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individuals to benefit from the functions associated with autobiographical memories, such as 
improving problem solving, bonding, self-concepts, and emotion regulation.  
The current results did not support the CaR-FA-X model as the underlying 
mechanism between depression, trauma, and memory specificity in normal samples. More 
research is needed to explore other dimensions of the CaR-FA-X model (e.g., other measures 
of functional avoidance, other levels of executive functioning), as well as test other factors 
that may explain associations between these variables in this population. Although it did not 
explain the associations, the findings of this study indicate that rumination and poor 
inhibition still increase the likelihood of the retrieval of more overgeneral types of memory. 
Hence, reframing and reducing maladaptive thoughts and self-schema via psychotherapy to 
reduce rumination levels (Querstret & Cropley, 2013) and engaging in cognitive exercises to 
improve inhibition abilities (e.g., Maraver, Bajo, & Gomez-Ariza, 2016) could reduce the 
likelihood that individuals with higher levels of depression and trauma will retrieve more 
overgeneral types of memory.  
 
Limitations 
One limitation of this study is the automatic narration styles of individuals was not 
taken into account. Narration style can differ according to a person’s cultural background 
(Dritschel et al., 2011; Humphries & Jobson, 2012), tendencies to respond differently to 
emotional stimuli (Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010), and individual differences. However, 
the current study did not measure the baseline narration style or specificity levels for neutral 
cues to compare against the specificity levels for the experimental word cues. Future studies 
can include a baseline measurement of specificity or narration by incorporating neutral word 
cues in the memory recall task. 
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In terms of the methodology, one limitation is that the executive functioning tasks 
used were not tested for reliability and validity in this research. Literature has suggested that 
these types of tasks may not be pure measurements of the respective executive function, and 
instead measure more than one type of executive functioning (Packwood et al., 2011). Thus, 
it is not clear to what degree the tasks used in the current studies actually measure the domain 
of executive functioning that they are supposed to measure, and how specific the 
measurement is to only one domain of executive functioning.  
Last, the experimental tasks used to measure executive functioning of individuals in 
the current study may not reflect executive functioning used in daily living. Executive 
functioning in daily life are more complex and involves global cognition, which are not 
captured or reflected in experimental tasks (Javanovski, 2011; Vaughan & Giovanello, 2010). 
Future studies could include a questionnaire that measures executive functioning levels and 
difficulties in daily living, in addition to the experimental tasks. 
 
Conclusions 
There were no differences in memory specificity between individuals with subclinical 
depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals, indicating that there were no 
impairments in memory specificity. The lack of differences in memory specificity were 
observed regardless of memory retrieval instructions given and the valence and intensity of 
cues presented. Trauma severity predicted the generation of semantic associations when the 
retrieval instructions were minimal and the retrieval of OGM when the retrieval instructions 
were specific. The findings suggest that there are no differences in semantic associations and 
OGM upon crossing the subclinical PTSD threshold but having higher trauma symptoms 
does seem to contribute to the development of more overgeneral styles of retrieval.  
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Rumination, avoidant coping, inhibition, and verbal working memory did not mediate 
or moderate the relations of depression and trauma with specific memories and OGM. 
However, higher rumination and stronger impairment in inhibition strengthened the relations 
of higher depression and trauma with the generation of more semantic associations when 
minimal retrieval instructions were given. The subcomponents of rumination, brooding and 
reflection independently moderated the relation between depression and semantic 
associations but not the relation between trauma and semantic associations. The Car-FA-X 
model does not seem to be the underlying mechanism for the relations of depression and 
trauma with memory specificity, but the presence of the CaR and X components are still 
detrimental to memory retrieval for those with higher depression and trauma symptoms. 
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Chapter 4: Depression, Trauma, and Psychological Distance 
 
In addition to episodic aspects, semantic aspects, and types of memory, subjective 
feelings are another facet of autobiographical memories. One common subjective feeling that 
autobiographical memories might elicit is psychological distance. Psychological distance is 
the subjective perception regarding how far away and long ago a memory or an event feels 
from the present and from the current self, independent of the actual temporal distance (Ross 
& Wilson, 2002; Van Boven & Caruso, 2015). Typically, people perceive themselves to be 
closer to positive memories and further away from negative memories, but Janssen et al. 
(2015) found that individuals with higher depression levels perceived themselves to be 
further away from positive memories whereas individuals with higher trauma levels 
perceived themselves to be nearer to negative memories. However, the effect the objective 
age of the memory may have on these associations have not been studied. The mechanisms 
underlying these relations have also not been investigated yet. Memory phenomenology, such 
as recollective experience, vantage perspective, emotional intensity, and centrality, have been 
shown to relate to psychological distance, but whether these phenomenological 
characteristics, as well as emotion regulation strategies, could be its underlying mechanisms 
has not been tested. 
 
Background 
Temporal Information of Memory Recall 
 The recall of autobiographical memories involves many types of phenomenological 
information, such as sensory information, emotions, cognition, and temporal information 
(Friedman, 2004; Rubin, 2005). One type of temporal information that can exist in the recall 
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of autobiographical memories is distance, which refers to the temporal distance or length of 
time, as measured from when the event took place to the current time (Friedman, 1993, 2004) 
(e.g., “the gathering with my childhood friends took place 4 weeks ago”). With the present as 
the point of reference, how far away the events feel, how accessible the event is, and how 
strongly the event is recalled are also reflective of temporal distance.  
The temporal information, distance, can be further broken down into three different 
constructs: objective time / distance, perceived objective time / distance, and psychological 
distance (Van Boven & Caruso, 2015). The first type of distance information, objective time 
or distance, is the actual numeric distance of the time the event occurred or will occur from 
the present time (e.g., “the trip took place six days ago”). The second type of distance 
information, perceived objective time or distance, is the subjective perception about the 
objective time the event occurred or will occur from the present time (e.g., “I think we went 
on the trip 3 days ago”). When asked for the objective time, the person aims to estimate the 
objective time with as much accuracy as possible, and therefore, is not aware that their 
estimation may not be accurate. The last type of distance information, psychological distance 
is the subjective perception regarding the perceived distance and closeness an event feels 




Specifically, psychological distance refers to how far away versus how close the event 
feels from the current time, how long ago versus how recent the event feels from the current 
time, and how far away versus how close the self that experienced the events feels from the 
current self, independent of the objective time and distance (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Van 
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Boven & Caruso, 2015). Events could be accurately perceived as occurring when they did, or 
they could be perceived differently from when they actually occurred. An example for the 
former would be if an event occurred one month ago and feels like it occurred one month ago 
(i.e., the psychological distance is similar to the objective distance). Examples for the latter 
would be if the event occurred one year ago but feels like it occurred five years ago (i.e., 
event feels older and further than it actually is), or if the event occurred one year ago but feels 
like it occurred three months ago (i.e., event feels more recent and closer than it actually is).  
People can simultaneously recall the perceived objective time and psychological 
distance about an event. They may think that an event happened three months ago (i.e., 
perceived objective time) while at the same feel that the event happened six months ago (i.e., 
psychological distance). Whereas people when describing perceived objective time may not 
be aware of their inaccurate estimates of time, people when describing psychological 
distance, on the other hand, are aware that their estimate of time is purely subjective. 
Van Boven and Caruso (2015) proposed a tripartite foundation for psychological 
distance. This framework suggest that the psychological distance of events can be formed or 
changed from the interactions between the language used to describe the time, the 
physiological and psychological experiences (e.g., emotions) surrounding the event, and the 
goals that the individual is currently working towards. Events that used language depicting 
spatial closeness (e.g., “nearly here”), had more physiological and psychological experiences 
(e.g., higher emotional intensity), and had higher probability of achieving goals successfully 
were perceived to feel psychologically closer overall. 
Certain types or characteristics of events tend to feel closer over other types. In 
general, people tend to feel closer to memories and events that encompass successes and 
match their current self-concepts, but feel further away from memories and events that 
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encompass failures, do not match their current self-concepts, and contain parts of their self 
that they no longer identify with (Demiray & Janssen, 2015; Libby & Eibach, 2011; Ross & 
Wilson, 2002). Psychological distance also varies depending on the objective age of the 
memories. People feel closer to events that are more recent and further from events that are 
older (Janssen et al., 2015; Ross & Wilson, 2002).  
One aspect of memory recall that psychological distance relates to bidirectionally is 
the accessibility of memories. Memories of events are easier to access and retrieve when the 
event feels closer but becomes more difficult to retrieve when the event feels further (Öner & 
Gülgöz, 2018). At the same time, feelings of closeness further increase when memories are 
easier to access and recall, whereas feelings of distance increase when memories become 
more difficult to access.  
Past research has found that psychological distance is related to self-esteem (Demiray 
& Freund, 2017; Demiray & Janssen, 2015; Ross & Wilson, 2002). Individuals with higher 
self-esteem felt closer to memories of successes and achievements that involved themselves, 
indicating a self-enhancement function. The findings of the relations between self-esteem and 
psychological distance of negative memories were mixed, with some studies showing those 
with higher self-esteem distancing themselves from memories of failures (Demiray & Freund, 
2017; Ross & Wilson, 2002), whereas other studies showing no associations between the 
variables (Demiray & Janssen, 2015). However, for both memories of successes and failures, 
individuals with low self-esteem did not show self-enhancement functions, with no relations 
between self-esteem and psychological distance (Demiray & Freund, 2017; Ross & Wilson, 
2002). Although psychological distance has been shown to relate to perceptions of the self, its 
relations with clinical disorders and psychological distress areas are less clear. 
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Depression, Trauma, and Psychological Distance 
Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, and Ayduk (2012) examined how increasing or reducing 
distance when recalling extremely sad events would affect thoughts and emotions in groups 
with and without clinical depression. The clinically depressed group that distanced 
themselves from the sad event were found to exhibit fewer negative emotions and depressive 
thoughts, as compared to the clinically depressed group that focused on and reflected about 
the sad event. However, this finding was not replicated in the non-depressed groups, leading 
the researchers to suggest that distancing only brings benefits at high levels of depression.  
Janssen et al. (2015) investigated the relations between depression, trauma, and 
psychological distance of most positive and negative events in an undergraduate student 
sample. Higher levels of depression were associated with feeling more distant from positive 
events. Conversely, higher levels of trauma were associated with feeling closer to negative 
events. The inability of those with more depression symptoms to feel closer and utilize the 
self-enhancement function of positive memories, as well as the inability of those with more 
trauma symptoms to distance themselves from negative events could be reflective of 
maladaptive coping and emotion regulation.  
Gross and John (2003) discussed two types of emotion regulation strategies; cognitive 
reappraisal and expressive suppression. Cognitive reappraisal is a strategy that is viewed as 
adaptive and involves changing one’s perceptions, meanings, and thoughts about an event, 
which in turn changes the emotions associated to the event. Meanwhile, expressive 
suppression is a strategy that is perceived as maladaptive and constitutes inhibiting, avoiding, 
or repressing any behaviours or actions that involve expressing the emotions that one is 
experiencing. Cognitive reappraisal has been associated with increase in positive memories 
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for self-enhancement, whereas expressive suppression is linked to increased accessibility to 
negative memories (Newman & Lindsay, 2009; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).  
Depression and trauma symptoms have been associated with having poor cognitive 
reappraisal (e.g., Boden et al., 2013; Dryman & Heimberg, 2018; El Haj et al., 2020; 
Shepherd & Wild, 2014) and using higher expressive suppression (e.g., Boden et al., 2013; 
Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 2008; Shepherd & Wild, 2014). Hence, it is possible that the 
difficulties in feeling closer and utilizing the self-enhancement function of positive memories 
for individuals with higher depression can be explained from having fewer positive memories 
to begin with, due to their poor cognitive reappraisal abilities. Individuals with higher trauma 
could have a higher use of expressive suppression, leading to increased accessibility to 
negative memories, which may explain their difficulties in distancing themselves from those 
negative experiences. However, these mechanisms have not been tested yet. 
Although being able to distance oneself from negative events and reduce distance 
from positive events have been shown to be beneficial, the mechanisms that may underlie and 
explain the associations of depression and trauma with psychological distance have not been 
established clearly. Besides poor emotion regulation, other factors that are suggested to 
influence psychological distance are phenomenological characteristics of the retrieved 
memory. Phenomenological characteristics in this context refer to subjective traits 
experienced and properties of memory during recall, which are part of the event-specific 
knowledge level in the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rubin et al., 2003; Mitchell, 
2016). The phenomenology of memories are believed to influence the experience of the recall 
(Sutin & Robins, 2007), by either enabling the person to feel like they are experiencing the 
recalled event as when it occurred and connecting to the self in the memory, or limiting the 
person to feel like they are experiencing the event as if watching a movie or listening to a 
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story told by someone else. The former would result in the event feeling psychologically 
closer, as if it just happened, whereas the latter would result in opposite feelings, as if it 
happened a long time ago. Examples of phenomenological characteristics that could influence 
memory recall are recollective experience, vantage perspective, emotionality, and centrality, 
(e.g., Libby & Eibach, 2002, 2011; Janssen et al., 2015; Sutin & Robins, 2007).  
 
Recollective Experience  
One phenomenological characteristic of memory that could influence psychological 
distance is recollective experience, which is an individual’s ability to mentally travel back to 
the event and the extent to which they are can relive or re-experience the event in the present 
(Brewer, 1986). It also includes having more details in the memory, which in turn relates to 
higher feelings of vividness when experiencing the memory (Brewin, 2001; Rubin, Feldman, 
& Beckham, 2004; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004). Events that are recent and positive tend 
to be recalled with stronger feelings of recollective experience, whereas remote and negative 
memories are generally recalled with lower recollective experience (D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2004; Talarico et al., 2004). 
Past findings have shown associations between recollective experience and 
psychological distance. Kross et al. (2012) found that lower recollective experience related to 
feeling further away from negative memories. In addition to those findings, Janssen et al. 
(2015) found that higher recollective experience predicted higher feelings of closeness for 
positive memories but not negative memories. These studies suggest that recollective 
experience does relate to psychological distance, but the results about its variations according 
to the valence of the memory are still mixed. 
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Besides psychological distance, depression and trauma symptoms have also been 
associated with recollective experience. Upon experiencing a sad mood induction, individuals 
with remitted depression retrieved positive memories that were less vivid than non-depressed 
individuals, but there were no differences in vividness for negative memories (Werner-
Seidler & Moulds, 2011). Opposite to those findings, higher depression scores in normal 
samples were related to the recall of negative memories with higher vividness, but they were 
unrelated to the recollective experience of positive memories (Knyazev, Savostyanov, 
Bocharov, & Kuznetsova, 2017). However, there are also findings that show no differences in 
vividness for positive, negative, and self-defining memories, as well as recent and remote 
memories between clinically depressed and non-depressed groups (Kuyken & Howell, 2007; 
Söderlund et al., 2014).  
The recall of ILS events, most positive memories, most stressful memories, and word 
cued memories were tested in PTSD and non-PTSD groups (Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 
2011), and high and low trauma groups in an undergraduate student sample (Rubin et al., 
2008). The PTSD group retrieved memories that had higher levels of reliving than the non-
PTSD group for all memories, whereas high and low trauma groups did not differ in reliving 
for all memories. Within PTSD samples, higher trauma scores were also related to higher 
vividness, higher reliving, and more details for all memories regardless of valence (Rubin et 
al., 2004; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2017). 
The results show that there are mixed findings for the associations between depression 
and trauma and recollective experience. Although there was no difference in recollective 
experience between recent and remote memories, depression related to higher recollective 
experience in negative memories of normal populations but lower recollective experience in 
positive memories of clinical populations. Meanwhile, trauma related to higher recollective 
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experience for all memories in clinical populations but did not relate to recollective 
experience in normal populations. From these findings, it can be theorized that recollective 
experience may serve as an underlying mechanism for the associations of depression and 
trauma with psychological distance. 
 
Vantage Perspective 
Another phenomenological characteristic is vantage perspective, which refers to the 
viewpoint that a person sees when they recall a memory. There are two types of perspective, 
which are field and observer perspective. Field perspective involves viewing the memory 
from a first-person point of view or as the person originally experiencing the memory, 
whereas observer perspective involves viewing the memory from a third-person point of view 
or from the standpoint of an audience or an outsider. Previously, field perspective was seen as 
the opposite end of observer perspective on the vantage perspective spectrum, with high field 
perspective automatically indicating low observer perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; 
Robinson & Swanson, 1993). However, field perspective and observer perspective are no 
longer viewed as mutually exclusive components (Butler, Rice, Wooldridge, & Rubin, 2016; 
Rice & Rubin, 2009), with memories being able to be recalled from both perspectives.  
Recent events tend to be recalled using more field perspective, but remote memories 
were recalled using observer perspective (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; 
Talarico et al., 2004). Both positive and negative memories are recalled with field 
perspective, but positive memories were recalled with higher field perspective 
(D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; Talarico et al., 2004). However, vantage 
perspectives have also been shown to not differ with valence (Sutin & Robins, 2010).   
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Vantage perspective is shown to relate to psychological distance. Higher field 
perspective predicted higher feelings of closeness regardless of the valence of the memory 
(Crawley, 2010; Gu & Tse, 2016; Janssen et al., 2015; Kross et al., 2012; Libby & Eibach, 
2002, 2011; Sutin & Robins, 2010). Although most studies found that memories recalled 
using an observer perspective were found to be psychologically further away regardless of 
the valence of the memory (Crawley, 2010; Gu & Tse, 2016; Kross et al., 2012; Libby & 
Eibach, 2002, 2011; Sutin & Robins, 2010), Janssen et al. (2015) found that higher observer 
perspective predicted higher feelings of closeness for negative memories, but not positive 
memories. One possible reason for this difference in results may be because Janssen et al. 
(2015) measured field perspective and observer perspective separately, unlike the other 
studies that measured field perspective and observer perspective as opposite ends of one 
variable. The results of these studies suggest field perspective relates to feelings of closeness 
overall, but there are still mixed results for the associations of observer perspective and 
psychological distance across valence, depending on how field perspective and observer 
perspective are measured. 
Meanwhile, vantage perspective was associated with depression symptoms. 
Individuals with recurrent depression recalled recent memories using more field perspective 
and older memories using more observer perspective (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), which is 
similar to past findings in non-depressed samples (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Talarico et al., 
2004). Additionally, higher depression levels in this sample was associated with recalling 
positive memories using more observer perspective and less field perspective (Kuyken & 
Moulds, 2009). Depression groups in clinical and normal samples similarly recalled positive 
memories with higher observer perspective and lower field perspective when compared with 
non-depressed groups (Bergouignan et al., 2008). However, there were no associations 
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between depression and vantage perspective for negative memories (Bergouignan et al., 
2008; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Nelis, Debeer, Holmes, & Raes, 2013). Another study 
showed no differences in vantage perspectives for both memory valences between the 
remitted depression and non-depressed groups (Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011).  
Unlike depression, vantage perspective did not appear to relate to trauma groups from 
normal populations for both positive and negative memories (Rubin et al., 2008). 
Contradictory to this finding, people with PTSD have been shown to recall memories, 
regardless of valence, more often from an observer perspective than from a field perspective 
(Van den Broeck, 2014). It should be noted, however, that the sample used in this study had a 
comorbid diagnosis of BPD, which may have attributed to the differences in vantage 
perspective. When recalling traumatic memories, people with higher symptoms of PTSD 
more often recall those memories from an observer perspective than from a field perspective 
(Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003; Kenny et al., 2009). However, because traumatic 
memories tend to have different phenomenology than memories of other valences (Porter & 
Birt, 2001), this finding may not be applicable to non-traumatic memories. 
The results indicate that those with depression retrieved recent and remote memories 
using the typical vantage perspectives associated with those events. More observer 
perspective and less field perspective were used when recalling positive memories in 
depressed groups from clinical and normal populations, whereas there were no associations 
between depression and vantage perspective for negative memories. Trauma and vantage 
perspective had mixed findings, with clinical populations demonstrating potentially more 
observer perspective across valence, whereas normal populations did not differ in their 
vantage perspective. Hence, it is possible that vantage perspective may serve as an underlying 
mechanism for the relations of depression and trauma with psychological distance. 





Emotional intensity is also a phenomenological characteristic that could influence 
psychological distance and refers to the strength of the positivity or negativity of the event 
when it is recalled. The emotional intensity of remote memories is lower than the emotional 
intensity of recent memories, with remote negative memories having lower emotional 
intensity than remote positive memories (Skowronski, Walker, Henderson, & Bond, 2014; 
Walker & Skowronski, 2009). However, emotional intensity does not differ between recent 
positive and negative memories. 
Emotional intensity has also been shown to relate to psychological distance. Mei, Li, 
and Wang (2018) manipulated how emotional the memories were narrated and observed that 
emotional intensity was a moderator for the relation between valence and psychological 
distance. Negative events were perceived to feel further than positive events, especially when 
the memory had lower emotional intensity rather than higher emotional intensity. Van Boven, 
Kane, McGraw, and Dale (2010) had used similar methodology as Mei et al. (2018) and 
demonstrated that higher emotional intensity caused events to feel closer regardless of 
valence. Despite this relation, emotional intensity was unable to independently predict 
psychological distance (Janssen et al., 2015). The findings suggest that emotional intensity is 
able to moderate and predict psychological distance but may not be able to uniquely explain 
changes in psychological distance. 
The emotional intensity of memory is associated with depression and trauma 
symptoms. Clinical depression groups have been observed to recall recent negative memories 
with higher emotional intensity than remote negative memories when compared to non-
depressed groups (Söderlund et al., 2014). Higher depression scores also relate to the recall of 
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negative memories with higher emotional intensity in normal samples but not in samples with 
clinical depression and remitted depression (Knyazev et al., 2017; Rottenberg, Joormann, 
Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). There were no associations 
between depression and emotional intensity for positive memories in clinical and non-clinical 
samples. The PTSD group retrieved all memories with higher emotional intensity than the 
non-PTSD group, whereas high trauma groups from the normal population retrieved only 
important and negative memories with higher emotional intensity as compared to low trauma 
groups (Rubin et al., 2008, 2011).  
The results highlight that there were associations between higher depression and 
higher emotional intensity for negative memories in normal populations, but no associations 
for depression and emotional intensity of negative memories in clinical populations and of 
positive memories in clinical and normal populations. However, negative memories that were 
recent were recalled with higher emotional intensity than negative memories that were remote 
for depressed groups. The results also indicate that high trauma groups from clinical 
populations retrieve positive and negative memories with higher emotional intensity, but 
those from non-clinical populations only do so for negative memories. These findings suggest 




An additional phenomenological characteristic that might affect psychological 
distance is the centrality of event, which refers to how relevant and important the event is 
towards their current self-concept and life narrative (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). It also refers 
to how much the event is used as a point of reference for making meaning of past and present 
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events and expectations of the future. Positive events tend to have higher centrality, whereas 
negative events often have lower centrality (Rubin, Berntsen, Deffler, & Brodar, 2019; 
Zaragoza Scherman, Salgado, Shao, & Berntsen, 2015). Remote events are viewed as more 
central to a person’s life, whereas recent events are viewed as less central (Rubin et al., 
2019). However, this direction of the association was only seen for positive memories, and 
the opposite was observed for negative memories, with recent events being more central than 
remote events (Berntsen et al., 2011). Centrality of event is also related to the psychological 
distance of the event. Centrality was shown to predict feeling closer to positive memories but 
did not predict the psychological distance of negative memories (Janssen et al., 2015).  
Centrality of event has been shown to relate to depression and trauma symptoms. 
Higher depression scores in normal populations were shown to relate to the recall of negative 
memories with higher centrality (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boals, 2014; Wamser-Nanney, 
Howell, Schwartz, & Hasselle, 2018; Zaragoza Scherman et al., 2015). Similarly, individuals 
with higher trauma symptoms related to higher event centrality of negative memories for 
clinical and non-clinical samples when compared to individuals with lower trauma symptoms 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boals, 2014; da Silva et al., 2016; Wamser-Nanney et al., 2018; 
Zaragoza Scherman et al., 2015). These relations were not replicated for positive memories. 
These findings indicate that higher depression in normal populations and higher 
trauma in clinical and normal populations relates to perceiving that negative events are more 
central to a person’s life, but there were no associations for positive memories. Thus, 
centrality of event may function as an underlying mechanism for the relations of depression 
and trauma with psychological distance. 
  
Study 5 
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The Current Study 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate how individuals with subclinical 
depression and PTSD symptoms may differ from psychologically healthy individuals in the 
psychological distance attached to positive and negative events, and how these relations 
differ for recent and remote events. The current study also aimed to explore whether emotion 
regulation strategies and phenomenology of autobiographical memories may underlie the 
relations of depression and trauma with psychological distance.  
The outcomes from this study could provide insight into the differences in subjective 
feelings of distance attached to different types of events, and the potential implications 
towards areas, such as distancing and the self-enhancement function of autobiographical 
memory. Moreover, the emotion regulation strategies and phenomenological characteristics 
that could play a role in changing these distances in individuals with depression and trauma 
would be able to be identified, which could be applied into clinical settings. Manipulating 
relevant emotion regulation strategies and phenomenological traits of memories in therapy 
could change the psychological distances associated to the memory. Being able to make 
positive events feel closer and negative events feel further away could tap into the distancing 
effects and self-enhancement function of memory, which could then improve self-esteem and 
mood (Demiray & Freund, 2017) and possibly reduce the severity of depression and trauma 
symptoms (Kross et al., 2012).  
The relations of depression and trauma with psychological distance have been shown 
to differ according to the valence of the recalled memory, whereby higher levels of 
depression have been shown to relate to feeling further away from positive memories and 
higher levels of trauma related to feeling closer to negative memories (Janssen et al., 2015). 
Although psychological distance has been shown to be influenced by the objective age of the 
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memory, with people feeling closer to recent events and further from remote events (Janssen 
et al., 2015; Ross & Wilson, 2002), whether the psychological distance of those with 
subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms will differ according to objective age of the 
memory has not been investigated. Furthermore, the interactions between depression and 
trauma with the valence and objective age of memory on psychological distance has not been 
tested. 
 Although the relations between depression and trauma and psychological distance 
have been established, the mechanisms that may explain those relations have not been 
studied. Changes in phenomenological characteristics of memories, such as recollective 
experience, vantage perspective, emotional intensity, and centrality, have been shown to 
relate to changes in psychological distance (Crawley, 2010; Gu & Tse, 2016; Janssen et al., 
2015; Kross et al., 2012; Libby & Eibach, 2002, 2011; Mei et al., 2018; Sutin & Robins, 
2010; Van Boven et al., 2010). Changes in memory phenomenology also relate to depression 
(Bergouignan et al. 2008; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boals, 2014; Knyazev et al., 2017; 
Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Nelis et al., 2013; Wamser-Nanney et al., 2018; Werner-Seidler & 
Moulds, 2011; Zaragoza Scherman et al., 2015) and trauma (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boals, 
2014; da Silva et al., 2016; Rubin et al., 2004, 2008, 2011; Van den Broeck, 2014; Wamser-
Nanney et al., 2018; Zaragoza Scherman et al., 2015). However, all these relations (i.e., 
depression and memory phenomenology; trauma and memory phenomenology; memory 
phenomenology and psychological distance) have only been tested independently, and all 
three components have not been tested together yet. Therefore, despite these 
phenomenological traits having relations with the three components, it is not known whether 
the phenomenological characteristics could explain or influence the relations between 
depression and trauma and psychological distance. Furthermore, the past studies on vantage 
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perspective (except Janssen et al. 2015) did not investigate field and observer perspective as 
two separate components, and whether viewing the components separately would produce 
similar relations is unclear. The past studies on recollective experience, vantage perspective, 
and centrality mentioned above, meanwhile, did not take both the emotional valence and 
objective age of the memories into account. Hence, how the relations with these components 
will vary according to both valence and objective age of the memory has not been studied. 
The differences in psychological distance observed for those with higher depression 
and trauma symptoms were theorized to be reflective of poorer emotion regulation. Although 
the relations between emotion regulation strategies and psychological distance have not 
established, cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression have been noted to relate to 
depression and trauma (Boden et al., 2013; Dryman & Heimberg, 2018; El Haj et al., 2020; 
Moore et al., 2008; Shepherd & Wild, 2014), and the accessibility of memories (Newman & 
Lindsay, 2009; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), which is also a form of temporal distance 
(Friedman, 1993, 2004). Whether emotion regulation could also explain or influence the 
relations between depression and trauma and psychological distance, and how it may vary 
according to the valence and objective age of memories has not been explored.  
Based on the review of the literature, the five research questions that we aim to 
answer in our study are: 
1. Are there differences in psychological distance between individuals with subclinical 
levels of depression and psychologically healthy individuals? 
2. Are there differences in psychological distance between individuals with subclinical 
levels of PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals? 
3. Do valence and objective age of memory have an effect on the relations of depression 
and trauma with psychological distance? 
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4. Will recollective experience, vantage perspective, emotional intensity, and centrality 
of events mediate or moderate the relations of depression and trauma with 
psychological distance? 
5. Will emotion regulation strategies mediate or moderate the relations of depression and 
trauma with psychological distance? 
 
Based on previous findings, we hypothesized for our current study that:  
1. Individuals with subclinical depression symptoms will demonstrate lower 
psychological distance (i.e., feel further away) towards recent positive events than 
psychologically healthy individuals. Psychological distance of recent negative events 
and older events will be similar for those with subclinical depression and those who 
are psychologically healthy. 
2. Individuals with subclinical PTSD symptoms will demonstrate higher psychological 
distance (i.e., feel closer) towards recent negative events than psychologically healthy 
individuals. Psychological distance of recent positive events and older events will be 
similar for those with subclinical PTSD and those who are psychologically healthy. 
3. Valence and age of the memory will have an interaction effect on the relations 
between depression groups and psychological distance and between trauma groups 
and psychological distance. 
4. Recollective experience, field perspective, observer perspective, and emotional 
intensity, and centrality of events will mediate or moderate the relations of depression 
with the psychological distance of recent positive memories and the relations of 
trauma with the psychological distance of recent negative memories.  
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5. Cognitive reappraisal will mediate or moderate the relations of depression with the 
psychological distance of recent positive memories. Expressive suppression will 
mediate or moderate the relations of trauma with the psychological distance of recent 
negative memories. 
 
To test these hypotheses, participants were asked to describe their most positive and 
negative memories that were recent and remote. For each memory described, participants 
then completed the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire, Psychological Distance Scale, 
and Centrality of Event Scale. Last, they answered the Center for Epidemiologic Studies 




Power analysis with a medium effect size of .50, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .20 (to 
give a power of .80) indicated that 102 participants would be needed to reach statistical 
significance in an independent-samples t-test. For this study, 126 students from the 
University of Nottingham Malaysia were recruited. There were no errors in answering the 
memory task or the questionnaires, therefore, no participants were excluded. The participants 
had a mean age of 21.35 (SD = 2.56, range = 18-34), and consisted of 59 males and 67 
females. Most participants were Malaysians (N = 89) and the remaining 37 were non-
Malaysians (25 British, 2 German, 1 Irish, 1 Danish, 1 Polish, 1 Lithuanian, 1 South African, 
1 Vietnamese, 1 Sri Lankan, 1 Indian, 1 Pakistani, and 1 Iranian). Similar to the studies in the 
previous chapters, the data in the current study is conceptualized as both categorical groups 
and as existing on a continuum. 





Most positive and negative memory task. Similar to methodology used from 
Janssen et al. (2015), the memory task aimed to elicit the most positive and the most negative 
memories. This instruction was given to control for importance of the memory, which is a 
variable that could also affect psychological distance (Demiray & Janssen, 2015). To obtain 
recent events, participants were asked to provide short descriptions of their most positive 
memory that had occurred within the past 3 years (i.e., recent positive memory) and their 
most negative memory that had occurred within the past 3 years (i.e., recent negative 
memory). To obtain older events, participants were similarly asked to briefly describe their 
most positive memory that had occurred more than 3 years ago (i.e., remote positive 
memory) and their most negative memory that had occurred more than 3 years ago (i.e., 
remote negative memory).  
A cut-off of 3 years was used to distuingush between recent and remote memories in 
the current study. Recency effects of memory can span up to 10 years when looking at 
memory over a lifespan (Rubin et al., 1986). However, taking into account the young age of 
the sample (i.e., 18-34 years old), it was not possible to use that cut-off (e.g., an 18-year-old 
participant would only be able to include events that occurred at the age of 8 and below for 
remote events if a cut-off of 10 years is used). Events older than 3 years for this sample 
would already fall into a different lifetime period (i.e., before entering university). Hence, we 
decided to reduce the cut-off to 3 years to mirror the original recency cut-off but in a shorter 
lifespan. 
Later, the short memory descriptions were returned to the participants. For each 
memory, participants were prompted to provide the date of the event and longer descriptions 
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of the memories (in no less than 40 words) with as much details and phenomenological 
information (e.g., place, people, emotions, thoughts, atmosphere, and clothing) as possible. 
There was no time limit given to complete each memory description. 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ). For each memory, the 
participants answered the AMQ. The AMQ is an 18-item instrument designed to measure 
characteristics and phenomenological aspects of autobiographical memory (refer to Appendix 
P). Fifteen items that measured areas of sensory, narrative, properties, and metacognition 
were taken from Rubin et al. (2003), whereas 3 items that measured emotional intensity, field 
perspective, and observer perspective were added for the current study. It consists of a 7-
point Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 7) for 18 of the items, whereas 1 item had 3 multiple 
choice options and 1 item was a short answer. 
Psychological Distance Scale. For each memory, the participants also answered the 
the Psychological Distance Scale (adapted from Ross & Wilson, 2002), which is a 3-item 
instrument developed to measure the psychological distance of events and memories (refer to 
Appendix Q). The three items measure how recent the event feels, how close the event feels, 
and how close the past self feels, and the scale consists of a 11-point Likert scale (ranging 
from 1 to 11). Psychological distance score is obtained by summing all the items together, 
with total scores ranging between 3 and 33. Although having more psychological distance 
may suggest that there is greater distance from the events, in actuality, higher psychological 
distance score reflects that the event feels psychologically closer. This scale has Cronbach’s 
alphas ranging between .82 and .89 (Demiray & Freund, 2017; Demiray & Janssen, 2015; 
Janssen et al., 2015).  
Centrality of Event Scale – short form (CES). The participants also answered the 
CES for each memory. The CES (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) is a 7-item instrument developed 
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to measure the centrality of an event to the individual’s current self and life narrative, in 
terms of meaning-making and future expectations (refer to Appendix R). It consists of a 5-
point Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 5), and centrality scores for the event are obtained by 
summing all the items together. Total scores range from 5 to 35, and higher total score 
reflects higher centrality towards the event. This scale has Cronbach’s alphas ranging 
between .87 and .92.  
CES-D and PCL-5. Similar to the studies in the previous chapters, the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977) was used to measure 
depression symptomology in the general population (refer to Appendix D). Also similar to 
the previous chapters, the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5) (Weathers et al., 2013) was 
used to measure PTSD or trauma symptoms (refer to Appendix B).  
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-
item instrument developed to measure two types of emotion regulation strategies, which are 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression (refer to Appendix S). It consists of a 7-
point Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 7), with higher scores reflecting a higher magnitude of 
the respective coping style. Cognitive reappraisal score was obtained by adding items from 
the cognitive reappraisal domain, whereas expressive suppression score was obtained by 
adding items from the expressive suppression domain. Total score of cognitive reappraisal 
ranges from 6 to 42, whereas total score of expressive suppression ranges from 4 to 28. This 
scale has a three-month test–retest reliability of .69 for both domains and Cronbach’s alphas 
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This study was approved by the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Nottingham Malaysia (SJ110118). The study was conducted using a 
desktop computer in a controlled space in the University. Participants were first given an 
information sheet to read and a consent form and demographic sheet to answer. After they 
had given their informed consent, participants answered the memory task. The retrieval of 
positive and negative memories in the memory task was counterbalanced, but there was a 
fixed order of recent memories followed by remote memories. Subsequently, they were given 
the events back one-by-one. For each event, participants were asked to provide the longer 
descriptions and to answer the AMQ, the Psychological Distance scale, and the CES. Last, 
participants answered the CES-D, PCL-5, and ERQ. The order of the tasks was fixed, as 
listed above. The session took approximately 30-45 minutes to complete. At the end of the 
session, the participants were thanked for their contribution, for which they received a small 
financial reward (RM10). 
 
Scoring 
 From the items in the AMQ, Item 1 was used as the recollective experience score, 
Item 8 was used as the field perspective score, and Item 9 was used as the observer 
perspective score. For the emotional intensity score, Item 18 was used, but the negative 
scores were converted to positive scores (e.g., -3 was converted to 3), whereas the positive 
scores were retained as it was. The reason the negative scores were converted is because Item 
18 incorporates both measurements of emotional valence (i.e., positive, negative, and neutral) 
and intensity (i.e., ranging between 0 and 3). Scores related to memory phenomenology (i.e., 
psychological distance, recollective experience, field perspective, observer perspective, 
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emotional intensity, and centrality of event) were calculated for each of the four memories 
recorded (i.e., recent positive, recent negative, remote positive, and remote negative). 
 
Results 
Phenomenology of Autobiographical Memories [Descriptives] 
The mean and standard deviations of the memory phenomenology are listed in Table 
4.1. To test for effects of valence and objective age of memory on the phenomenological 
traits of memory, a within-subjects multivariate analysis of variances was conducted. There 
was a significant main effect for the objective age of the memory on memory 
phenomenology. Recent memories were recalled with higher ratings of closeness (F(1, 125) = 
91.46, p < .001, d = .42; recent: M = 20.57, SD = 0.52; remote: M = 14.36, SD = 0.62), 
recollective experience (F(1, 124) = 41.58, p < .001, d = .25; recent: M = 4.86, SD = 0.10; 
remote: M = 3.99, SD = 0.12), field perspective (F(1, 125) = 66.69, p < .001, d = .35; recent: 
M = 5.29, SD = 0.10; remote: M = 4.33, SD = 0.13), emotional intensity (F(1, 125) = 21.18, p 
< .001, d = .15; recent: M = 2.37, SD = 0.05; remote: M = 2.08, SD = 0.06), and centrality 
(F(1, 125) = 8.42, p = .004, d = .06; recent: M = 23.76, SD = 0.47; remote: M = 22.06, SD = 
0.59), and lower ratings of observer perspective (F(1, 125) = 9.04, p = .003, d = .07; recent: 
M = 3.18, SD = 0.14; remote: M = 3.62, SD = 0.14) than remote memories. There were no 
main effects of valence and no interactions between the valence and age of the memories on 
the phenomenologies of memories (ps > .05) . 
 
Depression, Trauma, and Autobiographical Memory Phenomenology [Hypotheses 1 and 
2] 
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Scoring of subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. To analyse the data 
from a categorical approach, participants who scored a total of 20 and above in the CES-D 
(Vilagut et al., 2016) were categorized as subclinical depression (n = 53; males = 21, females 
= 32), whereas those who scored a total of 19 and below were categorized as non-depressed 
(n = 73; males = 38, females = 35). The depression scores varied significantly from the cut-
off score (M = 17.86, SD = 10.56, t(125) = -2.28, p = .025), indicating that the scores were 
distributed away from the cut-off.  
For the PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013), individuals that scored a total of 33 and above 
were categorized as subclinical PTSD (n = 41; males = 20, females = 21), whereas those who 
scored a total of 32 and below were categorized as non-PTSD (n = 85; males = 39, females = 
46). The trauma scores varied significantly from the cut-off score (M = 26.19, SD = 16.65, 
t(125) = -4.59, p < .001), indicating that the scores were distributed away from the cut-off.  
Subclinical depression and non-depressed group differences for recent 
memories. To examine differences in memory phenomenology between subclinical 
depression and non-depressed groups and between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, 
independent-samples t-tests were conducted (see Table 4.2, Figure 4.1, and Figure 4.2). For 
recent positive memories, there were no differences between subclinical depression and non-
depressed groups in psychological distance (t(124) = -1.72, p = .088), recollective experience 
(t(124) = -0.28, p = .784), field perspective (t(124) = 0.56, p = .578), observer perspective 
(t(124) = 0.77, p = .441), emotional intensity (t(124) = -0.99, p = .326), and centrality (t(124) 
= -0.52, p = .606).  
For recent negative memories, subclinical depression and non-depressed groups 
retrieved memories with similar field perspective (t(124) = 1.44, p = .152) and observer 
perspective (t(124) = -0.49, p = .624). Although the subclinical depression group felt closer to 
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the memory (t(124) = 1.98, p = .050), had more recollective experience (t(124) = 2.14, p = 
.034), and had higher centrality (t(124) = 2.17, p = .032) than the non-depressed group, these 
differences were no longer significant after applying Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .008). 
However, the subclinical depression group did experience higher emotional intensity (t(124) 
= 2.85, p = .005, d = .52) for the recent negative memories than the non-depressed group, 
even after Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .008). 
Subclinical depression and non-depressed group differences for remote 
memories. For remote positive memories, the subclinical depression and non-depressed 
groups had similar psychological distance (t(124) = -0.15, p = .879), recollective experience 
(t(124) = 0.28, p = .777), field perspective (t(124) = 0.89, p = .375), observer perspective 
(t(124) = -0.92, p = .359), emotional intensity (t(124) = -1.04, p = .300), and centrality (t(124) 
= -0.67, p = .502). For remote negative memories, there were also no differences in 
psychological distance (t(124) = 1.25, p = .214), recollective experience (t(124) = 0.67, p = 
.506), field perspective (t(124) = 1.81, p = .074), observer perspective (t(124) = 0.35, p = 
.724), emotional intensity (t(124) = 1.44, p = .153), and centrality (t(124) = 1.55, p = .125) 
between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. 
Subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD group differences for recent memories. Similar 
to depression, for recent positive memories, there were no differences between subclinical 
PTSD and non-PTSD groups in psychological distance (t(124) = -1.24, p = .216), recollective 
experience (t(124) = -0.81, p = .419), field perspective (t(124) = 0.36, p = .720), observer 
perspective (t(124) = -0.61, p = .546), emotional intensity (t(124) = 0.44, p = .658), and 
centrality (t(124) = 1.45, p = .150). For recent negative memories, those with subclinical 
PTSD and non-PTSD groups retrieved memories with similar psychological distance (t(124) 
= 1.75, p = .082), recollective experience (t(124) = 1.64, p = .103), observer perspective 
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(t(124) = -1.78, p = .077), and emotional intensity (t(124) = 1.81, p = .072). Although the 
subclinical PTSD group also recalled more field perspective (t(124) = 2.10, p = .038) than the 
non-PTSD group, this difference was no longer significant after Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ 
.008) were applied. However, the subclinical PTSD group did recall recent negative 
memories with higher centrality (t(124) = 2.84, p = .005, d = .54) than the non-PTSD group, 
even after correcting with Bonferroni (p ≤ .008). 
Subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD group differences for remote memories. For 
remote positive memories, there were no differences between subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups in psychological distance (t(124) = -0.74, p = .459), recollective experience 
(t(124) = -1.44, p = .153), field perspective (t(124) = 0.14, p = .892), observer perspective 
(t(124) = -0.53, p = .596), emotional intensity (t(124) = -0.92, p = .357), and centrality 
(t(95.25) = 0.67, p = .502). For remote negative memories, subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD 
groups retrieved memories with similar psychological distance (t(124) = 1.47, p = .145), 
recollective experience (t(124) = -0.12, p = .909), field perspective (t(124) = 0.38, p = .703), 
and observer perspective (t(124) = 0.62, p = .535). Although the subclinical PTSD group also 
recalled memories with higher emotional intensity (t(124) = 2.00, p = .047) than the non-
PTSD group, this difference was no longer significant after Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .008) 
were applied. The subclinical PTSD group had higher centrality (t(91.80) = 2.86, p = .005, d 
= .53) than the non-PTSD group towards their remote negative memories, and this difference 
was still significant after Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .008). 
Subclinical and psychologically healthy group differences for emotion regulation 
components. Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to test differences in emotion 
regulation components between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups and 
between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. The subclinical depression group had 
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lower cognitive reappraisal than the non-depressed group (t(124) =-3.82, p < .001, d = .69; 
sub dep: M = 28.28, SD = 6.54; non-dep: M = 32.55, SD = 5.91), even after Bonferroni 
corrections (p ≤ .025). There were no differences in expressive suppression between the 
subclinical depression and non-depressed groups (t(124) = 1.71, p = .090).  
The subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups had similar levels of cognitive 
reappraisal (t(124) =-1.92, p = .058). However, the subclinical PTSD group had higher 
expressive suppression than the non-PTSD group (t(124) = 3.43, p = .001, d = .66; sub PTSD: 
M = 18.54, SD = 4.76; non-PTSD: M = 15.33, SD = 4.99). This difference was still 
significant after applying Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .025).  
 
Valence and Objective Age of Memory [Hypothesis 3] 
Mixed-design multivariate analyses of variances were used to examine the effects of 
emotional valence and objective age of memory on psychological distance between 
subclinical depression and non-depressed groups and between subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups. There was an interaction effect between valence and depression groups on 
psychological distance (see Figure 4.3) (F(1 ,124) = 6.64, p = .011, Cohen’s d = .05). The 
subclinical depression group felt closer to negative memories (M = 18.32, SE = 0.90) than 
positive memories (M = 17.23, SE = 0.93), whereas the non-depressed group felt closer to 
positive memories (M = 18.54, SE = 0.79) than negative memories (M = 15.93, SE = 0.76). 
There was no interaction between objective age of memory and depression groups on 
psychological distance (F(1, 124) = 0.17, p = .686).  
Similar to depression groups, there was an interaction effect between valence and 
PTSD groups on psychological distance (see Figure 4.4) (F(1, 124) = 7.12, p = .009, Cohen’s 
d = .05). The subclinical PTSD group felt closer to negative memories (M = 18.63, SE = 
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1.02) than positive memories (M = 16.98, SE = 1.05), whereas the non-PTSD group felt 
closer to positive memories (M = 18.48, SE = 0.73) than negative memories (M = 16.12, SE = 
0.71). There was no interaction between objective age of memory and PTSD groups on 
psychological distance (F(1, 124) = 0.00, p = .949). 
 
Depression, Trauma, and Psychological Distance  
Exploratory linear regression analyses were conducted to test the predictive effects of 
depression and trauma severity on psychological distance, to examine the data from a 
continuous approach. Depression severity significantly explained 6.2% of the variance in the 
psychological distance of recent negative memories (F(1, 124) = 8.17, p = .005) even after 
Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .013), whereby higher depression predicted higher feelings of 
closeness towards recent negative memories (beta = .25, p = .005). Although depression 
severity explained 4.3% of the variance in the psychological distance of recent positive 
memories (F(1, 124) = 5.54, p = .020, beta = -.21), it no longer predicted psychological 
distance of recent positive memories after applying Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .013). 
Depression severity also did not predict the psychological distance of remote positive and 
negative memories (ps > .05). 
Although trauma severity significantly explained 3.9% of the variance in the 
psychological distance of recent negative memories (F(1, 124) = 5.02, p = .027, beta = .20), it 
was no longer a predictor of the psychological distance of recent negative memories after 
applying Bonferroni corrections (p ≤ .013). Trauma severity also did not predict 
psychological distance of recent positive memories and remote positive and negative 
memories (ps > .05). 
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Mediators of Depression, Trauma, and Psychological Distance [Hypotheses 4 and 5] 
Correlations with mediating variables. To investigate the associations between 
recollective experience, field perspective, observer perspective, emotional intensity, and 
centrality with depression, trauma, and psychological distance to determine potential 
mediators (see Table 4.3), Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated. As depression 
levels only related to psychological distance of recent positive and recent negative memories 
and trauma levels only related to psychological distance of recent negative memories, prior to 
Bonferroni corrections, only these psychological distances will be discussed here. 
For recent positive memories, psychological distance was associated with recollective 
experience (r(124) = .66, p < .001), field perspective (r(124) = .39, p < .001), emotional 
intensity (r(124) = .23, p = .011), centrality (r(124) = .18, p = .049). However, there were no 
linear relations between depression with recollective experience (r(124) = -.04, p = .676), 
field perspective (r(124) = .01, p = .902), emotional intensity (r(124) = -.08, p = .350), and 
centrality (r(124) = -.01, p = .892). Depression (r(124) = .03, p = .704) and psychological 
distance (r(124) = -.11, p = .204) were also not related to observer perspective. Due to the 
lack of relations to both variables in the relation, no phenomenological characteristics could 
be tested as mediators for the relations of depression and psychological distance of recent 
positive memories.  
Because depression predicted psychological distance of recent negative memories 
although it was not hypothesized to do so, exploratory mediation analyses would be 
conducted on this relation. The potential mediators were selected based on any memory 
phenomenology that related to both of the variables in the relation. For recent negative 
memories, psychological distance was associated with recollective experience (r(124) = .60, 
p < .001), field perspective (r(124) = .19, p = .034), and centrality (r(124) = .21, p = .020). 
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Depression was associated with recollective experience (r(124) = .20, p = .023) and centrality 
(r(124) = .18, p = .045) but not field perspective (r(124) = .12, p = .174), whereas trauma was 
associated with recollective experience (r(124) = .20, p = .025), field perspective (r(124) = 
.18, p = .044), and centrality (r(124) = .29, p = .001). Although depression (r(124) = .21, p = 
.016) and trauma (r(124) = .24, p = .008) related to emotional intensity, psychological 
distance (r(124) = .03, p = .760) did not. Depression (r(124) = -.05, p = .597), trauma (r(124) 
= -.12, p = .188), and psychological distance (r(124) = -.06, p = .523) were also not related to 
observer perspective. Hence, recollective experience and centrality could be tested as 
mediators for the relations between depression and psychological distance of recent negative 
memories. Field perspective, in addition to recollective experience and centrality, could be 
tested as mediators for trauma and psychological distance of recent negative memories.  
Associations between the emotion regulation strategy of cognitive reappraisal was 
also tested with depression and psychological distances of recent positive and negative 
memories, and expressive suppression with depression, trauma, and psychological distances 
of recent negative memories. Cognitive reappraisal related negatively to depression (r(124) = 
-.34, p < .001) but not to psychological distance of recent positive (r(124) = .09, p = .304) 
and recent negative (r(124) = -.08, p = .385) memories. Expressive suppression related 
positively to depression (r(124) = .27, p = .002) and trauma (r(124) = .36, p < .001) but not to 
psychological distance of recent negative memories (r(124) = .02, p = .862). Therefore, the 
emotion regulation strategies could not be tested as a mediator for the relations between 
depression and trauma and psychological distance. 
Mediation analyses for depression and psychological distance of recent negative 
memories. To examine recollective experience as a mediator of depression and psychological 
distance of recent negative memories, a hierarchical regression was conducted with 
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recollective experience (entered in the first step) and depression (entered in the second step) 
as the independent variables and psychological distance of recent negative memories as the 
dependent variable. Recollective experience fully mediated the relation between depression 
and psychological distance, whereby adding depression did not lead to a significant increase 
in the explained variance (ΔR2 = .017, p = .069; Z = 2.11, p = .035).  
Similar steps were repeated to test whether centrality of event mediated depression 
and psychological distance of recent negative memories, by entering centrality into the first 
step of the hierarchical regression analysis instead. Centrality of event did not mediate the 
relation between depression and psychological distance. Adding depression led to a 
significant increase in the explained variance (ΔR2 = .046, p = .014), and its influence was 
independent from the influence of centrality (Z = 1.31, p = .190). 
Mediation analyses for trauma and psychological distance of recent negative 
memories. To examine recollective experience as a mediator of trauma and psychological 
distance of recent negative memories, a hierarchical regression was conducted with 
recollective experience (entered in the first step) and trauma (entered in the second step) as 
the independent variables and psychological distance of recent negative memories as the 
dependent variable. Recollective experience fully mediated the relation between trauma and 
psychological distance, whereby adding trauma did not lead to a significant increase in the 
explained variance (ΔR2 = .006, p = .268; Z = 2.12, p = .034).  
Next, whether field perspective served as a mediator for trauma and psychological 
distance of recent negative memories was tested. All steps in the hierarchical regressions 
were similar as the previous analysis, except field perspective was entered into the first step 
of the hierarchical regression analysis instead. Field perspective did not mediate the relation 
between trauma and psychological distance. Adding trauma did not lead to a significant 
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increase in the explained variance (ΔR2 = .027, p = .060), but the Sobel test was not 
significant (Z = 1.22, p = .224).  
Finally, similar steps were repeated to test the role of centrality of event as a mediator 
of trauma and psychological distance of recent negative memories, by entering centrality into 
the first step of the hierarchical regression analysis instead. Centrality of event did not 
mediate the relation between trauma and psychological distance. Adding trauma did not lead 
to a significant increase in the explained variance (ΔR2 = .020, p = .104) but the Sobel test 
was not significant (Z = 1.51, p = .126). 
 
Moderators of Depression, Trauma, and Psychological Distance [Hypotheses 4 and 5] 
To investigate the effects of memory phenomenology and emotion regulation on the 
relations of depression and trauma and psychological distance, moderation analyses were 
conducted. Similar to the exploratory mediation analyses in the previous chapter, exploratory 
moderation analyses were also conducted for the relations of depression and trauma with 
psychological distance that were not included in the hypotheses or did not have significant 
relations, to test whether these relations could become significant with the addition of the 
moderator. All memory phenomenology and emotion regulation were tested as moderators 
for the exploratory moderation analyses, due to its exploratory nature. 
Moderation analyses for depression and psychological distance of recent 
memories. Moderation analyses showed that recollective experience (ΔR2 = .00, p = .329), 
field perspective (ΔR2 = .01, p = .330), observer perspective (ΔR2 = .00, p = .512), emotional 
intensity (ΔR2 = .01, p = .460), centrality (ΔR2 = .01, p = .239), and cognitive reappraisal (ΔR2 
= .01, p = .365) did not moderate the relation between depression and psychological distance 
of recent positive memories. For the relation between depression and psychological distance 
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of recent negative memories, field perspective (ΔR2 = .00, p = .780), observer perspective 
(ΔR2 = .00, p = .498), emotional intensity (ΔR2 = .00, p = .900), centrality (ΔR2 = .01, p = 
.178), cognitive reappraisal (ΔR2 = .00, p = .541), and expressive suppression (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.707) did not serve as moderators. Because recollective experience was found to function as a 
mediator for the relation of depression and psychological distance of recent negative 
memories, it was excluded from the moderation analysis for this relation. 
Moderation analyses for depression and psychological distance of remote 
memories. Only emotional intensity served as a moderator for the association between 
depression and psychological distance of remote positive memories (ΔR2 = .04, B = -.18, SE = 
.08, p = .028). Higher depression predicted feeling further from remote positive memories as 
the emotional intensity level increased. However, this moderating effect was only observed at 
high levels of emotional intensity. Recollective experience (ΔR2 = .01, p = .301), field 
perspective (ΔR2 = .00, p = .945), observer perspective (ΔR2 = .02, p = .088), centrality (ΔR2 = 
.00, p = .609), cognitive reappraisal (ΔR2 = .00, p = .884), and expressive suppression (ΔR2 = 
.01, p = .187) did not moderate this relation.  
For remote negative memories, field perspective was found to moderate the relation 
between depression and psychological distance (ΔR2 = .03, B = .07, SE = .03, p = .037). 
Higher depression predicted feeling closer to remote negative memories more strongly as 
field perspective increased. However, this moderating effect was only observed at high levels 
of field perspective. Recollective experience (ΔR2 = .01, p = .106), observer perspective (ΔR2 
= .01, p = .386), emotional intensity (ΔR2 = .02, p = .125), centrality (ΔR2 = .01, p = .233), 
cognitive reappraisal (ΔR2 = .00, p = .947), and expressive suppression (ΔR2 = .02, p = .180) 
did not moderate this relation.  
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Moderation analyses for trauma and psychological distance of recent memories. 
There were no significant moderating effects of recollective experience (ΔR2 = .00, p = .401), 
field perspective (ΔR2 = .00, p = .476), observer perspective (ΔR2 = .00, p = .779), emotional 
intensity (ΔR2 = .00, p = .924), centrality (ΔR2 = .00, p = .744), cognitive reappraisal (ΔR2 = 
.02, p = .090), and expressive suppression (ΔR2 = .00, p = .665) on the relation between 
trauma and psychological distance of recent positive memories. For the relation between 
trauma and psychological distance of recent negative memories, field perspective (ΔR2 = .00, 
p = .826), observer perspective (ΔR2 = .00, p = .958), emotional intensity (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.996), centrality (ΔR2 = .03, p = .056), and expressive suppression (ΔR2 = .00, p = .920) were 
not significant moderators. Recollective experience was excluded from the moderation 
analysis on the relation between trauma and psychological distance of recent negative 
memories because it functioned as a mediator for the relation. 
Moderation analyses for trauma and psychological distance of remote memories. 
For remote positive memories, recollective experience (ΔR2 = .00, p = .964), field perspective 
(ΔR2 = .00, p = .964), observer perspective (ΔR2 = .03, p = .071), emotional intensity (ΔR2 = 
.03, p = .070), centrality (ΔR2 = .00, p = .857), cognitive reappraisal (ΔR2 = .00, p = .977), and 
expressive suppression (ΔR2 = .00, p = .676) did not moderate the trauma and psychological 
distance relation. Field perspective served as a moderator for the relation between trauma and 
psychological distance of remote negative memories (ΔR2 = .05, B = .06, SE = .02, p = .005). 
Higher trauma predicted feeling closer to remote negative memories more strongly as field 
perspective increased, but this moderating effect was only observed at high levels of field 
perspective. However, recollective experience (ΔR2 = .02, p = .062), observer perspective 
(ΔR2 = .00, p = .880), emotional intensity (ΔR2 = .00, p = .586), centrality (ΔR2 = .01, p = 
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.325), cognitive reappraisal (ΔR2 = .00, p = .968), and expressive suppression (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.750) did not moderate this relation.  
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the relation of depression and trauma with 
psychological distance for memories of different valence (i.e., positive and negative) and 
different objective ages (i.e., recent and remote). Memory phenomenology (i.e., recollective 
experience, vantage perspective, emotional intensity, and centrality) and emotion regulation 
strategies (i.e., cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) as underlying mechanisms 
of these relations were also tested. To investigate these aims, participants retrieved positive 
and negative memories that were recent and remote, and completed the psychological 
distance scale, AMQ and CES for every event, as well as the CES-D, PCL-5, and ERQ. 
Overall findings indicate that:  
1. Individuals with subclinical depression and psychologically healthy individuals 
attached similar psychological distances to recent positive events (part of Hypothesis 
1 was not accepted), recent negative events, and remote events (part of Hypothesis 1 
was accepted). However, depression severity predicted feeling closer to recent 
negative memories. 
2. Individuals with subclinical PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals attached 
similar psychological distances to recent negative events (part of Hypothesis 2 was 
not accepted), recent positive events, and remote events (part of Hypothesis 2 was 
accepted).  
3. In general, subclinical depression and PTSD groups felt closer to negative events 
whereas psychological healthy groups felt closer to positive events (part of 
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Hypothesis 3 was accepted). There was no effect of objective age on the relations 
between depression and trauma groups and psychological distance (part of Hypothesis 
3 was not accepted).  
4. Recollective experience fully mediated the relations of depression and trauma with 
psychological distance for recent negative events (part of Hypothesis 4 was accepted). 
Recollective experience did not mediate the other relations (part of Hypothesis 4 was 
not accepted). 
5. Emotional intensity moderated the relation between depression and psychological 
distance of remote positive events, whereas field perspective moderated the relations 
of depression and trauma with psychological distance of remote negative events. 
Higher emotional intensity strengthened the relation between higher depression and 
feeling further from remote positive events. Higher field perspective strengthened 
relations of higher depression and trauma and feeling closer to remote negative 
events. Emotional intensity and field perspective did not mediate or moderate the 
other relations (part of Hypothesis 4 was not accepted). 
6. Observer perspective, centrality of event, cognitive reappraisal, and expressive 
suppression did not mediate or moderate the relations of depression and trauma with 
psychological distance for all types of memories (part of Hypotheses 4 and 5 were not 
accepted). 
 
Depression and Psychological Distance 
 Individuals with subclinical depression and psychologically healthy individuals did 
not feel any differently towards the psychological distance of memories. Unlike the group 
difference findings, higher depression severity predicted increased feelings of closeness 
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towards recent negative memories, but not feelings of closeness towards the other types of 
memories. This finding suggests that there is no observable difference in psychological 
distance upon crossing the subclinical threshold, but higher amount of depression symptoms 
could be one of the many predictors that contributes towards changes in psychological 
distance of negative memories that occurred in recent times. The current results are different 
from those of Janssen et al. (2015), who found that people with higher depression felt further 
from positive events, but did not feel closer to negative memories. 
The results showed that the relation between depression and psychological distance is 
affected by the valence of memories. When memories were negative, the subclinical 
depression group exhibit more feelings of closeness than the psychologically healthy group, 
whereas the opposite was observed when the memories were positive. Individuals with higher 
levels of depression have been known to have more negative attentional biases (Baert et al., 
2010; Dalgleish et al., 2011; Everaert et al., 2014), which cause feelings of closeness towards 
negative memories. Furthermore, those with higher depression symptoms include more 
negative memories than positive memories in their life narratives (Bohn, 2010; Dalgleish et 
al., 2011; Fromholt et al., 2003; Habermas et al., 2008; Jobson et al., 2018; Jørgensen et al., 
2012; Rubin et al., 2009), which means they think and talk about important negative 
memories more often. Rehearsal of memories, in terms of thinking and talking, have been 
shown to influence psychological distance (Demiray & Janssen, 2015). Hence, the tendency 
to narrate and think more about negative important memories may also be a reason for those 
with more depression symptoms to feel closer towards those memories. Besides the role of 
attentional biases and rehearsal, individuals with higher depression scores typically have 
higher rumination tendencies, particularly brooding (Schoofs et al., 2010; Treynor et al., 
2003; Xavier, Cunha, & Pinto-Gouveia, 2016). Higher brooding has been shown to make 
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negative events feel closer (Öner & Gülgöz, 2018), and thus, may also explain the reason 
higher levels of depression predicts feeling closer to negative events.  
Although depression severity predicted changes in psychological distance of negative 
events, it did so only for recent events but not remote events. Psychological distance has been 
noted to reduce or weaken over time, independent of the levels of depression (Janssen et al., 
2015; Ross & Wilson, 2002). Hence, it may be possible that the depression severity only 
predicts feeling closer to negative events in the beginning when the events have just occurred, 
and similarly loses its association over time.  
 
Trauma and Psychological Distance 
 The present study also did not find any differences in psychological distance for those 
with subclinical PTSD and psychological healthy individuals. In line with the lack of group 
differences, trauma severity also did not explain psychological distance. Individuals with 
trauma have been noted to have more attentional biases towards threatening memories rather 
than negative memories (Bryant & Harvey, 1997; Pineles et al., 2009; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 
2017). The current results about the negative events are different from Janssen et al. (2015), 
who showed that people with higher levels of trauma felt closer to negative events, but the 
current results about the positive events are similar to Janssen et al. (2015), who found no 
associations for positive memories. It is possible that the negative memories retrieved for the 
present study may not have been threatening in nature or related to their traumatic 
experience, which may be a reason that the participants with subclinical PTSD symptoms did 
not feel any closer or further from the negative memories.  
Similar to depression, the relation between trauma and psychological distance 
appeared to be affected by the valence of memories. The subclinical PTSD group experienced 
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more feelings of closeness than the psychologically healthy group when the memories were 
negative, whereas the opposite was experienced when the memories were positive. Although 
individuals with trauma symptoms primarily have attentional biases towards traumatic and 
threatening memories (Bryant & Harvey, 1997; Pineles et al., 2009), they may still 
experience a small amount of attentional bias towards negative memories (El Khoury-
Malhame et al., 2011; Vythilingam et al., 2007). 
 Another potential factor that may explain the lack of group differences in 
psychological distance for the subclinical PSTD group, as well as the subclinical depression 
group, is the language of narration. Van Boven and Caruso (2015) theorized that language 
during narration of the memory has the ability to form or change psychological distance 
towards an event. Past studies have shown that people tend to have less access to memories 
when the language during encoding and narration do not match, and people have more 
difficulty retrieving and narrating memories in their second language if it is not as fluent or 
preferred as their first language (Marian & Neisser, 2000; Matsumoto & Stanny, 2006). 
These effects are known as language-dependent memories. The current study required 
participants to narrate their memories in English, but the sample consisted of participants 
from a mixture of nationalities that may not have had English as a first language despite 
having sufficient proficiency to complete the task. Thus, psychological distance could have 
been affected during narration of the memory for participants who did not have English as a 
first language. Additionally, language has also been shown to affect memory 
phenomenology, such as emotional intensity. When describing emotional memories or 
events, emotional intensity was shown to increase when first language was used and decrease 
when second language was used (Pizzaro, 1994). 
 




The current study found that recollective experience was the underlying mechanism 
of the relation of depression and trauma with psychological distance of recent negative 
events. Individuals with more depression and trauma symptoms felt closer to recent negative 
events, because they are able to travel back in time to that event and relive or re-experience it 
as intensely as if it were occurring at the present. However, the current study did not find any 
differences in the amount of recollective experience for the negative events engaged by those 
with subclinical depression and PTSD as compared to those who are psychologically healthy, 
similar to past studies using clinical samples (Söderlund et al., 2014). This finding suggests 
that those with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD do not engage in more recollective 
experience towards recent negative events than the average person, but they do appear to be 
more strongly impacted by it. The enhanced effect that reliving of recent negative events has 
may be due to the negative attentional biases experienced by people with depression and 
trauma symptoms that makes the recall of these events easier and more intense (Baert et al., 
2010; Dalgleish et al., 2011; El Khoury-Malhame et al., 2011; Everaert et al., 2014; 
Vythilingam et al., 2007), causing an increase in the closeness felt towards the event. 
 
Vantage Perspective 
Field and observer perspective did not underlie the relations of depression and trauma 
with psychological distance. However, manipulating vantage perspective from field to 
observer perspective has been used as a tool to create distance from memories, emotions, and 
thoughts, especially in clinical populations (e.g., Gu & Tse, 2016; Kross et al., 2012). One 
reason for the difference in results from the literature is that past studies viewed field and 
observer perspective as opposite ends of one variable, and did not take into account the 
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interaction between objective age and valence of the memory. Subclinical depression and 
PTSD groups in the current study did not have significant differences in field and observer 
perspective, similar to previous studies (Rubin et al., 2008), which suggests that those with 
subclinical depression and PTSD did not view the recalled memory any differently. Hence, 
although changing vantage perspective has the ability to change psychological distance, it is 
not able to directly account for the influence of depression and trauma on psychological 
distance.  
Instead, field perspective was found to strengthen the associations of depression and 
trauma with psychological distance of remote negative memories but only at high levels of 
field perspective. This moderation means when an individual has more symptoms of 
depression or trauma and high field perspective during recall of a remote negative memory, 
the likelihood that the individual feels closer to the memory increases. There was no prior 
association between trauma and psychological distance of remote negative memories but 
adding high field perspective resulted in findings that match Janssen et al. (2015), whereby 
higher trauma predicted feeling closer towards negative memories.  
Seeing negative memories from a field perspective is likely to make the memory 
appear as if the person is experiencing the event first-hand in the present, which could reflect 
an increase in recollective experience. Marcotti and St. Jacques (2018) found that changes in 
vantage perspective and psychological distance could be attributed to changes in recollective 
experience. As the current results have shown that recollective experience underlies those 
with higher depression and trauma levels feeling closer to recent negative memories, it may 
be possible that the high field perspective is indirectly increasing the recollective experience, 
which then alters the psychological distance of remote negative memories. 
 




Emotional intensity also did not underlie the relations of depression and trauma with 
psychological distance. Changing the emotional intensity at recall has been shown to cause 
changes in psychological distance (Mei et al., 2008; Van Boven et al., 2010). In the current 
study, emotional intensity was not associated to measures of psychological distance, and was 
not any different between the subclinical depression and PTSD groups and the 
psychologically healthy groups for all except recent negative memories, results of which 
were different from past studies (Knyazev et al., 2017; Rottenberg et al., 2005; Rubin et la., 
2008, 2011; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). The subclinical depression group retrieved 
recent negative memories with higher intensity than the psychologically healthy groups.  
The higher emotional intensity for negative but not positive memories could be 
attributed to people with depression symptoms having an impairment in their fading affect 
bias (Gibbons & Lee, 2019; Marsh, Hammond, & Crawford, 2019). Fading affect bias refers 
to the emotional intensity of negative memories typically fading faster than positive 
memories, and usually starts taking an effect between one day to three months after the event 
occurred (Gibbons & Lee, 2019; Walker & Skowronski, 2009). The mean objective age of 
memories recorded in the recent negative category for the subclinical depression group was 
12.5 months, which means a fading affect bias should have taken place on the memories. The 
high emotional intensity for recent but not remote negative events suggests that individuals 
with subclinical depression do not completely lack the fading affect bias, but instead may 
experience delays or weakening in automatically reducing the negative emotions of recent 
memories, similar to findings of Hitchcock et al. (2020).  
Gu and Tse (2016) found that psychological distance and vividness mediated and 
caused changes in emotional intensity. One possibility that arises from the lack of 
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associations between depression and trauma and psychological distance for the other memory 
conditions in the current study is that other phenomenological factors, such as vividness or 
recollective experience, could have an influence and may need to be taken into account. 
Another factor that explains the lack of associations is narrating memories using one’s second 
or less-preferred language, which can increase or decrease the emotional intensity of the 
memory as compared to narrating it in the first or preferred language (Marian & 
Kaushanskaya, 2008; Pavlenko, 2012). Hence, it is possible that the emotional intensity 
recorded at narration may not reflect the actual emotional intensity experienced during recall 
for some bilingual participants. 
However, higher emotional intensity strengthened the association between depression 
and psychological distance of remote positive memories but only at high levels of emotional 
intensity. It means when an individual has more symptoms of depression and high emotional 
intensity during recall of a remote positive memory, the likelihood that the individual feels 
further from the memory increases. Although there was initially no association between 
depression and psychological distance of remote positive memories, the addition of high 
emotional intensity resulted in a relation similar to the results of Janssen et al. (2015), 
whereby higher depression predicted feeling further away from positive memories.  
Feeling further when positive memories have a higher intensity may be a form of 
avoidance by those with depression symptoms. People with depression have been observed to 
demonstrate fear and avoidance towards emotions that are positive in nature (e.g., Hayes, 
2015; Vanderlind, Stanton, Weinbrecht, Velkoff, & Joormann, 2016; Werner-Seidler, Banks, 
Dunn, & Moulds, 2013). Therefore, remote memories that are accompanied by higher 
positive emotional intensity are likely to increase this fear and avoidance in individuals with 
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In addition, centrality of the event was not the underlying mechanism for the 
depression, trauma, and psychological distance relations either. Although the current study 
looked at the most important positive and negative personal events, these memories were not 
necessarily central to the person’s identity and outlook in life. Importance and centrality are 
characteristics of memory that are highly related but separate constructs (Gehrt, Berntsen, 
Hoyle, & Rubin, 2018; Janssen et al., 2015). In line with past studies (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006; Boals, 2014; da Silva et al., 2016; Wamser-Nanney et al., 2018; Zaragoza Scherman et 
al., 2015), those with subclinical PTSD symptoms did perceive negative events as being more 
central to them regardless of the objective age of memory, but the centrality of those events 
did not account for trauma’s influence on psychological distance of those events.  
 
Emotion Regulation 
Finally, although those with subclinical depression symptoms had lower cognitive 
reappraisal and those with subclinical PTSD symptoms had higher expressive suppression, 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression did not explain associations between 
depression and trauma with psychological distance. This finding indicates that the inability of 
those with higher depression symptoms to feel closer to positive events and those with higher 
trauma to distance themselves from negative events is not related to poor emotion regulation 
strategies. However, the current study only tested two types of emotion regulation strategies 
and it is still possible that other types of emotion regulation strategies, such as task- or 
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problem-focused, emotional-focused, and avoidant-focused (Carver et al., 1989; Endler, 
1997; Sahler & Carr, 2009), may be related to the associations instead. Task- or problem- 
focused coping involves planning, strategizing, and taking action in trying to solve the 
experienced problems. Emotional-focused coping primarily aims to manage and reduce 
emotional distress that arises from problems, by venting emotions and relying on social 
support. Avoidant focused coping are forms of aversions and dissociations towards the 
problem, by denying that the problem is real or forgetting that the problem exists. These three 
emotion regulation strategies cover a wider coping area than cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression, and hence, may be able to better explain the associations between 
depression and trauma and psychological distance. 
 
Implications 
 The findings suggest that depression symptoms do contribute to feeling 
psychologically closer towards recent negative events, which has been shown to relate to 
negative mood and thoughts (Kross et al., 2012). Hence, managing or reducing individuals’ 
symptoms of depression via psychotherapy could help them to distance themselves from 
negative events that occurred in recent times. Being able to successfully distance themselves 
from negative events will further allow those with depression symptoms to reduce the 
likelihood of the escalation of depression symptoms to clinical levels (e.g., Barbosa, Silva, 
Pinto-Guiveia, & Salgado, 2019; Kross & Ayduk, 2009; Kross et al., 2012).  
The current findings further suggest that an effective way to increase the distance 
from recent negative events for individuals with higher depression and trauma is by 
manipulating the recollective experience of these events. The amount of reliving experienced 
when recalling an event can be altered by asking these individuals to recall these memories 
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with fewer episodic details, which will help reduce the vividness and enable them to relive 
the memories less intensely. Memory specificity training is employed as a form of cognitive 
training to increase the episodic details recalled in positive autobiographical memories in 
populations with depression and PTSD (e.g., Erten & Brown, 2018; Hamlat & Alloy, 2018; 
Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2009). This memory specificity training could be modified to 
help people with higher depression and trauma symptoms reduce the amount of episodic 
details of the recent negative memories they recall instead, therefore reducing the recollective 
experience of those memories and hence, increasing the distance from those memories. By 
targeting only certain types of memories to decrease its episodic details (e.g., only recent 
negative memories instead of all negative memories or positive memories), the risk of the 
individuals developing OGM tendencies from the training is low. However, future 
application research is needed to study how effective this adapted memory specificity training 
would be.  
Besides these two implications, the results from this study also indicate that the 
centrality that individuals with subclinical PTSD symptoms place on negative events does not 
change over time. This result means that the centrality of negative events will not 
automatically reduce over time and that active intervention needs to be undertaken to reduce 
the centrality of negative events. Changing the meaning and perceptions associated with 
negative events, or learning to accept and normalize the event, could reduce the centrality 
attached to the event by the individual, which could further help reduce their symptoms of 
trauma from escalating (e.g., Boals & Murrell, 2016; Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Greenhoot, 
Sun, Bunnell, & Lindboe, 2013).  
Last, the current results showed that individuals with subclinical depression 
symptoms had stronger emotional intensity for their recent negative memories. As the 
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emotional intensity of negative events does not appear to fade automatically or as quickly in 
people with many depression symptoms, active intervention needs to be used to alleviate the 
heightened emotional intensity. Reframing perceptions of the event or increasing the 
acceptance towards recent negative memories could be used to reduce the emotional intensity 
of the negative events (e.g., Clabby, 2006; Qu, Sas, & Doherty, 2019). Besides reframing 
memories, mindfulness-based intervention can also be utilized to manage the emotional 
intensity attached to negative memories (e.g., Jimines, Niles, & Park, 2010; Wu et al., 2019). 
Using both types of techniques could reduce the emotional intensity and hence, prevent their 
depression symptoms from escalating. 
 
Limitations 
One limitation of the present study is that the memory retrieval task used in the 
current study may not have reflected naturalistic retrieval and narration of memories. The 
memory task required participants to describe their memory in more than 40 words. 
Therefore, individuals who may not typically recall their memories with that much 
phenomenological characteristics were forced to do so, which may have elevated the ratings 
obtained in the current study beyond their typical recall patterns. Furthermore, it also raises 
the possibility that some participants may not have been able to recall sufficient details about 
the memory, leading them to describe memory details that they have less confidence in and 
are less accurate, to meet the minimum word limit.  
One more limitation is that the current study only examined the relations of 
depression and trauma with phenomenological traits of most important memories. Everyday 
memories or memories of varying importance were not studied, and hence, whether the 
current results can also be generalized to those memories is uncertain. The current study 
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tested the recall phenomenology that was related to each specific event as possible underlying 
mechanisms but did not take into account existing individual differences in recall 
phenomenology tendencies that may be present in general, regardless of the event that is 
being recalled. Future studies could address this limitation by comparing the individual 
differences in overall recollective experience tendencies, vantage perspectives typically used 
for memory recall, and intensity of emotions typically experienced during recall, with 
phenomenological traits attached to specific events, to explain differences in psychological 
distance.  
Another limitation of the current study is that although the study was conducted in 
English, language ability was not taken into account. The current sample consisted of 
participants of many different nationalities, some of whom may be bilinguals or trilinguals, 
who did not have English as their first language. Having different first languages could affect 
memory recall and phenomenology during narration, but aspects of language were not 
measured or recorded in the current study. Future studies could record first and second 
languages of participants and employ measurements of language proficiency to test for 
effects of language on relations of depression and trauma on psychological distance. 
 
Conclusions 
 There were no differences in the psychological distance attached by individuals with 
subclinical depression and PTSD as compared to psychologically healthy individuals, 
regardless of the valence or objective age of the memories. However, subclinical depression 
and PTSD groups had stronger tendencies to feel closer to negative memories than 
psychologically heathy groups, and the opposite for positive memories. Higher depression 
severity was predicted increased feelings of closeness towards recent negative events but not 
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remote negative events. The findings suggest that although having more depressive 
symptoms contributes to feeling closer towards negative events that occurred recently, it 
loses its significance over time. 
 Recollective experience mediated the relation of depression and trauma with the 
psychological distance of recent negative events but not with the psychological distance of 
other events, despite the lack of difference in recollective experience between subclinical 
depression and PTSD groups and psychologically healthy groups. Individuals with higher 
levels of depression and trauma had difficulties distancing themselves from recent negative 
events due to their inability to stop reliving the event intensely, which appears to impact them 
greatly although they don’t relive the memory more. Higher emotional intensity strengthened 
associations between higher depression and feeling further from remote positive memories, 
whereas higher field perspective strengthened associations between higher depression and 
trauma and feeling closer to remote negative memories. Observer perspective, centrality, and 
emotion regulation did not mediate or moderate the relations of depression and trauma with 
psychological distance. 
Chapter 5: General Discussion - 233 
 
 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
Summary 
Aims of current thesis. The literature has shown that those with clinical depression 
and PTSD have impairments in aspects of their autobiographical memory recall as compared 
to those who are psychologically healthy. However, whether there are differences in 
autobiographical memory recall for individuals with subclinical levels of depression and 
PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals and for which aspects of autobiographical 
memory (i.e., semantic and episodic components, types of memories, and subjective feelings) 
have not been clearly established yet. Underlying mechanisms that explain those relations 
and factors that influence those relations were also tested. 
Findings from Chapter 2. Chapter 2 (i.e., Study 1 and Study 2) examined 
differences in characteristics and typicality of CLS and ILS for individuals with subclinical 
levels of depression and PTSD. The chapter further examined differences in societal 
pressures and perceived ability associated with the CLS and ILS and the role of societal 
identification. The results showed that there were no differences in characteristics (i.e., 
importance, emotional valence, pressure, and perceived ability) of the CLS across the 
depression and trauma groups, but there was a difference in typicality of the CLS for the 
depression groups. Individuals with subclinical depression symptoms generated less typical 
CLS events than psychologically healthy individuals, but higher depression symptoms did not 
predict changes in CLS typicality. Further exploration suggested that a difference in the 
knowledge of the CLS, rather than the selection process of typical events, may underlie the 
differences in CLS typicality observed for those with subclinical depression symptoms. The 
changes in CLS knowledge was predicted by levels of depression. Although people with 
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subclinical PTSD levels also had some differences in their CLS knowledge, it did not appear 
to have an impact on the type of events they included in the CLS.  
Meanwhile, there were no differences in the typicality and characteristics of the ILS 
across the depression and trauma groups, except for the emotional valence and pressure to 
achieve the ILS for the trauma groups. Individuals with subclinical PTSD symptoms 
retrieved less positive ILS events than the psychologically healthy individuals, despite no 
differences in ILS typicality between the groups. This result, along with them rating 
individual typical ILS events as more negative, indicates that they attach more negative 
emotions to positive events. Those with subclinical PTSD symptoms also perceived there was 
higher pressure to achieve the ILS events than those who are psychologically healthy. Higher 
trauma symptoms predicted changes in ILS valence and pressure.  
Finally, collectivism was found to moderate the associations between depression and 
CLS typicality and between depression and trauma and ILS pressure. Having lower 
collectivism strengthened the associations between higher depression and lower CLS 
typicality, whereas having higher collectivism strengthened the associations between higher 
depression and trauma and higher pressure to achieve ILS events.  
Findings from Chapter 3. Chapter 3 (i.e., Study 3 and Study 4) looked at differences 
in memory specificity for individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD. The 
chapter also tested whether the CaR-FA-X model underlies or influences the observed 
associations. The results showed that there were no differences in memory specificity (i.e., 
specific memory, OGM, categorical memory, extended memory, semantic associations, and 
omissions) between individuals with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms and 
psychologically healthy individuals, regardless of the retrieval instructions, emotional 
valence of the cues, and emotional intensity of the cues. Despite a lack of group differences, 
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higher trauma predicted the retrieval of more semantic associations when minimal retrieval 
instructions were provided and the retrieval of more OGM when specific instructions were 
provided. These results indicate that trauma levels contribute to the development of 
overgeneral styles of memory retrieval.  
The CaR-FA-X model (i.e., rumination, avoidant coping, inhibition, and verbal 
working memory) did not mediate the relations of depression and trauma with memory 
specificity. However, rumination and inhibition moderated the relations between depression 
and trauma and semantic associations when minimal retrieval instructions were provided. 
Having higher rumination and having more impairments in inhibition strengthened the 
relations of higher depression and trauma with the retrieval of semantic associations. These 
findings indicate that the CaR-FA-X model does not explain the relations of depression, 
trauma, and memory specificity, but its CaR and X components are still able to impair 
memory specificity for those with more depression and trauma symptoms. 
Findings from Chapter 4. Chapter 4 (i.e., Study 5) investigated the differences in 
psychological distance for individuals with subclinical levels of depression and PTSD. The 
chapter also tested whether emotion regulation strategies and memory phenomenology 
underlies, or influences, the observed associations. The results showed that that there were no 
differences in psychological distance between individuals with subclinical levels of 
depression and PTSD and psychologically healthy individuals, regardless of the emotional 
valence or objective age of the memory. However, there was an interaction effect for the 
valence of the events, whereby the subclinical depression and PTSD groups felt closer to 
negative events than the psychologically healthy group, whereas the psychologically healthy 
groups felt closer to positive events than the subclinical depression and PTSD groups. 
Despite a lack of group difference, higher depression predicted feeling closer to recent 
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negative events but not remote negative memories. The results further suggested that 
depressive symptoms do contribute to the psychological distance of negative events that 
occurred recently, but its contribution may diminish over time.  
Memory phenomenology (i.e., vantage perspective, emotional intensity, and 
centrality) and emotion regulation (i.e., cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) did 
not mediate the relations of depression and trauma with psychological distance, except for 
recollective experience, which mediated the relations of depression and trauma with the 
psychological distance of recent negative events. People with higher depression and trauma 
levels had more difficulties in distancing themselves from recent negative events due to them 
reliving the event more intensely. However, there was a lack of group differences in the 
recollective experience of recent negative events, which suggests that although people with 
higher depression and trauma levels do not relive or reexperience recent negative events more 
often than people with lower depression and trauma levels, they appear to be more strongly 
impacted by them. Emotional intensity moderated the relations of depression with the 
psychological distance of remote positive events, and field perspective moderated the 
relations of depression and trauma with the psychological distance of remote negative events. 
Higher emotional intensity strengthened the relations of higher depression with feeling 
further from remote positive memories, whereas higher field perspective strengthened the 
relations of higher depression and trauma with feeling closer to remote negative memories. 
 
Autobiographical Memory as Multidimensional Components  
 The findings from this thesis corroborate that autobiographical memories are indeed 
multidimensional. This finding is supported from the different results obtained for the various 
facets of autobiographical memory tested here, despite all of them being a part of 
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autobiographical memory. The results suggest that an individual with subclinical depression 
and PTSD may be able to recall some facets of a memory with no difficulties, but they may 
also have difficulties in other facets of the very same memory. Considering various different 
facets and dimensions come together to form a coherent recollection of memory (Rubin, 
2005), difficulties in any one facet could result in impairments for the recall of the specified 
memory. The current findings highlight the importance of studying memory recall in a 
holistic manner not only for subclinical populations but also for other populations. 
 
Autobiographical Memory Recall for Depression  
Overall memory profile. The current studies show that there are small differences in 
autobiographical memory recall between individuals with subclinical depression and 
psychologically healthy individuals. Individuals with subclinical depression symptoms 
differed in the semantic aspects (i.e., generated less typical CLS events) and phenomenology 
of their memories (i.e., recalled recent negative memories with higher emotional intensity) as 
compared to psychologically healthy individuals. However, there were no differences in the 
recall of the episodic components of their memories, in the type of memories they recalled, 
and in how they felt towards their memories. Despite the lack of group differences, 
depression severity did predict feelings towards the memory (i.e., higher depression severity 
predicted feeling closer towards recent negative events).  
These findings indicate that in normal populations, many aspects of recalled 
autobiographical memories are stable and do not appear to change for individuals with 
subclinical symptoms of depression. The characteristics of their most important and 
significant memories did not change, nor did they have more difficulties recalling the details 
of their memories, and there were no unusual distancing effects towards their memories, as 
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compared to those who are psychologically healthy. Hence, the findings suggest that the 
recall of memories does not change greatly upon crossing the subclinical depression threshold 
and is not influenced much by, or much dependent on, the presence or severity of depression 
symptoms. However, the results do suggest that for individuals with a higher range of 
depression severity, a distancing effect may be seen.  
In the larger context of the Self Memory System (SMS) model (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004), the findings from this thesis show that the long-term self 
is mostly stable for people with subclinical depression symptoms. This suggestion is 
evidenced by the lack of differences in the episodic components, types of memories recalled, 
and their feelings towards the memories; areas which are represented at or involve the 
conceptual self and autobiographical knowledge base that make up the long-term self 
(Conway & Jobson, 2012; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004; Williams 
et al., 2007). The difference in semantic aspects of memory and some memory 
phenomenology, however, suggests that there may still be small differences at the event-
specific knowledge level within the autobiographical knowledge base, the conceptual self, 
and the working self for those with subclinical depression symptoms (Conway & Jobson, 
2012).  
Attentional biases. The individuals with subclinical depressive symptoms in this 
thesis did not appear to attach negative biases to their recalled memories, although depression 
is typically associated with increased attention to negative materials (Baert et al., 2010; Beck, 
1995; Dalgleish et al., 2011; Feng et al., 2015). They did not generate more negative 
culturally shared semantic knowledge or recall more negative events in their life narrative. 
They also did not have greater ease in recalling details of negative memories or feel closer to 
negative memories. Similarly, they did not exhibit aversions towards positive memories, as 
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demonstrated by not recalling fewer positive events for culturally shared semantic knowledge 
or the life narratives. They also did not have more difficulty in recalling details of positive 
memories or feel further from positive memories.  
The biases that those with depressive symptoms typically possess towards negative 
memories (or against positive memories) may depend on the age of the memories. Those with 
subclinical depression symptoms experienced the emotions associated with negative 
memories more intensely than those who are psychologically healthy and depression 
symptoms contributed to feeling closer to negative memories, but only for recent memories 
and not for older memories. Hence, the negative biases typically accompanying depression 
may only exist for newer memories, with this bias dissipating as the memory ages. This age 
dependency may also explain why no negative bias was observed for the life narratives and 
cue-elicited memories, which consists of a wider age range and include many older 
memories.  
Besides age, another factor that may affect the presence of a negative bias is the 
severity of depressive symptoms. Depression symptoms contributed to psychological distance 
of recent negative events, which may indicate the presence of a negative bias. However, there 
was an absence of group differences, and hence, a distance effect towards those events was 
suggested to be observed only at higher depression levels, further suggesting that negative 
biases may exist more strongly at higher depression severity. These suggestions are in line 
with the literature that showed depression severity was related to negative biases in thinking, 
storage, and interpretation of information from the past and future (Korn, Sharot, Walter, 
Heekeren, & Dolan, 2014; Orchard & Reynolds, 2018). Furthermore, the relation between 
depression severity and feeling distant from remote positive events becoming stronger when 
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the memory had a higher emotional intensity also suggests that an aversion from positive 
memories may have a bigger effect at higher depression severity. 
In addition to severity, the type and combination of symptoms may also be a factor 
that relates to attentional biases. Krings, Heeren, Fontaine, and Blairy (2020) similarly found 
a lack of attentional biases toward negative stimuli and away from positive stimuli for their 
subclinical depression group as well as their clinically depressed group. They attributed the 
absence of the typically observed attentional biases to the diversity and heterogeneity of 
depression symptoms that individuals experience, and argued that a specific combination or 
profile of symptoms may be needed before these attentional biases are triggered. 
Fading affect bias. Only one of the episodic aspects of autobiographical memory 
recall was shown to vary with depression, whereby those with subclinical levels of depression 
recalled recent negative memories with higher emotional intensity but recent positive 
memories in the same manner as those who are psychologically healthy. Although the 
emotional intensity of negative memories typically fades faster than the emotional intensity 
of positive memories (Walker & Skowronski, 2009), individuals with subclincal depression 
in the current thesis demonstrated an absence of this fading effect bias. Fading affect bias has 
been shown to occur between one day to three months after the event took place (Gibbons, 
Lee, & Walker, 2011), which means that recent negative events in the current studies that 
encompassed memories within the past three years should similarly demonstrate a fading 
affect bias, but it did not for those with subclinical depression symptoms. However, there 
were no differences in emotional intensity of negative remote memories which encompassed 
memories older than three years, indicating that the intensity of negative memories did 
dissipate but over a longer span of time. This finding raises the possibility that those with 
subclinical depression symptoms may have a delay in their fading affect bias instead of a 
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complete absence of the effect. This delay indicates that they also experience their negative 
memories at a higher intensity for a longer span of time, which could further excarbate their 
depression symptoms (Davis & Burns, 1999).  
This inability or delay to automatically reduce the intensity of negative memories 
among those with depression matches the results of past studies (e.g., Marsh et al., 2019; 
Gibbons & Lee, 2019; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003) but also 
raises the possibility of another variable playing a role in this mechanism. These past studies 
found that thinking or ruminating about the memory and rehearsing the memory (cognitively 
or verbally) mediated the association between depression and the fading affect bias and may 
similarly serve as underlying mechanisms for the relations between depression and memory 
intensity observed in the current thesis. Individuals with subclinical depression symptoms 
tend to have higher rumination levels, as seen in the current thesis and the literature (e.g., 
Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 2007) and tend to rehearse negative memories more often 
(e.g., Kuyken & Howell, 2006), and these tendencies are likely to cause the difficulties 
observed in reducing negative memory intensity.  
Updating societal information. Although most episodic aspects of autobiographical 
memory do not vary, the findings do suggest that the semantic aspects related to 
autobiographical memory changes for individuals with subclinical symptoms of depression. 
Semantic knowledge in general is typically stable and constant (Tulving, 1972), even among 
individuals with depression (Söderlund et al., 2014), but the type of semantic knowledge 
examined in the current thesis revolved around societal norms and expectations. What is 
defined as normal or expected by society (e.g., the age at which people are expected to marry 
or have children) is constantly changing and being reconstructed (Freud, 1999), which means 
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an inability to keep up and update oneselves with those changes is likely to result in the 
differences in culturally shared semantic knowledge as found in this thesis.  
Individuals with depression have been found to be self-absorbed in their own 
symptoms and problems and suffer from social isolation as a result (Matthews et al., 2016; 
Taylor & Vaughan, 1967). After being in this state for a prolonged period of time, they may 
become less aware and more disinterested and disconnected from society and its 
expectations, occurances, and changes (Cruwys Alexander Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, et al., 
2014; Matthews et al., 2016; Söderlund et al., 2014; Taylor & Vaughan, 1967). This lower 
interest and ability in keeping up with updated information could cause differences in their 
existing semantic knowledge as compared to others and likely leads to differences in the CLS 
seen in this thesis.  
Individuals with depression symptoms have been shown to have difficulties and 
differences in their decision-making model (Bishop & Gagne, 2018; Paulus & Ju, 2012). The 
results of the current thesis indicated that there were no impairments in the decision-making 
process itself for both semantic and episodic components of memory of those with subclinical 
depression symptoms. However, the underlying semantic knowlege or information needed to 
make decisions regarding the CLS for these individuals were different, and this difference is 
what results in the differences in decisions of CLS events to select and generate. Furthermore, 
individuals with higher depression are likely to use minimal information and resources to 
make decisions (Leykin, Roberts, & DeRubeis, 2011), indicating that when asked about 
typical CLS events, they may have just selected any event that came to the forefront of their 
mind without evaluating the validity of their semantic knowledge. Individuals with higher 
depression have also been found to have difficulties making immediate decisions (Lawlor et 
al., 2019). Having the participants with subclinical depression in the current thesis make 
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immediate decisions about the events typically experienced by people in society may have 
caused them to be less accurate in the retrieval of their semantic knowledge.  
 
Autobiographical Memory Recall for Trauma  
Overall memory profile. Similar to the findings on depression, the current studies 
showed small differences in memory recall between individuals with subclinical PTSD 
symptoms and psychologically healthy individuals. Individuals with subclinical PTSD 
symptoms had differences in the episodic aspects of their memory (i.e., recalled ILS events 
that were more negative and had higher societal pressure to achieve their ILS events) and 
phenomenology of recalled memory (i.e., higher centrality towards negative important 
events) as compared to individuals who are psychologically healthy. However, there were no 
differences in the recall of the semantic aspects of their memory, in the type of memories 
they recalled, and in how they felt towards their memories. Changes in trauma severity 
predicted changes in the episodic components of memory (i.e., higher trauma severity 
predicted ILS that were more negative and had higher pressure), in line with the group 
differences, and in the types of memory they recall (i.e., higher trauma severity predicted 
more overgeneral styles of retrieval), despite the lack of observable group differences.  
 These findings indicate that in normal populations, some aspects of autobiographical 
memories recalled are still stable and do not change for individuals with subclinical 
symptoms of PTSD. Their culturally shared semantic knowledge did not change, they did not 
have any difficulties recalling the details of their autobiographical memories, and there were 
no unusual distancing effects towards their memories as compared to those who are 
psychologically healthy. The findings suggest that these aspects of semantic and episodic 
autobiographical memory recall do not changes upon crossing the subclinical PTSD threshold 
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and are not influenced much by, or much dependent on, the presence or severity of trauma 
symptoms. However, the results do suggest that individuals with a much higher trauma 
severity may develop difficulties in recalling details of their memories and have tendencies to 
recall negative narratives.  
 In terms of the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004), the 
results of this thesis suggest that the working self and parts of the long-term self are stable for 
those with subclinical PTSD symptoms. The semantic components, types of memories 
recalled, and their feelings towards the memories which are represented in these areas of the 
model did not differ between the groups (Conway & Jobson, 2012; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2007). However, the ILS is also 
represented within the conceptual self and at higher levels of the autobiographical knowledge 
base, and therefore, differences in the ILS may reflect some differences in these two parts of 
the memory model. 
Attentional biases. The individuals with subclinical PTSD symptoms in this thesis 
did not appear to attach negative biases to most of their recalled memories, despite past 
research showing that those with PTSD do demonstrate negative biases (El Khoury-Malhame 
et al., 2011; Vythilingam et al., 2007). They did not feel closer to negative memories, have 
greater ease in recalling details of negative memories, or retrieve more negative culturally 
shared semantic knowledge. Those with trauma have been noted to have stronger biases 
towards threatening stimuli, thoughts, and memories (Bryant & Harvey, 1997; Constans, 
McCloskey, Vasterling, & Brailey, 2004; Pineles et al., 2009). However, the stimuli 
presented and memories retrieved by the subclinical PTSD group in the current thesis may 
not have been sufficiently threatening to trigger those biases. Similarly, they also did not 
show aversions towards positive memories, as demonstrated by not feeling further from 
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positive memories, not having more difficulty in recalling details of positive memories, and 
not recalling fewer positive culturally shared semantic knowledge. 
Trauma symptoms contributed to the development of difficulties in recalling the 
specific details of their memories, independent of valence. However, there were no 
differences upon crossing the subclinical threshold, indicating that impairments in recalling 
specific memory details were only observed at higher trauma symptom severity. The 
literature has shown trauma severity was related to threat biases towards thoughts, cues, 
memories, and expectations from the past and future, as a form of global self-protection from 
feelings of anxiety (El Khoury-Malhame et al., 2011; Naim et al., 2015; Wald et al., 2011). 
The lack of difference in recall between positively cued and negatively cued memories 
indicates that negative biases may not underlie the relations, but it does not exclude the 
possible underlying role of threat biases. The past findings suggest that threat biases may 
exist more strongly at higher trauma severity and, hence, may be the underlying mechanism 
for the relation between severity of trauma and difficulties in recalling memory details found 
in the current results.  
Significant memories. Meanwhile, there were other aspects of the recalled memories 
that changed for those with subclinical symptoms of PTSD. Their most important and 
significant memories were more negative, more central to their identity, and had higher 
pressure to achieve, as compared to those who are psychologically healthy. People with lower 
levels of distress have been shown to associate positive personally significant events as more 
central to their identities and narratives, whereas people with higher levels of distress 
associate negative personally significant events as more central (Zaragoza Scherman et al., 
2015), matching the findings of the current thesis. Associating higher centrality to significant 
negative memories may be a function of the negative bias that has been observed in these 
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populations (El Khoury-Malhame et al., 2011; Vythilingam et al., 2007), suggesting that a 
small negative bias may be present among those with subclinical PTSD in the current thesis, 
but only for significant events.  
Besides significant memories, traumatic events have been shown to be more central 
towards the life narrative of people with higher trauma (Berntsen et al., 2011; da Silva et al., 
2016; Lloyd & Lishman, 1975). Replacing these existing central traumatic events with future 
events which are important, positive, and socially expected could be perceived as an effective 
coping strategy by the society to bring back perceptions of normality to those with trauma 
symptoms. This expectation from society, especially from the people with whom they have 
close relations and whose opinions are highly valued, can induce a large amount of pressure 
to meet those expectations and achieve the important expected events. 
Attribution style. The lack of difference in the types of events listed in the life 
narratives but not the emotional valence indicates that those with subclinical levels of PTSD 
attached negative emotions to typically positive events, and thus demonstrating a difference 
in their attribution of emotions. Individuals with PTSD have been shown to have more 
negative or depressive attribution tendencies (de Kliene et al., 2019; Gonzalo, Kleim, 
Donaldson, Moorey, & Ehlers, 2012) and tend to view their past experiences in a negative 
light (Beck et al., 1979; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014). 
This attribution bias may then cause them to override the original positive nature of the event 
and recall the event as being more negative.  
One possible reason for this difference in attribution styles is the emotional valence of 
central memories. Individuals with subclinical symptoms of PTSD symptoms viewed 
negative events that they have experienced as being more central to their narrative and 
identity. Events that are considered as central serve as reference points and affect how a 
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person perceives and makes attributions about themselves and the world around them 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Having positive events as references will more likely result in 
positive perceptions and attributions towards their past and current experiences, whereas 
having negative events as references will more likely result in negative perceptions and 
attributions towards those experiences. Therefore, those with subclinical levels of PTSD 
having more negative events that are central could increase the likelihood of negative 
attributions being extended to their other experiences and memories that may not be 
inherently negative to begin with. 
 
Comparisons of Depression and Trauma  
Memory differences. Due to their co-morbidity and overlap in symptoms, no 
statistical comparisons were conducted between the subclinical depression and PTSD groups 
throughout the thesis, but surface-level or descriptive comparisons can be made on the overall 
findings for the groups. Although depression and trauma are different psychopathologies, 
both subclinical depression and PTSD groups did not have differences in the type of 
memories they recalled and in how they felt towards their memories, and both depression and 
trauma severity were unrelated to semantic aspects of memory. However, there were also 
differences in memory recall across the groups. There were differences in the semantic 
aspects of memory for the subclinical depression group but not the subclinical PTSD group, 
whereas there were differences in the episodic aspects of memory for the subclinical PTSD 
group but not the subclinical depression group, when compared to the psychologically 
healthy groups. Higher depression severity predicted changes in feelings towards the 
memory, whereas higher trauma severity predicted the type of memories recalled and 
changes in the episodic aspects of memory. The differences in memory, and the relations with 
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memory components, did not overlap greatly for those with subclinical depression and PTSD 
symptoms, suggesting that there may be slight differences in the memory retrieval processes 
involved, which may relate back to differences in symptoms and aetiologies for the two 
psychopathologies (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Shared mechanisms and moderators. Although the components of autobiographical 
memory recall that differed from psychologically healthy individuals were not the same for 
those with subclinical depression and those with subclinical PTSD, the findings showed that 
some similar mechanisms were involved in the relations of depression and trauma with 
autobiographical memory. Only one mechanism was found to underlie the relations, for both 
depression and trauma, which was recollective experience. Those with higher depression and 
trauma symptoms were impacted greatly by the typical amount of reliving and reexperiencing 
of recent negative memories. This greater impact may relate back to the increased attention 
and sensitivity towards negative information that are observed in people with depression and 
trauma symptoms (Baert et al., 2010; Beck, 1995; Dalgleish et al., 2011; El Khoury-Malhame 
et al., 2011; Feng et al., 2015; Vythilingam et al., 2007). 
The CaR-FA-X model was not supported as a suitable explaination for memory 
specifity differences for both depression and trauma. Rumination, executive functioning, and 
memory phenomenology did not serve as underlying mechanisms for both depression and 
trauma, but instead, were found to influence the relations of both depression and 
autobiographical memory recall, and trauma and autobiographical memory recall, along with 
another mechanism, societal identification.  
The effects of rumination and inhibition may reflect the involvement of another 
cognitive component, attention. Problems with allocating attention to the needed areas or 
activities is a symptom that is typically seen in both depression and PTSD (American 
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Psychiatric Association, 2013). Rumination has been shown to be caused by more attention 
being captured by ruminative and negative thoughts, emotions, and memories that were 
unable to be inhibited for people with depression and PTSD symptoms (e.g., Buchholz et al., 
2016; Zetsche, D'Avanzato, & Joormann, 2011). Therefore, problems or differences in 
attention allocation may be the reason that rumination and inhibition results in more 
impairments in memory recall for those with depression and trauma symptoms.  
Emotion regulation similarly did not serve as the underlying mechanism for the 
relations between depression and trauma and memory recall differences. Functional 
avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and expressive suppression are all emotion regulation 
strategies (Carver et al., 1989; Endler, 1997; Gross & John, 2003; Sahler & Carr, 2009), and 
despite those with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms in the current thesis exhibiting 
differences in these strategies, it did not appear to have an affect on the relations with 
memory recall. Although depression and PTSD are psychopathologies that are characterized 
with experiencing negative mood as a symptom (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 
the findings from this thesis suggest that the differences or difficulties in memory recall are 
not due attempts or inabilities of these individuals to manage this negative mood. The current 
findings of overlapping mechanisms suggest that there are some similar mechanisms that are 
involved in the way those with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms recall memory, 
despite MDD and PTSD being two distinct psychopathologies.  
 
Memory Differences Compared to Clinical Samples 
Memory in depressed populations. The current thesis did not show any differences 
in the life narrative and types of memory retrieved by the subclinical depression and 
psychologically healthy groups, but clinical samples were shown to have differences in their 
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life narratives (Dalgleish et al., 2011; Fromholt et al., 2003; Habermas et al., 2008; Jobson et 
al., 2018) and the types of memory recalled (Dritschel et al., 2011; Hitchcock et al., 2019; Liu 
et al., 2016; Park et al., 2002; Ridout et al., 2016). The phenomenology of memories recalled 
in the current thesis also did not mimic those seen in clinical samples (Bergouignan et al., 
2008; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Rottenberg et al., 2005; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). 
Furthermore, clinically depressed studies have shown effects of cue valence (Champagne et 
al., 2016; Park et al., 2002; Ricarte et al., 2011) and depression severity (Kleim & Ehlers, 
2008) on the types of memory recalled, which was not observed in the current results. There 
have not been studies that have examined the recall of culturally shared semantic knowledge 
and feelings towards memories using clinical samples, and hence, comparisons with the 
current findings are not able to be made.  
Memory in PTSD populations. Similarly, the current thesis did not show any 
differences in the types and phenomenology of memory recalled by the subclinical PTSD and 
psychologically healthy groups, but clinical samples had differences in the types of memory 
(Nixon et al., 2013; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006, 2017; Schönfeld et al., 2007) and the 
phenomenology of memory recalled (Rubin et al., 2004, 2011). Valence of cues did not affect 
the types of memory recalled, unlike observed in clinical samples (Ono et al., 2016; 
Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006).  
However, there was one similarity in memory recall between the current thesis and 
clinical samples. Trauma severity was shown to predict the higher retrieval of more 
overgeneral types of memory, which was similar to clinical samples (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). 
Previous studies have not yet examined the recall of life narratives (using the same 
characteristics as the current thesis), culturally shared semantic knowledge, and feelings 
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towards memories using clinical samples, which means comparisons with the current findings 
cannot be made at the present. 
Depression and PTSD symptoms. There were hardly any similarities in memory 
recall between the subclinical depression and PTSD groups in the present thesis and clinical 
samples from the literature. One possible explanation for memory differences being observed 
in clinical samples but not the current subclinical groups is the severity of the symptoms. The 
results of the current thesis showed that depression and trauma contributed to some 
differences in memory recall, but the lack of group differences suggested that those memory 
differences may only be observed at a state of higher symptoms severity. Clinical groups in 
past research tend to experience higher symptom severity and more prolonged distress from 
those symptoms, as compared to the subclinical depression and PTSD groups in the current 
thesis. Thus, the severity of symptoms experienced by the subclinical groups may not have 
been sufficiently high or prolonged to replicate the same autobiographical memory recall as 
those observed in clinical populations.  
Besides the severity, the way depression and trauma are measured could also be a 
possible explaination for the difference in results. The studies that used clinical samples 
measured or identified clinical-level symptoms using clinician-administered assessments or 
self-report questionnaires with clinical norms, or they used samples that had already been 
previously diagnosed in psychiatry settings. The studies in this thesis, meanwhile, did not use 
the same self-report questionnaires as the studies with clinical samples, as measurements that 
were more suitable for normal samples were used instead. These differences in measurement 
tools used could cause variations in the measurements of symptom severity and allocation of 
people into groups, which may result in the different relations between depression and trauma 
and memory recall in the current thesis as compared to the clinical samples. 
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Variability of memory across the spectrum. Although some differences in memory 
recall were observed in the current thesis, these differences were not the same as the ones 
typically seen with clinical samples, which may relate to symptoms of depression and trauma 
existing on a spectrum. In addition to increases in memory difficulties, either at different 
stages of the spectrum or as symptoms increase progressively, there is also a possibility that 
components of memory recall change non-linearly as symptoms become more severe.  
Individuals with a subclinical range of symptoms may, for example, experience 
autobiographical memories differently than psychologically healthy individuals (e.g., 
experience negative memories with more emotional intensity), but once reaching the clinical 
range, they may no longer have differences in the same areas and develop differences in other 
areas of memory recall (e.g., individuals with clinical depression do not differ from 
psychologically healthy individuals in emotional intensity but in recollective experience of 
negative memories). This non-linear variability across the spectrum may explain why there is 
hardly any overlap in the type of memory differences when comparing psychologically 
healthy samples with subclinical samples and when comparing psychologically healthy 
samples with clinical samples.  
This non-linear variability also highlights the need to incorporate both categorical and 
continuum approaches when conceptualizing memory recall for depression and trauma 
symptoms. Memory recall of psychologically healthy, subclinical, and clinical groups (i.e., 
categorical) need to be viewed in the context of their place along the spectrum (i.e., 
continuum), to fully be able to see the evolution and change in memory recall across the 
different groups and different severity of symptoms. 
Cultural and language influences. Besides symptom-specific explainations, there 
may also be more general reasons for the results of the current thesis not replicating those 
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from the literature. The effect of culture may be a factor to consider in explaining the 
differences in results. Most of the differences in memory seen the literature were stable 
across cultures, but there were still small variations in naturalistic memory retrieval and 
narration styles between Western and Asian samples (e.g., Dritschel et al., 2011; Wang, 
2009). Cultural differences in emotional processing, viewpoints of the self and the world, and 
social behaviours also have the ability to affect the recall of memory (Ross & Wang, 2010). 
A large amount of the past studies with clinical samples used Western samples, as compared 
to the current thesis that used samples consisting of a variety of nationalties and cultural 
backgrounds. This difference in cultures between the samples could be a reason that the 
findings from the past clinical samples were not replicated in the current thesis. 
Besides culture, language is another factor that could explain the differences. The 
language that memories are recalled and narrated in, and whether it matches the language the 
memories were encoded in could either enhance or impair memory recall and feelings 
towards those memories (Van Boven & Caruso, 2015). In addition to the congruence of 
language, proficiency and comfort in using the language, especially for languages that are not 
the first language can also affect the ease or difficulty in retrieving and narrating memories 
(Marian & Neisser, 2000; Matsumoto & Stanny, 2006). Contradictory to some clinical 
samples that asked participants to recall and narrate their memories in their first language, the 
studies in the current thesis required participants to recall and narrate their memories in 
English, regardless of whether English was their first language or not. Despite the 
participants having sufficient profiency to complete the memory tasks, those who did not 
have English as their first language may have had difficulties in recalling or narrating certain 
memories, which could have caused the results obtained to differ from those seen in past 
clinical samples. 
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Statistical analyses. Another possible explanation for the lack of replication of the 
results from clinical samples are family-wise errors. Past studies using clinical studies did not 
appear to perform any correction for family-wise errors despite conducting many statistical 
analyses. The current thesis, on the other hand, corrected for family-wise errors using 
Bonferroni correction for all studies. Applying this correction changed a number of 
significant findings that would have matched the results from previous clinical studies into 
insignificant results, encompassed as a lack of memory differences between subclinical and 
psychologically healthy groups. Therefore, it is possible that after correcting for family-wise 
errors in those past studies, there may not be as robust of a memory difference with clinical 
samples.  
 
Methodological and Theoratical Considerations 
 Effect size. Although there were some significant group differences and relations with 
memory recall in this thesis, the effect sizes were small. Hence, there is a high likelihood that 
the results obtained from the studies here will not be replicable. The small effect sizes also 
suggest that memory differences within subclinical populations may not be a robust 
phenomenon and investigating memory differences in subclinical samples will not have the 
same level of implications as studying it in clinical samples. 
Validity of tools and cut-offs. One important methodological issue to take into 
account is the validity of measurement tools and cut-off scores used in the current thesis. To 
measure depression and trauma levels, the studies in this thesis used self-report 
questionnaires which either had norms and cut-offs for normal samples (i.e., CES-D), only 
clinical norms and cut-offs (i.e., PCL-5), or multiple cut-offs which were unclear to be used 
for clinical or normal samples (i.e., DASS-21). Using measurement tools and cut-off scores 
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that are not validated for normal or subclinical samples to measure symptom severity and 
allocate people into subclinical groups could cause inaccurate measurements and group 
allocations, and variability in expected results and relations. Besides a lack of validity of the 
measurements for normal samples, the absence of validity and norms of the measurement for 
cultures from which the samples are recruited could similarly have resulted in inaccurate 
measurements. 
Although many studies investigate similar variables and relations, more often each 
study uses different measurements and tasks. For example, there are many self-report 
questionnaires that measure depression and trauma symptoms and various experimental task 
that measure specific executive functioning components to choose from. Each task uses 
different types of stimuli, different number of questions, has different completion times, and 
may induce different mental states during participation. Hence, these variabilities in the 
measures could influence the final outcomes and increases difficulties in comparing the 
results between current and past studies. Standardizing the methods of diagnosing individuals 
as clinical and subclinical populations and the tools used to measure cognitive functioning 
could improve the comparibility and reliability of findings in this area. 
Complexity of autobiographical memories. A theoratical issue that warrants 
discussion is the complexities of autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memories are 
multidimensional recollections and consists of various components that are interrelated and 
integrated to form the recollection (Rubin, 2005). Although autobiographical memories can 
be broken down into individual components, recollection typically involves many 
components at once (e.g., describing a life story event with specific details of the event and 
how it relates to the current self, incorporates semantic and episodic components, specific 
types of memories, and feelings of distance). In the current thesis, specific components or 
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aspects of these memories were studied seperately, but it may not reflect the actual 
recollection process which involves many components at a time. 
Heterogeneity of symptoms. Similar to autobiographical memories, depression and 
PTSD are also complex structures. Depression and PTSD are psychopathologies that exist on 
a spectrum, which means that individuals can experience a different number and combination 
of symptoms at different severities with different levels of impairments. It is possible that at 
subclinical levels where not all symptoms are experienced and not at severe levels yet, only a 
certain profile or combination of symptoms may trigger differences in memories or cognitive 
processing (e.g., Krings et al., 2020). This variability in the depression and trauma symptoms 
could further cause variability in relations with memory recall, increasing the difficulty in 
obtaining consistent results of the memory differences. 
Besides the variability of symptoms, the state and trait properties of the depression 
and trauma symptoms are another area to take into consideration. Trait properties are constant 
and stable symptoms or markers that are present regardless of situation or levels of distress 
experienced, whereas state properties reflect symptoms or markers tied to the current mood 
and state of mind of the person (American Psychological Association, 2013; Lu et al., 2012). 
In the current thesis, depression and trauma were conceptualized as being trait symptoms, but 
the presence of state symptoms and the mood of the participants were not assessed. When the 
current mood or emotional state matches the mood or state of the memory, memories are 
more accessible and easier to recall, and vice versa (American Psychological Association, 
2013). Therefore, distinguishing between trait and state symptoms may be necessary to obtain 
more accurate results of the consistency and pervasiveness of differences in memory recall 
observed. 
 




Theorocatical. The results obtained from this thesis highlight the importance of 
studying autobiographical memories in a holistic manner, to better capture the nuances in 
memory recall across the different facets and dimensions. The results from this thesis also 
suggest that theoratical models such as the CaR-FA-X model may not be suitable in 
explaining memory specificity differences for subclinical populations. However, more 
research using experimental and longitudinal designs are needed before this conclusion can 
be made with more certainty and alternative models can be suggested.  
The findings from this thesis also improves our understanding into autobiographical 
memory recall in subclinical depression and PTSD populations. The results show that 
individuals with subclinical levels of depression do not necessarily have impairments or 
difficulties in recalling episodic aspects and details of autobiographical memories. As 
autobiographical memory functions to assists in problem solving, creating self-concepts, 
enhancing socialization, and improve emotion regulation (Bluck et al., 2005; Fivush, 2011; 
Pasupathi, 2003), being able to recall memories without many difficulties indicates that those 
with subclinical depression should be fully able to use memories for those aforementioned 
functions. Individuals with subclinical PTSD, on the other hand, appear to have some 
difficulties in recalling the episodic elements of memory, and therefore, may experience 
difficulties tapping into the memory functions mentioned above. 
The findings from this thesis indicate that there is some value in studying 
autobiographical memory in subclinical populations. By doing so, the changes in memory 
across the spectrum of symptoms can be established more clearly, along with factors and 
mechanisms that may exacerbate and limit those changes. However, the results obtained from 
subclinical samples are likely to be less consistent and robust as compared to clinical 
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samples, and hence, may produce findings that are less informative and have less 
implications. 
Diagnostics. The differences in memory recall observed in the subclinical depression 
and PTSD populations in this thesis, although small, could be used for early screening of the 
associated psychopathologies. For example, experiencing difficulties in recalling the 
semantic aspects of memory could be indicative of a risk of developing MDD, whereas 
difficulties in recalling the episodic aspects of memory could imply a risk of developing 
PTSD. By using the memory differences to identify those at risk, they can seek early 
intervention to prevent the subclinical symptoms they have from escalating to become 
psychological disorders (e.g., Leaman et al., 2013; Muñoz et al., 2012). 
Interventions. Although the subclinical populations in this thesis constitute of those 
individuals from normal samples with above average symptoms who are at risk for 
developing disorders, it is also possible that those with remitted depression or PTSD have 
residual symptoms that are presented at subclinical levels (Ji, 2012). Therefore, findings and 
insights regarding interventions from this thesis may not only reduce the likelihood of 
subclinical symptoms escalating to clinical levels and developing into psychological 
disorders, but they could possibly also prevent relapse in symptoms and disorders for those in 
the remitted category.  
These results of this thesis indicate that those with subclinical symptoms will not have 
difficulties engaging in psychotherapy interventions that employ techniques involving 
recalling the specific details of everyday activities or important past memories (e.g., cognitive 
behavioural therapy, narrative therapy, psychodynamic therapy) to increase understanding 
into presenting concerns and distress and to find evidence to contradict inaccurate negative 
beliefs and thoughts (Beck, 1995; Corey, 2013). Therefore, these types of interventions have 
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a likelihood of being effective when used in subclinical populations to manage their 
symptoms and prevent relapses for remitted populations. 
However, those with subclinical depression do recall recent negative memories with 
stronger emotions, which may cause them to experience more distress when asked to retrieve 
those memories. Hence, improving emotion regulation strategies, as well as focusing on 
reducing the emotional intensity towards those events during psychotherapy may help 
alleviate the distress they experience. Depression symptoms contributed to feeling 
psychologically closer to negative memories, which similarly has the potential to lead to 
experiencing more distress during recall, indicating that it is also important to work on 
managing depression symptoms to be able to change the retrieval styles of negative events. 
The current thesis also shows that individuals with subclinical PTSD have differences 
in their recall of life narratives, which tends to be more negative and have higher levels of 
centrality. Reframing negative experiences, changing attributions associated with memory to 
become more realistic, and reducing centrality of traumatizing and other negative memories 
can be done in psychotherapy of those with subclinical PTSD symptoms, to modify the 
cognitive processes to become more adaptive, reduce the negative emotions attached to their 
life narratives, and create a life narrative that is more functional (Beck, 1995; Corey, 2013).  
Trauma symptoms contributed to difficulties retrieving specific memories and details 
of memories, which may suggest that individuals with higher levels of trauma may not be 
able to fully use the benefits that autobiographical memory recall has, and could further 
deteriorate their already poor daily functioning levels (Bluck et al., 2005; Fivush, 2011; 
Pasupathi, 2003). Therefore, to maintain access to those memory benefits and improve 
overall functionality, it is crucial for them to work on managing trauma symptoms through 
psychotherapy. In addition, those with higher trauma symptoms have vulnerabilities toward 
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developing overgeneral styles of memory retrieval, and hence may benefit from cognitive 
training such as Memory Specificity Training (Raes et al., 2009) to practice recalling the 
details of memories, which will reduce difficulties in retrieving specific memories.  
The mechanisms tested in the current thesis help shed light into ways to change the 
relations of depression and trauma with memory recall. Practicing recalling negative 
memories that occurred recently with less details, and that occurred remotely from an 
observer perspective, could be implemented as a form of cognitive training for those with 
subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms. This cognitive training could increase the 
distance felt towards negative memories and in turn, reduce any distress experienced from the 
difficulties in distancing away from these memories. 
Using mindfulness and cognitive behavioural techniques to challenge rumination 
tendencies (e.g., Deyo, Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009; Querstret & Cropley, 2013) could 
help to improve the recall of memory details that people with depression and trauma 
previously had difficulties recalling. Similarly, tasks or mental exercises that improve 
executive functioning related to inhibition (e.g., Maraver et al., 2016) can also be 
implemented to increase the amount of cognitive resources available to recall more details of 
memories. For those with depression and trauma who are too attuned to meeting societal 
norms and expectations, reducing the values and importance attached to these expectations 
can help reduce feelings of pressure (e.g., Cruwys, Alexander Haslam, Dingle, Jetten, et al., 
2014; Muldoon et al., 2019). Meanwhile, for those with depression who are less attuned to 
what the societal norms are, improving their connection to society will not only increase 
social support but will also increase awareness of what are considered societal norms, and 
hence, update their semantic knowledge of society.  
 




As discussed in previous sections, current mood states, along with their congruence 
with depressive and trauma symptoms, were not measured, which may have confounded the 
recalled memories and interacted with the cues of varying valences and intensities. Cultural 
and language backgrounds, which could have confounded the recall of memories, were also 
not measured and controlled in the current thesis. 
Another limitation was that clinical groups were not recruited in addition to the 
subclinical and psychologically healthy groups. Hence, no direct comparison between clinical 
and subclinical groups using the same tasks and measurements could be conducted. Instead, 
comparison of the current results was made with studies from the literature that used clinical 
samples, but differences in conditions and measures used may have affected the accuracy of 
the comparisons.  
Besides not using a clinical sample, participants were also not screened as to whether 
they have been formally diagnosed with depression or PTSD in the past, or whether they 
were in a remitted state. Individuals with remitted depression or PTSD may still experience 
residual symptoms at subclinical levels, similar to never-diagnosed individuals with 
subclincal symptoms (Paykel, 2008). However, those at a remitted stage have typically 
undergone interventions, such as psychotherapy or medication, which could confound the 
recall of memories, automatic thoughts, and emotion regulation abilities. Furthermore, 
participants were not screened for pre-existing psychological disorders, and hence, the effect 
of comorbidity of other psychological disorders on the symptoms of depression and trauma 
was not taken into account.  
The studies in the current thesis used correlational designs, and hence, causation 
between the variables could not be determined. Although we suggested possible directions 
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between depression, trauma, and memory recall in this study, this directionality was inferred 
from the literature. Previous studies indicated bidirectional relations exist between the 
variables, and we selected one of the two possible directions to test the mediation and 
moderation models. Future research could use either experimental manipulation or 
longitudinal designs to obtain more accurate directions of these variables, to then be able to 
test these mediation and moderations models.  
 
Future Directions 
The current research projects have looked into the differences and underlying 
mechanisms of recalling episodic and semantic aspects of memory, types of memory recalled, 
and feelings towards those memories for people with subclinical symptoms of depression and 
PTSD. Future studies could investigate these components using three groups: clinical group, 
subclinical group, and psychologically healthy group. By studying all three groups together, 
more accurate comparisons can be made, as all groups will be administered the same 
measures and tasks under similar conditions. This will enable the variation of memory recall 
across the depression and trauma spectrum to be better established. As there is no clinical 
literature for the recall of culturally shared semantic knowledge and subjective feelings 
towards memories, these two components could also be studied using only clinical samples, 
to better understand memory differences in clinical samples. 
It would be interesting if future studies would examine whether there would be 
differences in the functions of recalling autobiographical memories between those with 
subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms and those who are psychologically healthy. 
Autobiographical memories have been shown to have functions in the areas of problem 
solving, self-concept development, socialization, and emotion regulation (Bluck et al., 2005; 
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Fivush, 2011; Pasupathi, 2003), and utalizing certain functions over others could have an 
effect on memory recall. Whether they are differences in the purpose of recalling memories, 
or the existence of other functions that have not been taken into account in these populations, 
are not known. Identifying similarities and differences in these functions may explain the 
memory recall observed in the current thesis.  
Besides functions of autobiographical memory, it may be valuable for future studies 
to examine the stability of the memory recall observed in this thesis across mood. 
Congruence between current mood and mood of the memory have been identified as a factor 
that affects the type of memory recalled and its characteristics (e.g., Rutherford, 2009; 
Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). Whether mood congruence in individuals with subclinical 
depression (i.e., sad) and PTSD (i.e., anxious) symptoms will affect autobiographical 
memory recall and whether mood induction procedures in these samples will affect the 
stability of memory recall has not been investigated. Establishing the role of mood could 
provide further insight into the memory recall tendencies and the selective attentional biases 
observed in the current thesis. In a similar manner, the affect of culture and language on 




The results of this thesis indicate that in normal populations, individuals with 
subclinical depression symptoms differed in culturally shared semantic knowledge and the 
emotional intensity of recent negative memories, whereas other aspects of autobiographical 
memory did not differ from individuals who are psychologically healthy. Individuals with 
subclinical PTSD symptoms from normal populations, on the other hand, differed in their life 
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narrative, whereas other aspects of autobiographical memory did not differ from individuals 
who are psychologically healthy. In addition, depression severity predicted the psychological 
distance towards recent negative memories, whereas trauma severity predicted overgeneral 
memory retrieval and the valence and pressure associated with life narratives.  
In terms of underlying mechanisms, recollective experience was found to underlie the 
association of depression and trauma with psychological distance but only for recent negative 
memories. Vantage perspective, emotional intensity, centrality, emotion regulation, 
rumination, functional avoidance, and executive function did not serve as underlying 
mechanisms for the associations of depression and trauma with psychological distance and 
memory specificity. However, rumination and executive functions (i.e., inhibition) 
strengthened associations between depression and trauma and the retrieval of semantic 
associations. Societal identification was also shown to strengthen associations between 
depression and CLS typicality, and between depression and trauma and the pressure of 
achieving ILS events. Emotional intensity, meanwhile, strengthened associations between 
depression and feeling further from remote positive memories, whereas field perspective 
strengthened associations between depression and trauma and feeling closer to remote 
negative memories. 
Those with subclinical symptoms of depression were observed to have different 
deficits in memory recall from those with subclinical symptoms of PTSD, but both groups 
had similar underlying mechanisms for their associations with autobiographical memory 
recall. When comparing the current findings with past clinical studies, individuals with 
subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms were found to have different deficits in memory 
recall as compared to clinical samples with MDD and PTSD. 
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Hence, there is a need for psychotherapeutic interventions to focus on modifying 
negative cognitive processes and attribution of emotions to become more adaptive, which in 
turn should improve memory recall. Reducing details of negative memories, reducing 
rumination, improving executive functioning, managing vantage perspective of negative 
memories, and managing societal expectations could also improve memory recall. Improving 
the memory recall of those with subclinical depression and PTSD symptoms will in turn 
improve their overall functioning.
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Table 2.1. Cultural Life Script events (including number and percentage of mentions), and mean and standard deviation of expected age at occurrence, 
prevalence, importance, emotional valence, and societal pressure associated with the events. Asterisk (*) denotes categories that were not considered part of 
the Malaysian Cultural Life Script according to Janssen and Haque (2018), whereas dashed line denotes the 4% threshold of Berntsen and Rubin (2004).  
Category Number Percentage 
Age Prevalence Importance Valence Pressure 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Marriage 92 76.67 27.74 3.32 72.60 14.77 5.57 1.18 1.95 0.95 5.41 1.43 
Begin childcare / kindergarten 63 52.50 4.29 2.07 87.00 13.94 5.73 1.26 1.67 1.24 4.40 1.62 
Begin primary school 50 41.67 7.10 0.68 89.60 12.01 5.88 1.10 1.50 1.25 4.70 1.89 
Begin university 50 41.67 17.74 2.85 64.68 19.58 5.90 0.99 1.44 1.25 5.36 1.19 
Having children 45 37.50 29.89 2.94 65.42 16.15 5.44 1.20 1.93 1.03 5.20 1.55 
Death (Own) 44 36.67 78.23 10.34 99.20 5.28 5.66 1.68 -0.91 1.58 1.80 1.23 
First full-time job 43 35.83 23.51 1.37 82.05 15.44 5.98 1.08 0.72 1.32 6.14 0.89 
University graduation 42 35.00 22.93 1.07 59.40 16.42 6.07 0.95 1.93 1.42 5.79 1.02 
Birth (Own)* 35 29.17 2.83 15.18 99.71 1.69 6.29 1.07 1.80 1.47 3.17 2.28 
Retirement 28 23.33 62.18 7.56 79.89 17.79 4.93 1.68 1.36 1.16 3.32 1.91 
Beginning high school 27 22.50 13.22 2.14 84.04 13.59 5.89 0.89 1.04 1.22 5.19 1.47 
Fall in love / first kiss 27 22.50 16.59 4.24 87.78 12.85 5.11 1.45 1.30 1.17 4.04 1.48 
Adolescents / puberty 25 20.83 12.88 4.54 80.40 22.20 5.92 1.08 0.56 1.71 3.56 1.96 
Settle on career 24 20.00 27.08 5.82 66.88 21.27 6.21 0.88 1.33 1.58 6.08 1.02 
Peer group / friendships 20 16.67 10.65 7.52 83.70 22.86 6.20 0.89 1.50 1.79 3.30 2.05 
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Adulthood* 19 15.83 22.47 4.64 84.68 14.21 6.42 0.77 1.63 1.34 5.63 1.61 
Death of parents 16 13.33 49.50 12.61 89.38 9.66 6.50 0.82 -2.25 1.18 2.50 2.07 
Learning to walk / first steps 15 12.50 1.67 1.05 94.80 5.29 6.60 1.30 2.60 0.91 3.60 2.41 
High school graduation 14 11.67 17.57 1.60 70.29 16.49 5.64 0.93 1.07 1.33 5.29 0.99 
Making a long journey 14 11.67 25.07 13.18 69.79 20.34 5.07 1.07 1.71 1.44 3.57 1.95 
First rejection / heartbreak 13 10.83 18.46 6.33 77.00 17.55 5.46 1.05 -1.54 1.05 3.00 1.83 
Learning to talk / first words 13 10.83 2.00 1.00 94.38 7.61 6.62 0.65 2.85 0.38 4.00 2.04 
Meeting future partner 13 10.83 23.69 4.71 72.85 21.31 4.85 1.46 1.38 1.45 4.69 1.44 
Buying house or other property 11 9.17 31.82 7.69 58.00 16.98 5.09 1.38 1.45 1.21 6.00 0.89 
Major achievement 11 9.17 25.27 8.17 62.18 24.67 6.00 1.18 1.73 1.27 5.36 1.43 
First birthday 10 8.33 0.80 0.42 88.70 14.74 5.30 1.16 2.50 0.97 2.20 1.40 
Twenty-first birthday* 6 5.00 21.00 0.00 82.00 21.54 5.33 1.21 1.83 0.75 2.50 1.05 
Children leave house / empty nest 5 4.17 38.40 15.73 72.00 15.25 5.40 1.52 -0.20 1.30 4.00 1.00 
End primary school 5 4.17 12.20 0.45 84.20 19.66 5.40 1.14 1.40 1.52 4.40 1.52 
Important promotion at work 5 4.17 28.80 5.45 63.00 23.83 5.60 1.34 2.40 0.55 5.20 1.30 
Serious illness 5 4.17 39.20 33.70 78.60 25.37 5.40 1.34 -2.60 0.55 1.60 0.55 
Death of grandparents* 4 3.33 20.75 6.60 90.00 20.00 5.50 1.73 -1.75 1.26 2.00 1.41 
First part-time job* 4 3.33 16.75 0.96 72.00 19.13 4.50 1.29 1.00 0.82 3.25 1.71 
Obtaining driver’s license 4 3.33 18.50 1.29 74.00 12.94 5.75 1.26 1.00 1.15 4.75 1.71 
Accident 3 2.50 15.00 13.75 68.67 28.02 5.67 1.53 -2.67 0.58 3.33 2.52 
First play friend 3 2.50 4.33 0.58 79.67 33.50 5.00 1.73 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.73 
Having grandchildren 3 2.50 53.33 6.11 61.67 28.43 5.67 0.58 2.67 0.58 3.33 1.15 
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Problems at home* 3 2.50 24.33 7.37 95.33 8.08 6.00 1.00 1.00 2.65 4.67 1.15 
Moving to another house* 2 1.67 17.00 11.31 50.00 14.14 4.50 0.71 -1.00 1.41 1.50 0.71 
First sexual experience 1 0.83 18.00 0.00 95.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 7.00 0.00 
Learning to cycle or swim* 1 0.83 10.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Leave home 1 0.83 20.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 7.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 
Problems at work* 1 0.83 27.00 0.00 89.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 
Other* 20 16.67 15.60 8.91 77.80 24.52 6.35 1.09 0.80 1.58 3.90 1.80 
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Table 2.2. Perceived Individual Life Story events (including number and percentage of mentions), and mean and standard deviation of (expected) age at 
occurrence, prevalence, importance, valence, and societal pressure associated with the events. Asterisk (*) denotes categories that were not considered part of 
the Malaysian Cultural Life Script according to Janssen and Haque (2018), whereas dashed line denotes the 4% threshold of Berntsen and Rubin (2004).  
Category Number Percentage 
Age Prevalence Importance Valence Pressure 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Begin university 84 70.00 18.80 2.13 57.48 21.62 6.15 1.02 1.32 1.55 4.92 1.78 
Major achievement 59 49.17 23.14 9.56 39.32 20.27 6.20 0.98 2.20 1.03 4.07 1.96 
Making a long journey 43 35.83 23.84 10.36 49.53 22.56 5.74 1.11 1.88 1.31 2.81 1.91 
Peer groups / friendships 41 34.17 16.07 4.19 65.51 29.77 5.49 1.53 0.39 2.20 3.02 1.75 
University graduation 38 31.67 22.42 1.24 60.08 18.06 6.47 0.86 1.95 1.23 5.32 1.16 
Marriage 37 30.83 27.84 2.77 73.89 15.38 5.81 1.22 2.08 1.14 5.03 1.38 
Beginning high school 36 30.00 13.92 1.75 65.11 28.24 6.06 0.86 0.83 2.06 4.75 1.84 
Begin primary school 34 28.33 7.62 1.39 74.94 23.03 5.35 1.20 0.65 1.65 3.21 1.93 
First full-time job 34 28.33 23.62 2.00 79.68 20.35 6.50 0.75 1.41 1.37 5.68 1.17 
Settle on career 28 23.33 25.07 3.31 64.39 26.06 6.68 0.55 1.86 1.30 5.36 1.85 
Adulthood* 26 21.67 24.50 6.54 63.92 27.57 5.77 1.27 0.42 1.70 3.73 2.13 
Fall in love / first kiss 25 20.83 18.16 4.46 85.84 12.34 5.80 1.15 1.12 1.62 3.64 2.00 
First rejection / heartbreak 22 18.33 17.45 2.42 77.32 24.39 5.18 1.68 -1.45 1.37 2.73 1.83 
Problems at home* 22 18.33 14.05 6.40 59.68 29.77 6.09 1.19 -1.68 1.62 4.18 2.36 
Having children 21 17.50 30.90 4.32 67.52 14.84 5.86 1.20 2.38 0.74 4.62 1.43 
Begin childcare / kindergarten 16 13.33 4.25 0.93 75.50 23.51 5.06 1.53 1.31 1.54 2.69 1.96 
Birth (Own)* 16 13.33 3.13 8.92 95.31 12.66 6.13 1.67 1.75 1.73 2.75 2.35 
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Accident 15 12.50 10.87 6.76 35.00 24.27 5.27 1.67 -1.40 1.64 1.67 1.11 
Death of parents 15 12.50 36.93 19.64 81.20 21.24 6.53 0.92 -2.53 0.92 2.80 2.40 
High school graduation 15 12.50 17.53 0.83 67.40 22.79 6.00 1.56 1.67 1.59 5.47 1.36 
Leave home 15 12.50 18.87 5.94 63.47 30.67 5.53 1.13 0.87 1.19 2.93 2.05 
Death (Own) 14 11.67 55.36 34.72 77.36 34.98 4.93 2.20 -0.71 1.20 2.29 1.94 
Adolescents / puberty 12 10.00 12.83 5.32 61.75 29.35 5.50 1.00 0.67 1.72 3.67 1.83 
First part-time job* 12 10.00 18.25 1.36 57.17 22.16 5.83 1.34 0.25 1.71 3.75 1.54 
Death of grandparents* 11 9.17 15.36 4.23 91.91 9.89 6.00 0.89 -2.18 0.87 2.91 1.92 
Meeting future partner 11 9.17 24.45 3.59 71.09 19.64 6.27 1.01 1.91 1.30 4.00 1.61 
Retirement 10 8.33 59.50 5.99 81.90 19.65 5.40 1.51 1.70 1.06 2.50 2.07 
Serious illness 9 7.50 15.00 3.61 39.56 22.87 6.11 1.05 -1.78 1.48 3.00 1.94 
First sexual experience 8 6.67 18.75 2.12 75.25 22.37 5.38 1.69 -0.25 1.98 2.88 2.10 
Divorce parents* 6 5.00 13.67 3.61 20.83 12.01 6.17 0.75 -1.67 1.03 3.83 2.48 
Moving to another house* 6 5.00 17.50 8.98 47.00 17.15 5.83 0.98 0.33 2.34 3.33 2.42 
Birth of younger sibling* 4 3.33 12.00 9.31 72.50 20.24 6.50 1.00 2.50 0.58 3.25 2.06 
Buying house or other property 3 2.50 29.00 4.00 75.33 12.86 6.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 4.33 1.53 
Death of sibling or friend 3 2.50 32.67 23.86 57.00 37.24 5.67 2.31 -3.00 0.00 2.67 2.89 
Eighteen birthday* 3 2.50 18.33 0.58 89.00 10.15 6.00 1.00 2.67 0.58 1.00 0.00 
First play friend 3 2.50 5.67 1.15 65.00 22.91 6.33 1.15 2.33 1.15 2.00 1.73 
Twenty-first birthday* 3 2.50 21.00 0.00 83.33 28.87 3.00 1.73 1.33 1.53 2.33 1.53 
Children leave house / empty nest 2 1.67 10.50 9.19 20.00 14.14 4.50 0.71 1.00 1.41 1.00 0.00 
End primary school 2 1.67 12.00 0.00 85.00 7.07 6.50 0.71 0.00 2.83 6.50 0.71 
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First birthday 2 1.67 6.50 7.78 79.00 2.83 5.50 0.71 2.00 1.41 2.50 2.12 
Important promotion at work 2 1.67 28.50 9.19 61.00 14.14 6.00 1.41 1.50 2.12 5.00 2.83 
Learning to talk / first words 2 1.67 1.50 0.71 87.50 17.68 7.00 0.00 2.50 0.71 1.00 0.00 
Obtaining driver’s license 2 1.67 18.50 2.12 89.00 1.41 5.50 2.12 -1.00 2.83 4.50 0.71 
Learning to cycle or swim* 1 0.83 21.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Problems at work* 1 0.83 19.00 0.00 15.00 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 
Other* 66 55.00 16.94 6.52 50.97 28.91 5.89 1.25 1.24 1.83 2.88 2.03 
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Table 2.3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between characteristics of cultural life script (CLS) and individual life story (ILS). 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CLS typicality 201.28 60.6 - -.07  .19*  .14 -.34***  .37***  .01  .25**  .13  .03 
2. CLS importance 5.77 0.64  -  .34***  .12  .34***  .02  .49***  .15  .20*  .19* 
3. CLS valence 1.24 0.89   -  .08  .03  .09  .21*  .37***  .09 -.14 
4. CLS pressure 4.46 1.04    - -.13  .03  .14  .15  .32*** -.07 
5. CLS ability 6.18 0.76     - .17  .18  .04 -.01  .22* 
6. ILS typicality 137.88 68.5      -  .14  .42***  .24** -.18* 
7. ILS importance 5.91 0.69       -  .29*** .26**  .17 
8. ILS valence 0.95 1.03        -  .04 -.16 
9. ILS pressure 3.84 1.18         -  .09 
10. ILS ability 6.53 0.53          - 
            *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001
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Table 2.4. Means (and standard deviations) of subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, for measures of cultural life script (CLS) and perceived 
individual life story (ILS). 
Variable Subclinical Dep Non-Dep Subclinical PTSD Non-PTSD  
CLS typicality 184.64 (59.2) 214.90 (58.8) 185.53 (52.3) 209.77 (63.4)  
CLS importance 5.71 (0.68) 5.81 (0.61) 5.83 (0.64) 5.73 (0.64)  
CLS valence 1.21 (1.02) 1.26 (0.78) 1.29 (1.05) 1.21 (0.80)  
CLS pressure 4.35 (1.09) 4.54 (1.00) 4.57 (1.09) 4.39 (1.01)  
CLS ability 6.15 (0.81) 6.21 (0.72) 6.33 (0.70) 6.11 (0.78)  
ILS typicality 126.22 (59.3) 147.42 (74.3) 125.10 (63.7) 144.76 (70.4)  
ILS importance 5.88 (0.66) 5.93 (0.71) 5.97 (0.70) 5.87 (0.68)  
ILS valence 0.71 (1.05) 1.15 (0.99) 0.62 (1.12) 1.13 (0.95)  
ILS pressure 4.03 (1.29) 3.69 (1.07) 4.29 (1.25) 3.60 (1.07)  
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Table 2.5. Mean emotional valence ratings (and standard deviations) of subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups for typical individual life story (ILS) events. 
ILS event Subclinical PTSD Non-PTSD  
Marriage 2.45 (1.04) 1.92 (1.16)  
University graduation 1.50 (1.38) 2.15 (1.12)  
Fall in love / first kiss 0.45 (1.86) 1.64 (1.21)  
Begin university 0.79 (1.95) 1.56 (1.23)  
Begin primary school 0.00 (1.87) 1.00 (1.53)  
Major achievement 2.32 (1.12) 2.10 (0.94)  
Settle on career 1.73 (1.35) 1.94 (1.30)  
Making a long journey 1.88 (1.36) 1.89 (1.31)  
Peer groups / friendships -0.13 (2.34) 0.72 (2.09)  























Tables - 321 
 
 
Table 2.6. The number and percentage of mentions of Cultural Life Script events (on the CLS task), 
and percentage that rated each event as typical (on the CLS knowledge task). Asterisk (*) denotes 
categories that were not considered part of the Malaysian Cultural Life Script according to Janssen 
and Haque (2018), whereas dashed line denotes the 4% threshold of Berntsen and Rubin (2004).  
Category Mentions (N) Mentions (%) Typical (%) 
Marriage 120 54.30 89.57 
Begin childcare / kindergarten 86 38.91 86.73 
University graduation 78 35.29 90.52 
First full-time job 76 34.39 88.63 
Having children 75 33.94 86.26 
Begin university 72 32.58 92.89 
Birth (Own)* 72 32.58 89.57 
Begin primary school 70 31.67 91.00 
Fall in love / first kiss 61 27.60 89.57 
Death (Own) 49 22.17 89.10 
Beginning high school 44 19.91 90.52 
Death of parents 42 19.00 91.94 
Retirement 42 19.00 86.26 
Adolescents / puberty 39 17.65 93.84 
Major achievement 37 16.74 92.89 
First birthday 32 14.48 80.57 
Adulthood* 30 13.57 96.21 
Learning to talk / first words 30 13.57 91.00 
Learning to walk / first steps 30 13.57 91.47 
Making a long journey 30 13.57 78.67 
Peer groups / friendships 25 11.31 92.89 
Settle on career 25 11.31 82.94 
High school graduation 24 10.86 87.68 
Buying house or other property 22 9.95 79.15 
Engagement / proposal* 16 7.24 86.26 
First play friend 15 6.79 67.30 
Major failure* 14 6.33 82.46 
First part-time job* 12 5.43 72.51 
Meeting future partner 11 4.98 89.57 
Serious illness (Own) 11 4.98 62.09 
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Death of grandparents* 10 4.52 87.68 
First rejection / heartbreak 10 4.52 80.09 
Children leave house / empty nest 9 4.07 69.19 
Eighteenth birthday* 9 4.07 68.25 
Twenty-first birthday* 9 4.07 75.83 
Important promotion at work 8 3.62 77.25 
Leave parents' / childhood home 8 3.62 85.31 
Birth of younger sibling* 7 3.17 68.25 
End primary school 7 3.17 75.36 
First sexual experience 7 3.17 80.57 
Having grandchildren 7 3.17 73.46 
Accident 6 2.71 67.77 
Death of sibling or friend 6 2.71 84.83 
Learning to cycle or swim* 6 2.71 71.09 
Getting a pet* 5 2.26 56.87 
Problems at work* 5 2.26 78.67 
Take post-graduate or professional courses* 5 2.26 56.87 
Obtaining driver’s license 4 1.81 82.94 
First tooth / teething* 3 1.36 72.51 
Death of partner* 2 0.90 76.30 
Hajj / pilgrimage* 2 0.90 25.12 
Become an aunt / uncle* 1 0.45 62.09 
Learning to read and write* 1 0.45 89.10 
Moving to another house* 1 0.45 76.30 
Problems at home* 1 0.45 78.67 
Divorce (Own)* 0 0.00 32.23 
Divorce of parents* 0 0.00 39.81 
Serious illness of parents* 0 0.00 65.88 
Sixteenth birthday* 0 0.00 54.03 
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Table 2.7. Means (and standard deviations) of subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, for measures of cultural life script (CLS). 
Variable Subclinical Dep Non-Dep Subclinical PTSD Non-PTSD  
CLS typicality 185.97 (66.4) 170.19 (72.8) 175.13 (69.4) 180.76 (70.1)  
Total typical CLS events 47.71 (8.10) 44.76 (8.86) 47.77 (9.07) 45.40 (8.15)  
Accuracy of typical CLS 29.96 (4.65) 28.76 (5.29) 29.84 (5.42) 29.12 (4.69)  
Accuracy of atypical CLS 7.26 (3.86) 9.00 (3.99) 7.07 (4.07) 8.71 (3.85)  
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Table 3.1. Correlations between depression, trauma, memory specificity, and the CaR-FA-X components during minimal instructions AMT. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Depression 20.87 9.91 - -.74*** -.22* .13 -.01 .14 .20* -.08 .54*** .51*** .08 -.07 
2. Trauma 25.24 15.15  - -.20* .10 -.04 .09 .26** -.10 .59*** .64*** .13 -.23* 
3. Specific memories 4.47 2.01   - -.55*** -.07 -.67*** -.47*** -.12 -.16 -.09 .02 -.10 
4. OGM 5.92 1.87    - .71*** .25** -.14 -.33*** .12 -.04 -.03 .05 
5. Categorical memories 3.64 2.11     - -.51*** -.01 -.21* .01 -.07 -.06 .07 
6. Extended memories 2.28 1.54      - -.16 -.11 .13 .05 .05 -.04 
7. Semantic associations 0.97 1.34       - -.13 .16 .17 -.00 -.03 
8. Omissions 0.64 1.03        - -.11 .01 .02 .13 
9. Rumination 23.69 5.67         - .44*** .09 .00 
10. Avoidant coping 28.61 7.19          - -.01 -.08 
11. Inhibition 0.00 1.87           - .04 
12. Final span 7.39 1.41            - 
*p ≤ .05, **≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001
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Table 3.2. Means (and standard deviations) of subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, for measures for memory specificity and CaR-FA-X 
components during minimal instructions AMT. 
Memory Specificity Subclinical Dep Non-Dep Subclinical PTSD Non-PTSD 
Specific 4.18 (2.04) 4.75 (1.96) 3.82 (2.12) 4.73 (1.92) 
OGM 6.23 (1.74) 5.64 (1.96) 6.21 (1.65) 5.81 (1.95) 
Categorical 3.95 (2.06) 3.36 (2.14) 3.82 (1.85) 3.58 (2.21) 
Extended 2.28 (1.78) 2.28 (1.29) 2.39 (1.92) 2.24 (1.38) 
Semantic association 1.07 (1.40) 0.87 (1.25) 1.48 (1.70) 0.76 (1.12) 
Omission 0.53 (0.89) 0.74 (1.14) 0.48 (1.00) 0.69 (1.04) 
Rumination 24.84 (5.82) 21.51 (4.72) 27.67 (5.02) 22.14 (5.15) 
Avoidant coping 30.09 (7.39) 25.83 (5.96) 34.39 (8.70) 26.36 (5.00) 
Final span 7.40 (1.43) 7.37 (1.41) 6.85 (1.35) 7.60 (1.39) 
Inhibition 0.12 (2.28) -0.21 (0.61) 0.40 (3.36) -0.15 (0.71) 
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Table 3.3. Correlations between depression, trauma, memory specificity, and the CaR-FA-X components during specific instructions AMT. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Depression 20.45 10.94 - .79*** -.17* .19* .17* .10 .08 -.10 .59*** .41*** .05 -.03 
2. Trauma 27.35 16.73  - -.21* .22** .22** .11 .12 -.14 .65*** .56*** .05 -.11 
3. Specific memories 6.90 2.51   - -.78*** -.59*** -.55*** -.42*** -.25** -.14 -.12 .06 .08 
4. OGM 3.80 2.21    - .73*** .73*** -.09 -.15 .16 .18* -.06 -.02 
5. Categorical memories 1.81 1.52     - .06 .02 -.16 .13 .16 -.03 -.15 
6. Extended memories 1.99 1.51      - -.14 -.06 .11 .11 -.06 .13 
7. Semantic associations 0.80 1.29       - -.04 .10 .02 .04 -.12 
8. Omissions 0.50 1.00        - -.13 -.13 -.06 -.01 
9. Rumination  24.12 5.75         - .49*** .08 .01 
10. Avoidant coping 28.77 6.38          - .15 .01 
11. SSRT 189.23 110.19           - -.02 
12. Working memory 0.00 1.48            - 
*p ≤ .05, **≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001
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Table 3.4. Means (and standard deviations) of subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and 
subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups, for measures for memory specificity and CaR-FA-X 
components during specific instructions AMT.  
Memory Specificity Subclinical Dep Non-Dep Subclinical PTSD Non-PTSD 
Specific 6.65 (2.58) 7.12 (2.44) 6.26 (2.52) 7.29 (2.43) 
OGM 4.14 (2.33) 3.50 (2.06) 4.30 (2.22) 3.49 (2.16) 
Categorical 2.05 (1.56) 1.61 (1.46) 2.17 (1.67) 1.59 (1.38) 
Extended 2.09 (1.50) 1.89 (1.53) 2.13 (1.40) 1.90 (1.58) 
Semantic association 0.82 (1.33) 0.78 (1.25) 1.08 (1.48) 0.63 (1.13) 
Omission 0.40 (0.86) 0.59 (1.10) 0.36 (0.86) 0.59 (1.07) 
Rumination 27.15 (4.71) 21.46 (5.26) 27.60 (4.87) 21.98 (5.20) 
Avoidant coping 30.80 (6.72) 26.99 (5.52) 32.45 (6.64) 26.50 (5.05) 
SSRT 196.45 (59.6) 182.88 (140.5) 196.70 (62.3) 185.86 (131.5) 
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Table 4.1. Means (and standard deviations) of phenomenology of recent and remote positive and 
negative memories. 
Phenomenology Recent positive Recent negative Remote positive Remote negative  
Age (months) 14.92 (10.7) 14.81 (11.6) 59.68 (37.9) 70.80 (44.5)  
Psychological distance 21.55 (7.73) 19.59 (8.30) 14.44 (8.41) 14.29 (8.23)  
Recollective experience 5.06 (1.55) 4.66 (1.63) 4.01 (1.63) 3.98 (1.69)  
Field perspective 5.34 (1.59) 5.23 (1.61) 4.29 (1.79) 4.37 (1.84)  
Observer perspective 3.35(1.98) 3.00 (1.83) 3.62 (1.92) 3.63 (1.92)  
Emotional intensity 2.40 (0.74) 2.35 (0.81) 1.98 (0.89) 2.17 (0.85)  
Centrality 24.78 (6.34) 22.74 (7.34) 21.95 (8.15) 22.17 (7.88)  
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Table 4.2. Means (and standard deviations) of memory phenomenology of subclinical depression and non-depressed groups, and subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups.  
Memory Phenomenology Subclinical Dep Non-Dep Subclinical PTSD Non-PTSD  
Recent positive Psychological distance 20.17 (7.45) 22.55 (7.83) 20.32 (8.41) 22.14 (7.36)  
 Recollective experience 5.02 (1.39) 5.10 (1.66) 4.90 (1.70) 5.14 (1.47)  
 Field perspective 5.43 (1.50) 5.27 (1.65) 5.41 (1.52) 5.31 (1.63)  
 Observer perspective 3.51 (1.97) 3.23 (2.00) 3.20 (2.00) 3.42 (1.98)  
 Emotional intensity 2.32 (0.80) 2.45 (0.69) 2.44 (0.67) 2.38 (0.77)  
 Centrality 24.43 (6.16) 25.03 (6.49) 25.95 (6.09) 24.21 (6.41)  
Recent negative Psychological distance 21.28 (8.07) 18.36 (8.31) 21.44 (8.61) 18.69 (8.06)  
 Recollective experience 5.02 (1.54) 4.40 (1.66) 5.00 (1.79) 4.49 (1.53)  
 Field perspective 5.47 (1.53) 5.05 (1.66) 5.66 (1.53) 5.02 (1.68)  
 Observer perspective 2.91 (1.68) 3.07 (1.94) 2.59 (1.80) 3.20 (1.82)  
 Emotional intensity 2.58 (0.69) 2.18 (0.86) 2.54 (0.75) 2.26 (0.83)  
 Centrality 24.38 (7.04) 21.55 (7.37) 25.34 (7.21) 21.48 (7.11)  
Remote positive Psychological distance 14.30 (7.60) 14.53 (9.00) 13.63 (8.15) 14.82 (8.54)  
 Recollective experience 4.06 (1.54) 3.97 (1.72) 3.71 (1.55) 4.15 (1.67)  
 Field perspective 4.45 (1.67) 4.16 (1.88) 4.32 (1.81) 4.27 (1.80)  
 Observer perspective 3.43 (1.93) 3.75 (1.92) 3.49 (2.03) 3.68 (1.88)  
 Emotional intensity 1.89 (0.85) 2.05 (0.93) 1.88 (0.81) 2.04 (0.93)  
 Centrality 21.38 (7.32) 22.37 (8.72) 22.61 (7.05) 21.64 (8.65)  
Remote negative Psychological distance 15.36 (8.91) 13.51 (7.67) 15.83 (9.10) 13.54 (7.73)  
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 Recollective experience 4.09 (1.71) 3.89 (1.68) 3.95 (1.83) 3.99 (1.63)  
 Field perspective 4.72 (1.75) 4.12 (1.88) 4.46 (1.95) 4.33 (1.80)  
 Observer perspective 3.70 (1.99) 3.58 (1.88) 3.78 (2.12) 3.55 (1.82)  
 Emotional intensity 2.30 (0.70) 2.08 (0.94) 2.39 (0.63) 2.07 (0.92)  
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Table 4.3. Correlations between depression, trauma, emotion regulation, and the memory 
phenomenology of recent positive and recent negative memories. 
   Psychological distance  
Variable Depression Trauma Recent positive Recent negative 
Recent positive     
          Recollective experience -.04 -.03 .66*** - 
          Field perspective .01 .06 .39*** - 
          Observer perspective .03 -.06 -.11 - 
          Emotional intensity -.08 -.03 .23* - 
          Centrality -.01 .17 .18* - 
Recent negative     
          Recollective experience .20* .20* - .60*** 
          Field perspective .12 .18* - .19* 
          Observer perspective -.05 -.12 - -.06 
          Emotional intensity .21* .24** - .03 
          Centrality .18* .29*** - .21* 
Cognitive reappraisal -.34*** -.29*** .09 -.08 
Expressive supression .27** .36*** -.21* .02 
*p ≤ .05, **≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001






Figure 2.1. CLS characteristics in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. No differences between subclinical depression and non-
depressed groups were found in the CLS characteristics. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 




Figure 2.2. CLS and ILS typicality in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. * = significant differences between the subclinical 
depression and non-depressed groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 2.3. CLS characteristics in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. No differences between subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups 
were found in the CLS characteristics. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 2.4. CLS and ILS typicality in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. * = significant differences between the subclinical PTSD and 
non-PTSD groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 2.5. ILS characteristics in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. * = significant differences between the subclinical depression 
and non-depressed groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 2.6. ILS characteristics in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. * = significant differences between the subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 2.7. CLS typicality and accuracy in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. * = significant differences between the subclinical 
depression and non-depressed groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 2.8. CLS typicality and accuracy in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. * = significant differences between the subclinical PTSD 
and non-PTSD groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 3.1. Mean memory specificity in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups when minimal instructions were given in the AMT. No 








Figure 3.2. Mean memory specificity in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups when minimal instructions were given in the AMT. * = 
significant differences between the subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 3.3. Mean memory specificity when minimal instructions and specific instructions were given in the AMT. * = significant differences 
between minimal instructions and specific instructions. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 




Figure 3.4. Mean memory specificity in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups when specific instructions were given in the AMT. No 
differences between subclinical depression and non-depressed groups were found in the memory specificity categories. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
 





Figure 3.5. Mean memory specificity in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups when specific instructions were given in the AMT. * = 
significant differences between the subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 





Figure 4.1. Psychological distance of memory in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. * = significant differences between the 
subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 





Figure 4.2. Psychological distance of memory in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. No differences between subclinical PTSD and non-
PTSD groups were found in the psychological distance of memories. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 





Figure 4.3. Psychological distance of positive and negative memories in subclinical depression and non-depressed groups. There was a 
significant interaction of depression and memory valence on psychological distance. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 





Figure 4.4. Psychological distance of positive and negative memories in subclinical PTSD and non-PTSD groups. There was a significant 
interaction of trauma and memory valence on psychological distance. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 






Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) (Lovibond, 1995) 
Instructions: Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates 
how much the statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0 Did not apply to me at all 
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1. I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things 0 1 2 3 
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3 
3. I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0 1 2 3 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0 1 2 3 
5. I just couldn't seem to get going 0 1 2 3 
6. I tended to over-react to situations 0 1 2 3 
7. I had a feeling of shakiness (e.g., legs going to give way) 0 1 2 3 
8. I found it difficult to relax 0 1 2 3 
9. I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most 
relieved when they ended 
0 1 2 3 
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0 1 2 3 
11. I found myself getting upset rather easily 0 1 2 3 
12. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0 1 2 3 
13. 
14. 
I felt sad and depressed     
I found myself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way 
(e.g., lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting) 
0 1 2 3 
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15. I had a feeling of faintness 0 1 2 3 
16. I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything 0 1 2 3 
17. I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0 1 2 3 
18. I felt that I was rather touchy 0 1 2 3 
19. I perspired noticeably (e.g., hands sweaty) in the absence of high 
temperatures or physical exertion 
0 1 2 3 
20. I felt scared without any good reason 0 1 2 3 























PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5) (Weathers et al., 2013) 
Instructions: Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have in response to a very 
stressful experience. Please read each problem carefully and then circle one of the numbers to 
the right to indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem in the past month. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0 Not at all 
1 A little bit 
2 Moderately 
3 Quite a bit 
4 Extremely 
 
In the past month, how much were you bothered by: 
 
1. Repeated, disturbing, and unwanted memories of the stressful 
experience?  
0 1 2 3 4 
2. Repeated, disturbing dreams of the stressful experience?  0 1 2 3 4 
3. Suddenly feeling or acting as if the stressful experience were 
actually happening again (as if you were actually back there 
reliving it)?  
0 1 2 3 4 
4. Feeling very upset when something reminded you of the 
stressful experience?  
0 1 2 3 4 
5. Having strong physical reactions when something reminded you 
of the stressful experience (for example, heart pounding, trouble 
breathing, sweating)?  
0 1 2 3 4 
6. Avoiding memories, thoughts, or feelings related to the stressful 
experience?  
0 1 2 3 4 
7. Avoiding external reminders of the stressful experience (for 
example, people, places, conversations, activities, objects, or 
situations)?  
0 1 2 3 4 
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8. Trouble remembering important parts of the stressful 
experience?  
0 1 2 3 4 
9. Having strong negative beliefs about yourself, other people, or 
the world (for example, having thoughts such as: I am bad, there 
is something seriously wrong with me, no one can be trusted, the 
world is completely dangerous)?  
0 1 2 3 4 
10. Blaming yourself or someone else for the stressful experience or 
what happened after it?  
0 1 2 3 4 
11. Having strong negative feelings such as fear, horror, anger, 
guilt, or shame?  
0 1 2 3 4 
12. Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy?  0 1 2 3 4 
13. 
14. 
Feeling distant or cut off from other people?  0 1 2 3 4 
Trouble experiencing positive feelings (for example, being 
unable to feel happiness or have loving feelings for people close 
to you)?  
0 1 2 3 4 
15. Irritable behavior, angry outbursts, or acting aggressively?  0 1 2 3 4 
16. Taking too many risks or doing things that could cause you 
harm?  
0 1 2 3 4 
17. Being “superalert” or watchful or on guard?  0 1 2 3 4 
18. Feeling jumpy or easily startled?  0 1 2 3 4 
19. Having difficulty concentrating?  0 1 2 3 4 












Individualism and Collectivism Scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) 
Instructions: For each statement below, please rate how often you feel the way described by 
use the scale below and writing a number between 1 and 9 in the space provided. 
 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7----------8----------9 
       Never or         Moderately             Always or 
  Definitely No              Definitely Yes 
 
1. I'd rather depend on myself than others.  _____ 
2. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.  _____ 
3. It is important that I do my job better than others.  _____ 
4. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.  _____ 
5. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.  _____ 
6. The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.   _____ 
7. Winning is everything.  _____ 
8. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I 
want.  
_____ 
9. I often do “my own thing”.  _____ 
10. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.  _____ 
11. Competition is the law of nature.  _____ 
12. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are 
required.  
_____ 
13. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.  _____ 
14. I feel good when I cooperate with others.  _____ 
15. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.  _____ 
16. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.  _____ 
 
  




Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977) 
Instructions: Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please tell me how 
often you have felt this way during the past week. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0 Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day) 
1 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
2 Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days) 
3 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me. 0 1 2 3 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 0 1 2 3 
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family 
or friends. 
0 1 2 3 
4. I felt I was just as good as other people. 0 1 2 3 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 0 1 2 3 
6. I felt depressed. 0 1 2 3 
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort. 0 1 2 3 
8. I felt hopeful about the future. 0 1 2 3 
9. I thought my life had been a failure. 0 1 2 3 
10. I felt fearful. 0 1 2 3 
11. My sleep was restless. 0 1 2 3 
12. I was happy. 0 1 2 3 
13. 
14. 
I talked less than usual. 0 1 2 3 
I felt lonely. 0 1 2 3 
15. People were unfriendly. 0 1 2 3 
16. I enjoyed life. 0 1 2 3 
17. I had crying spells.  0 1 2 3 
18. I felt sad. 0 1 2 3 
19. I felt that people dislike me. 0 1 2 3 
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Emotional valence and intensity values of word cues (Warriner et al., 2013) 
Cue Word Valence Intensity 
Satisfied 7.16 3.95 
Calm 6.89 1.67 
Relaxed 7.25 2.49 
Happy 8.47 6.05 
Excited 8.11 6.43 
Surprised 6.57 5.95 
Bored 2.95 3.65 
Sad 2.10 3.49 
Depressed 2.27 4.25 
Distressed 3.38 6.28 
Afraid 2.25 5.12 
Angry  2.53 6.20 
Note. For valence, values closer to 9 indicate stronger positive valence, whereas values closer 
to 0 indicate stronger negative valence. For intensity, values closer to 9 indicate stronger 











































Stimuli used in the Digit Span 
Span Trial Digits 
Practice  1 1    4 
 2 8    3 
2 1 2    9 
 2 7    5  
3 1 9    3    1 
 2 5    2    7  
4 1 6    1    3    8 
 2 4    9    5    2 
5 1 3    6    2    8    1  
 2 7    5    9    1    4 
6 1 2    8    4    6    3    7 
 2 9    2    6    3    1    5  
7 1 8    3    5    4    7    1    6 
 2 4    7    2    6    8    5    9  
8 1 1    9    4    8    2    7    6    3 
 2 5    7    1    3    9    4    2    6 
9 1 3    9    6    2    4    7    1    5    8 




































































Ruminative Response Scale – Short Form (RRS-SF; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
Instructions: People think and do many different things when they feel sad or stressed. 
Please read each of the items below and indicate how often you think or do each one when 
you feel down or sad or depressed. Please indicate what you GENERALLY DO, not what 
you think you should do. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
1 Almost never 
2 Sometimes 
3 Often 
4 Almost always 
 
1. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 1 2 3 4 
2. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed 1 2 3 4 
3. Think “Why do I always react this way?” 1 2 3 4 
4. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way 1 2 3 4 
5. Write down what you are thinking about and analyze it 1 2 3 4 
6. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 1 2 3 4 
7. Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” 1 2 3 4 
8. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?” 1 2 3 4 
9. Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are 
depressed 
1 2 3 4 











COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989) 
Instructions: We are interested in how people respond when they confront difficult or 
stressful events in their lives. There are lots of ways to try to deal with stress. This 
questionnaire asks you to indicate what you generally do and feel, when you experience 
stressful events. Obviously, different events bring out somewhat different responses, but 
think about what you usually do when you are under a lot of stress. Then respond to each of 
the following items by circling a number for each, using the response choices listed just 
below. Please try to respond to each item separately in your mind from each other 
item. Choose your answers thoughtfully, and make your answers as true FOR YOU as you 
can. Please answer every item. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers, so choose the most 
accurate answer for YOU--not what you think "most people" would say or do. Indicate what 
YOU usually do when YOU experience a stressful event.  
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
1 I usually don’t do this at all 
2 I usually do this a little bit 
3 I usually do this a medium amount 
4 I usually do this a lot 
 
1. I turn to work or other substitute activities to take my mind off 
things.  
1 2 3 4 
2. I say to myself “this isn't real.”  1 2 3 4 
3. I admit to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying.  1 2 3 4 
4. I use alcohol or drugs to make myself feel better.  1 2 3 4 
5. I daydream about things other than this.  1 2 3 4 
6. I just give up trying to reach my goal.  1 2 3 4 
7. I try to lose myself for a while by drinking alcohol or taking drugs.  1 2 3 4 
8. I refuse to believe that it has happened.  1 2 3 4 
9. I sleep more than usual.  1 2 3 4 
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10. I drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less.  1 2 3 4 
11. I give up the attempt to get what I want.  1 2 3 4 
12. I pretend that it hasn’t really happened. 1 2 3 4 
13. I go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less.  1 2 3 4 
14. I reduce the amount of effort I’m putting into solving the problem 1 2 3 4 

























































Stimuli used in the Stop Signal Task (de Vries & Geurts, 2014) 
 

































































































Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) (Rubin et al., 2003) 
 




      Not at      Vaguely              Distinctly      As clearly as if it  
      all             were happening  
              right now 
 
1. As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving the original event.        ______ 
2. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind.                                             ______ 
3. As I remember the event, I can see it in my mind.                                               ______ 
4. As I remember the event, I or other people are talking.                                       ______ 
5. As I remember the event, I know its spatial layout.                                             ______ 
6. As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then.                ______ 
7. As I remember the event, I can recall the setting where it occurred.                   ______ 
 




                Not at all        Completely 
 
8. As I remember the event, I see it from my own eyes.                                          ______ 
9. As I remember the event, I see it as an observer or outsider.                               ______ 
 
Use the scale below for the following questions, and write a number between 1 and 7 in the 
space provided. 
 




      Not at      Vaguely              Distinctly          As much as  
      all                 any memory  
 
10. Sometimes people know something happened to them without being able to     ______ 
actually remember it. As I think about the event, I can actually remember it  
rather than just knowing that it happened.  
11. As I remember the event, it comes to me in words.                                             ______ 
12. As I remember the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it                  ______ 
happened, that I am a subject in it again, rather than an outside observer tied  
to the present.  
13. As I remember the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a                ______ 
coherent story or episode and not as an isolated fact, observation, or scene.  
14. This memory is significant for my life because it imparts an important              ______ 
message for me or represents an anchor, critical juncture, or a turning point.  
 
The following questions had unique scales. Circle a response for questions with scales or 
multiple choice options, and fill in the blanks for questions that have empty spaces.  
  
15. Since it happened, I have thought or talked about this event.  
 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7 
          Not               As often as any  
         at all                       event in my life 
 
16. Please date the memory (month/day/year) as accurately as you can. Please fill in a 
month, day, and year even if you must estimate. If the memory extended over a period 
of time, report the approximate middle of the period. 
___________________________________________ 
 
17. To the best of your knowledge, is the memory of an event that occurred once at one 
particular time and place, a summary or merging of many similar or related events, or 
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for events that occurred over a fairly continuous extended period of time lasting more 





18. Rate the emotional intensity of this event. 
 
(-3)-----------(-2)-----------(-1)-----------0-----------1-----------2-----------3 
   Extremely                          Neutral        Extremely  























Psychological Distance Scale (Ross & Wilson, 2002) 
 
1. How long ago does the event feel? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9-------10-------11 
       like a very                   like  
    long time ago              yesterday 
 
2. How far away does the event feel? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9-------10-------11 
    very distant              very close  
     
3. How close do you feel today to your ‘past self’ in the event? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9-------10-------11 
















Centrality of Event Scale – short version (CES) (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) 
Instructions: Please think back upon the most stressful or traumatic event in your life and 
answer the following questions in an honest and sincere way, by writing a number between 1 
and 5 in the space provided. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Totally disagree      Totally agree 
 
1. I feel that this event has become part of my identity.  _____ 
2. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself 
and the world.  
_____ 
3. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story.  _____ 
4. This event has coloured the way I think and feel about other experiences.     _____ 
5. This event permanently changed my life.  _____ 
6. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future.  _____ 




















Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003) 
Instructions: We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in 
particular, how you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions 
below involve two distinct aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, 
or what you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your 
emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions 
may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer 
using the following scale: 
 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7 
      Strongly            Neutral     Strongly  
      disagree         agree 
 
1. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I’m thinking about. 
_____ 
2. I keep my emotions to myself.  _____ 
3. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I 
change what I’m thinking about. 
_____ 
4. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.  _____ 
5. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a 
way that helps me stay calm. 
_____ 
6. I control my emotions by not expressing them.  _____ 
7. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation. 
_____ 
8. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m 
in.  
_____ 
9. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.  _____ 
10. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation. 
_____ 
 
